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This dissertation proposes to explain how militarization during the turn of the 
twentieth century affected relations in the transnational West Texas region between 
Mexicans and Anglos and between the United States and Mexico.  The study seeks to 
demonstrate that militarization complicated these relations and deepened racial and 
international divisions.  Within this discussion, the study will also demonstrate that the 
“border troubles” of the early twentieth century gave shape to an authority structure that 
was composed of border institutions that sought to pacify the region with ever-increasing 
vigilance and punitive measures.  The result of such measures was a disciplined society 
that reinforced racial segregation in towns and cities along the border, specifically El 
Paso. 
A case study approach is utilized to highlight specific events, institutions and 
public figures that contributed to the formation of authority in El Paso.  They include the 
National Guard, the 1916 El Paso race riot, the Texas Rangers, and the Border Patrol.  
 ix
The affects of developing authority and their institutions on race relations along the U.S.-
Mexican divide are addressed.  Historians have discussed various aspects of the history of 
immigration, race, and labor in the border region.  However, they have given little 
attention to militarization and the emergence of authority in the integration of Mexicans 
and Mexican Americans into American society in the border region.  Militarization of the 
U.S.-Mexican border between 1890 and 1924 contributed to the definition of racial and 
ethnic relations.  
This study examines the history of the West Texas region while focusing on the 
changing relationship between the Mexican-origin community and larger society.  The 
general intent is to demonstrate that the militarization of the region complicated relations 
at the same time that it established institutions that defined the new political structure in 
the border region.  The dissertation also studies how the history of Mexican Americans 
was tied to the special relations between the communities along the border.  This 
transnational relationship serves as a vantage point from which to study national and 
regional histories and an emphasis on race allows this study to explain the extent to 
which militarization affected social relations in the border region. 
 x
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This explains why the character of the movement is both desperate and redemptive…they mean that 
the people refuse all outside help, every imported scheme, every idea lacking some profound 
relationship to their intimate feelings, and that instead they turn to themselves. This desperation, this 
refusal to be saved by an alien project, is characteristic of the person who rejects all consolidation and 
shuts himself up in his private world: he is alone. At the same moment, however, his solitude becomes 
an effort at communion. Once again, despair and solitude, redemption and communion are equivalent 
terms. –Octavio Paz, El Laberinto de la Soledad 
 
Introduction 
I remember the twenty-mile trek from Anthony, Texas to El Paso.  My brothers 
and I attended a small all-male Catholic high school nestled near the downtown district.  
One morning, as we approached the stretch of highway that hugs the University of Texas 
at El Paso, I noticed that the city was preparing for war.  War, not in the traditional sense, 
but a long line of Border Patrol trucks had positioned themselves side by side along the 
banks of the Rio Grande to guard against what some people along the border call an 
“immigrant invasion.”  It was 1993, the El Paso Border Patrol Chief, Silvestre Reyes, had 
initiated Operation Blockade, later renamed Operation Hold the Line.  The policy called 
for border agents to stand watch at the boundary line to deter immigrants from crossing 
illegally into the country.1  Mixed feelings and thoughts raced through my mind but I 
dismissed them as we found our usual parking spot in front of the Stanton Street entrance 
of Cathedral High School.  I never forgot that image.  
This dissertation began on that day in 1993.  Since then I have tried to understand 
as much as I can about the issue of immigration from Mexico, its causes and 
explanations.  Now that I have the opportunity to systematically expand this 
                                                 
1 John L. Martin, “Can We Control the Border? A Look at Recent Efforts in San Diego, El Paso, and 
Nogales,” Center for Immigration Studies, Washington, D.C., May 1994. 
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understanding, I have chosen to address the history of the West Texas region, in particular 
its early formative history of racial and international conflict, during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, when U.S. officials sought to pacify the area and 
incorporate it into the national socio-economy.  I propose to explain how militarization 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries affected enduring relations 
between Mexicans and Anglos and, to a lesser degree, the relations between the United 
States and Mexico.2  Border scholar, Timothy Dunn, defines militarization as the use of 
military rhetoric and ideology, as well as military tactics, strategy, and forces.3  For this 
study, militarization will focus on the latter part of the definition and, more specifically, 
the introduction of local, state, and federal authoritative institutions in West Texas that 
were responding to local and international circumstances.  The second part of the study 
demonstrates that militarization complicated these relations and deepened racial and 
international divisions.  Within this analysis, I also demonstrate that the “border troubles” 
of the early twentieth century gave shape to an authority structure that was composed of 
border institutions that sought to pacify the region with ever-increasing vigilance and 
punitive measures.  The result of such measures was a disciplined society that reinforced 
racial segregation in towns and cities along the border, especially in El Paso. 
I contend that the history of border areas cannot be fully understood without 
examining their early militarization and the relationship of this formative development to 
social relations in local communities.  More specifically, I suggest that the history of the 
relationship between law enforcement, military, civil and political institutions, and local 
                                                 
2 The primary geographic focus of the dissertation is El Paso and Ciudad Juárez.  The broad political, 
social, and commercial significance of the twin border cities during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, however, require a broader geographical setting.  This is why I use the term West Texas.  It 
incorporates the various settlements surrounding El Paso, Texas. Moreover, I use the term Mexicans to 
identify all peoples of Mexican-origin regardless of citizenship.  Citizenship will be noted when necessary 
to distinguish between Mexican nationals and Mexican Americans.  
3 Timothy Dunn, The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border 1978-1992: Low Intensity Conflict Doctrine 
Comes Home (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1996), p. 3. 
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communities in the border region around El Paso contributed to the building of two 
separate, distinct, and racially divided communities.  This occurred at two levels, within 
El Paso and between El Paso and Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico.  The study spans 
the period between 1895 and 1924.  During this time, West Texas and El Paso 
experienced intense militarization efforts by local, state, and federal authorities who were 
responding to local and international circumstances.  
I utilize a case study approach to highlight specific events, institutions and public 
figures that took part in militarizing the region and in establishing U.S. authority in El 
Paso.  They include the U.S. Army, National Guard, the 1916 El Paso race riot, the Texas 
Rangers, and the Border Patrol.  Scholars have addressed various aspects of the history of 
immigration, race, and labor in the border region; however, they have given little 
attention to militarization and the emergence of authority in the integration of Mexicans 
and Mexican Americans into American society in the border region.  A case study 
approach allows for a close examination of both common and unique experiences by each 
institution in the region.  Moreover, a narrowed lens into each agency reveals how the 
community and social relations were affected and varied between authority figures, 
Anglos, and Mexican residents.  The complex and varied experiences among authority 
figures as well as its affect on social relations underlines the tentative nature of this work.   
Militarization of the U.S.-Mexican border during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries—between 1895 and 1924—was an important experience in local and 
international affairs.  It helped define social relations in racial terms.  Moreover, 
militarization reveals the extent to which local, state, and federal officials were willing to 
undertake to bring order to a highly chaotic situation.  The violence spilling over from 
Mexico and unstable relations between Mexico and the United States as well as the 
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increased political and criminal activity on the U.S side of the border represented a 
source of major concern among U.S. officials. 
The dissertation examines the history of the West Texas region while focusing on 
the changing relationship between the Mexican-origin community and larger society.4  A 
principal aim in this study is to demonstrate that the militarization of the region 
complicated and, at times, worsened relations between Anglos and Mexicans and to a 
lesser extent the United States and Mexico. At the same time, it established institutions 
that defined the new political structure.  The dissertation also acknowledges the 
transnational character of the history of Mexican Americans.  The binational ties that 
Mexican communities maintained across the border serve as a vantage point from which 
to study national and regional histories as well as a basis for understanding Mexican 
identity and Anglo concerns at the turn of the century. 
The study also addresses the history of Mexican Americans in West Texas as well 
as their relationship with other communities throughout the state and across the 
international border.  Their continuous interaction suggests that despite long distances 
and an increasingly patrolled border, they shared experiences and often responded to 
these experiences in like manner.  The study gives special attention to conflict between 
Mexicans and Anglos, especially the role that the Mexican Revolution played in 
encouraging the former to resist their social domination and in encouraging the latter to 
call for punitive measures against immigrants and political exiles.  Finally, the 
dissertation will discuss race and class in defining this conflictual relationship. 
This study is a history of institutions that militarized West Texas, especially El 
Paso.  A variety of different federal, state, and local resources are utilized in this study.  
However, heavy emphasis is given to state and local records.  At the turn of the twentieth 
                                                 
4 I use the term West Texas to refer to the Big Bend region and El Paso with a passing reference to Ciudad 
Juárez. 
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century, much of the responsibility of law enforcement was entrusted on state and local 
officials.  Therefore, the papers of the Texas Adjutant General and the variety of 
governors that served the state of Texas during the time period were a valuable asset.  In 
addition, local newspapers and oral histories are used extensively to provide a clearer lens 
into local happenings.  The oral histories, more specifically, are the experiences of active 
participants who bore witness to the affects of authority on social relations in West Texas 
and El Paso. 
 
West Texas, Northern Chihuahua, and Authority 
West Texas gives focus to the study primarily because the region and its border 
cities of El Paso and Ciudad Juárez provide a setting for the study of militarization and 
racialized social relations at a time of pronounced international tension and conflict.  El 
Paso and Ciudad Juárez has served as a crossroads for the interchange of culture, politics, 
goods, people, and ideas since the seventeenth century, thanks to their strategic 
geographic location on the north-south axis and their centralized location between the 
Pacific Ocean and Gulf of Mexico. 
Borderlands historians like Oscar Martínez, Wilbert H. Timmons, Charles L. 
Sonnichesen, and Mario García have explained that common threads have joined the 
regions from both sides of the border in a situation of interdependence, despite their 
seeming isolation and the stark economic difference between the cities.  Martínez 
complicates the special nature of the region by stating, “Because one city is an outpost of 
a developing country while the other is at the outer edge of a modern industrial power, 
Juárez and El Paso vividly illustrate two styles of life and starkly define two disparate 
standards of living.”5  The interdependent characteristic of the border region is woven 
                                                 
5 Oscar J. Martínez, Border Boom Town: Ciudad Juárez Since 1848 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1975), p. 4; Wilbert H. Timmons, El Paso: A Borderlands History (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1990); 
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throughout this study; however, as militarization increased in the region divisions became 
increasingly more rigid and reinforced. 
This study was drawn to El Paso and Ciudad Juárez because of the opportunity to 
understand how the transnational setting of West Texas complicated the establishment of 
authority.  Of particular interest was how the isolated nature of the West Texas region 
hampered the process even more.  West Texas existed in a periphery of the United States, 
and its history was intimately tied to the fortunes of another country.  Its peripheral and 
transnational setting encouraged resistance to authority in two general ways.  First of all, 
isolation and the great distance from seats of power and authority bred a frontier society 
that was naturally defensive towards policies and institutions that sought to integrate it 
into the nation state.  Second, the Mexican Revolution, the first social revolution of the 
twentieth century, overflowed into the region and created both local problems in social 
relations and law enforcement, as well as international misunderstanding, conflict, and 
distrust.  One of the consequences was an increase in local tensions.  For example, 
crossing between the two cities and social relations within El Paso became more rigid and 
monitored throughout the early part of the twentieth century as violence escalated and 
distrust intensified between Anglo and Mexican residents. 
The history of the West Texas region as both a point of convergence and 
divergence reveals several common and interdependent traits as well as contradictions 
and instances of resistance against the establishment of authoritarian institutions and the 
national identity that they sought to establish.  To better understand this complexity one 
must examine the authority structure that emerged with militarization and its relationship 
to the area communities and institutions.  More specifically, I suggest that the history of 
the region can be better understood by examining the development of law enforcement as 
                                                                                                                                                 
Charles Leland Sonnichsen, Pass of the North (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1968); Mario Garcia, Desert 
Immigrants: The Mexicans of El Paso, 1880-1920 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). 
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well as military, civil, and political institutions.  This history involved border protection 
and the border community’s support and reaction towards the authority structure during 
the Mexican Revolution and the Progressive and Prohibition Eras, when the region 
experienced incredible growth and conflict.  Moreover, the conflictual social relations 
that resulted underscore the importance of race in defining Anglo and Mexican relations 
as well as relations between El Paso and Ciudad Juárez. 
During the early 1900s, tensions between Anglos and Mexicans worsened as the 
policies of prohibition and immigration were enforced in the area.  State and federal 
institutions increased their presence and played a significant role in enforcing laws that 
locals often disobeyed.  A complex struggle developed as U.S. demand for illegal goods 
and labor escalated and Mexico continued to supply it, thus undermining the integrity and 
effectiveness of law enforcement agencies such as the United States Border Patrol. 
Much of the violence that visited the border region involved the smuggling of 
contraband alcohol as border entrepreneurs sought to avoid the law by producing it in 
Mexico, beyond the view of U.S. officials.  Crossing the contraband alcohol already 
involved major investments and the willingness to import it by any means necessary.  
This resulted in violent confrontations on the international line that often involved 
Mexican officials. 
Mexicans, of course, transported the liquor across the border. Consequentially, 
they were associated with the contraband trade as well as with the related conflict that 
often occurred in the region.  This is one of the reasons why Mexicans came to represent 
the subject “other,” the border resident who seemed to disregard the law and was prone to 
violent measures in pursuing the trade.  In this way, the enforcement of prohibition laws 
in West Texas contributed to the racialization of social relations and the creation of a dual 
society composed of Mexicans and Anglos. 
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Tension and conflict were not the only parts to the story of the development of 
authoritarian institutions along the border.  Rapid social and economic development was 
also evident.  Conflict and development, in fact, emerged together during the turn of the 
century as El Paso entered its first phase of modernization.  The city had a reputation as a 
haven for undesirables that included tough cowboys, Mexicans evading arrest in Mexico, 
and criminals.  This led to calls for the establishment of authoritarian institutions to 
ensure the smooth transition into modernity.  The establishment of a civil Americanized 
society was expected in a region that was still being incorporated into the U.S. socio-
economy during the late nineteenth century.  The tension and conflict that resulted from 
the Mexican Revolution and racialized relations on the U.S. side complicated life even 
more and reinforced the call for stability and order.6 
During the Mexican Revolution, numerous revolutionary factions used West 
Texas as a staging point to organize, recruit soldiers, and acquire supplies.  Ciudad 
Juárez, in particular, was a major battleground and a critical link for revolutionaries to 
ship supplies and men to strategic locales.  However, revolutionary activity and violence 
spilled over into the United States and some residents along the international boundary 
experienced incursions on their property by various revolutionary or independent groups.  
Many of the residents and authority figures in the region attributed the depredations to 
Mexicans residing in the United States and the influx of immigrants fleeing the turmoil in 
Mexico. 
The tumultuous state of affairs during the Revolution gave rise to massive 
emigration to the United States beginning in 1910 and continuing through the 1920s.  
Hundreds of thousands of immigrants flooded the U.S.-Mexican border region.  The 
instability in Mexico coincided with economic growth in the American Southwest, 
                                                 
6 Oscar J. Martínez, Troublesome Border (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988), p. 2. 
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accompanied by a tremendous demand for labor.7  Increased immigration from Mexico 
also inspired immigration restrictionists to seek tighter controls of the border.  As growers 
grew increasingly dependent on foreign labor, a system of regulated practices that yielded 
to ambiguous enforcement between the state and employers affected Mexican 
incorporation into the American socio-economy.  The authority structure played a critical 
role in facilitating labor, managing border crises, and defining place for the Mexican in 
the American cultural enclave. 
In defining the emergent authority structure in Far West Texas and northern 
Mexico, I draw on various works, including Marshall W. Meyer’s study of bureaucratic 
authority.  Meyer defines this concept as: 
 
…the authorization or legitimation of a particular person to issue 
commands or obligations that are binding upon other persons (and 
himself) in a particular situation…authority is an attribute that is attached 
to specific positions and roles.8   
His assessment of organization also addresses the circumstance of institutional expansion 
and the continual need to centralize control for optimal efficiency.9  Meyer’s definition of 
centralized organization can be seen in the establishment of formal state and federal 
authority, policy, and institutions along the U.S.-Mexican border.  However, under the 
kind of frontier conditions evident in West Texas during the late nineteenth century, 
Anglo and Mexican residents occasionally challenged effective centralized control.  In 
light of Meyer’s assessment of organization that depends on centralized control, the 
bureaucratic challenges posed by the frontier, such as distance from the center, 
international tensions, conflict, and communication lines often decentralized control.  
                                                 
7 Martínez, Border Boom Town, p. 41. 
8 Marshall W. Meyer, “Two Authority Structures of Bureaucratic Organization,” Administrative Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2 (September, 1968), p. 213. 
9 Ibid, p. 214. 
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Borderlands scholar, Oscar Martínez, expounds on Meyer’s take on the inability of 
traditional institutions to extend their reach effectively into outlying areas by outlining 
the unique context the frontier poses.10  
Martínez contends that the border is viewed from centralized governments and 
institutions as a trouble spot that portrays a breakdown of institutions, social systems and 
legal structures.11  However, it is within this context that the border functions normally, 
according to Martínez.  By nature, its distance from the core spawns independence, 
rebellion, cultural deviation, and lawlessness.  The borderlands, as a peripheral area away 
from the centers of power, prevented traditional institutions from taking hold quickly and 
effectively.  Isolation from economic and political centers played a key role in the 
fundamental breakdown of the state’s influence on the border region.  Martínez further 
explains that this challenge contributed to ad hoc measures by authority figures in local 
border areas:  
 
Isolation, weak institutions, lax administration, and a different economic 
orientation prompt people on the periphery to develop homemade 
approaches to their problems and unconventional means of carrying on 
mutually beneficial relationships across an international boundary.12  
 
The frontier conditions present in West Texas and the distance from centers of power in 
Austin, Texas, and Mexico City prompted local residents and officials to make 
independent decisions separate from the state.  These unique circumstances gave way to 
an independent spirit that was sometimes exercised through acts of resistance and 
conflict.  
                                                 
10 Martínez, Troublesome Border, p. 2. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid.  
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C. Edward Weber brings greater clarity to the development of authority with his 
claim that power arises out of certain circumstances relating to person, position, and 
situation.13  The peripheral status of the U.S.-Mexican border is reflective of Weber’s 
concept of authority.  As events unfolded in West Texas, power was granted and assumed 
to address the circumstances that arose along the region.  For example, “self-appointed” 
authority figures such as vigilante groups and deputized Ranchmen emerged as Texas 
Rangers. This falls squarely into the category of situational authority that Weber 
discusses.  The conflict raging in Mexico, the violence associated with Prohibition, and 
generalized conflict in West Texas provided the context for various authority figures to 
assume power along with the traditional institutions in El Paso.  Meyer and Weber 
provide us with a theoretical snapshot of authority that helps us understand the history of 
border policing and the disciplining of frontier society in the West Texas region.  Ana 
María Alonso offers specificity to the development of authority and power in the specific 
space of the Mexico-United States border region, especially as it relates to Mexican-
Anglo relations.14 
 Alonso argues that the subaltern discourse of protest implicitly recognizes that 
power circulates throughout the social body and is not simply concentrated in 
government structures.  Thus, a culture of warfare is bred and maintained within the 
parameters of the frontier.  Alonso also discusses the cycle of violence and how a frontier 
ethos, military training, and the need for social mobility were perpetuated.  Authority 
                                                 
13 C. Edward Weber, “The Nature of Authority: Comment,” The Journal of the Academy of Management, 
Vol. 4, No. 1 (April 1961), pp. 62-63. 
14 Ana María Alonso, Thread of Blood: Colonialism, Revolution, and Gender on the Mexican Northern 
Frontier (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1995).  
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structures were maintained by force and were critical to the maintenance of power.  
Furthermore, space and isolation contributed to the power shifts along the border.15 
 A closer look at Sebastian de Grazia’s assessment on the subject of authority is 
necessary in order to further Alonso’s argument concerning power.  He situates power 
and the acceptance of authority within the populous.  According to de Grazia the polis 
holds certain purposes in common:  
…they grant authority to whomever they esteem for being able to guide 
them to these ends.  The holder of authority thus is bound by common 
goals and by his desire and capacity to move toward them.16 
If those common goals are compromised then authority over those people is incomplete.  
In other words, the leader and the community must have a common understanding 
regardless of whether the leader is democratically or undemocratically elected. 
 The social setting in the West Texas region was consistent with the Alonso and De 
Grazia theses.  That is, the Texas Rangers, local law enforcement officials, the U.S. Army, 
the Mexican Army, and vigilantes assumed authority positions but had to seek the 
approval of the community.  Since they were unable to garner sufficient and consistent 
support, the resultant violence disrupted authority.  This led to efforts at reorganizing 
authority and centralizing its power which often aggravated tension and conflict.  
Martínez is especially useful in understanding the consequences of this.  He uses blunt 
language to describe them, “if national laws appear unjust or are viewed as impractical in 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
16 Sebastian De Grazia, “What Authority is Not,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 
(June 1959), p. 322. 
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a border context, it becomes culturally acceptable to work around them or ignore them 
altogether.”17  De Grazia adds an important and relevant point: 
In all cases, without respect for a dedication and a capacity related to the 
common good, authority does not exist. Those who dominate without 
esteem may have power, may often have obedience, but authority they 
have not. They are not rulers; they are tyrants, those who cannot lay down 
a rule.18 
The breakdown of a common objective between Mexicans and persons in positions of 
authority in West Texas, especially in El Paso and Ciudad Juárez suggests that various 
law enforcement agencies exercised tyrannical rule in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries and that this undermined their legitimacy and provoked challenges to 
their authority. 
 The conceptual arguments regarding authority and its effect on social relations 
can be seen in West Texas at the turn of the twentieth century.  In addition, the 
circumstances provided by the industrialization of West Texas, the Mexican Revolution, 
and Prohibition demonstrate how authority and social relations responded and changed 
over time.  The coupling of intense events and West Texas’ location along the 
international boundary challenged the effective development of authority and 
complicated social relations between Anglos and Mexicans. 
 The violence of the Mexican Revolution exported the problems of criminality, 
radical political activity, displaced workers and frayed social relations.  This hampered 
the ability of U.S. officials to effectively maintain order and affirm their authority.  The 
conflict that ensued in West Texas, thus assumed a bi-national and racialized nature.  This 
                                                 
17 Martínez, Troublesome Border, p. 2. 
18 De Grazia, “What Authority is Not,” p. 322. 
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is critical for an understanding of the establishment of authority in an unruly frontier 
society like El Paso and Ciudad Juárez in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century. 
 Vigilant measures over Mexican crossings on the border and within Texas became 
more pronounced at the turn of the century.  A number of factors contributed to the 
resultant conflict.  For example, northern Mexico’s economic downturn in the early 1900s 
forced mass migration northward and consequentially saturated labor pools and 
exhausted civil services.  Texas’ progressive reform in the late nineteenth century 
antagonized Mexico as it absorbed much of its vice industry.  Moreover, the criminality 
that ensued with increased ranch incursions, or ranch raids, into Texas made Mexicans a 
threat to Anglo settlement and authority in Texas’ western frontier. 
 The seeds of distrust and animosity between Anglos and Mexicans can be traced 
to the Texas Revolution in 1836 and the Mexican-American War of 1846-1848.  During 
the 1840s and 1850s, authorities such as the Texas Rangers and U.S. Army concentrated 
their efforts along the border region on behalf of the new Anglo settlers, harassing 
Mexican residents and ridding them from the territory.  Mexican obstruction involved 
resistance to the violent transfer of land to Anglo hands.19  The conflicts persisted through 
the turn of the century as Mexicans emerged as an obstacle to Anglo expansion after the 
Indian Wars of the 1880s. 
 The dramatic increase of Mexican immigration, a response to the industrialization 
of the Southwest, also caused problems for places like West Texas.  The immediate effect 
                                                 
19 Julian Samora, Gunpowder Justice: A Reassessment of the Texas Rangers (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1979), p. 2. 
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was significant Mexican population growth on both sides of the border.  This posed 
several problems. For instance, the increase in the labor supply complicated social 
relations as Anglos in urban areas began to complain that the workers recruited for 
agricultural work were entering the cities and posing problems like labor displacement 
and depressed wages.  Although there is no evidence that immigration depressed wages 
or displaced U.S. workers, organized labor made the claim. This, in turn, provoked added 
anti-Mexican feelings that were evident in El Paso.20  However, labor and a changing 
economy at the turn of the century were not the only contributing factors to antagonizing 
feelings toward Mexicans. 
 As the twentieth century began, Ciudad Juárez’s economic base changed from a 
prospering commercial and agricultural hub to a city focused on tourism.21  At the same 
time, Texas’ progressive agenda swept across the state and forced much of El Paso’s vice 
industry to shut down or move south of the border.  Ciudad Juárez consequently came to 
be characterized as the progressive’s immoral “other,” the crude and uncivilized contrast 
to Texas’ and El Paso’s modern self.  The smuggling of contraband during El Paso’s 
progressive reforms reinforced this view of Ciudad Juárez.  It also ushered in a violent 
era.  Increased violence between law enforcement officers and smugglers associated 
criminality and transgressions with the Mexican community as a whole. 
 Armed conflict between Anglo authorities and Mexican residents also contributed 
to the view of the Mexican as a threat.  This began during the later decades of the 
                                                 
20 Martínez, Border Boom Town, pp. 35-36. 
21 Ibid, p. 30. 
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nineteenth century, when gangs of thieves and rustlers flourished in the region.22  Many 
Anglo and Mexican criminals saw the region as a safe haven because of its relative 
isolation and access to the international boundary.  Regardless of the presence of Anglos, 
criminality became associated with the Mexican community.  Their cattle raids and 
killings, directed from Mexico and often inspired by revolutionary thought, increased 
significantly during the early twentieth century and reinforced the view of Mexicans as 
criminals.  Moreover, the Mexican Revolution led to violent encounters between law 
enforcement officials and Mexican residents from both sides of the border.  For example, 
the “Plan de San Diego,” an irredentist movement of 1915-1916 that engulfed Deep 
South Texas in a race war drew much inspiration from the Revolution and its partisans 
received material support from Mexican revolutionaries along the border.23  By the late 
1910s, Mexican residents on both sides of the border were classified as subject “others” 
and designated as a threat to Anglo security and national sovereignty. 
 The establishment of authority on the border consequently faced the challenge of 
transborder conflict.  First, the violence of the Mexican Revolution often spilled over 
onto American soil.  Also, Mexican revolutionaries, such as Francisco Madero and 
Francisco “Pancho” Villa, used American cities as safe havens to plan and organize 
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insurrections.  In addition, revolutionaries such as Villa threatened and seized American 
land holdings and businesses in Mexico.24 
 The enforcement of prohibition laws also contributed to transborder conflict.  The 
Texas Rangers, U.S. Customs officials, and the Border Patrolmen all acknowledged that 
violence in El Paso during 1918-1933 was the most intense and added to the difficulty in 
enforcing policies.  U.S. officials struggled to curb the alcohol smuggling into the United 
States because of lack of resources, including manpower, technology, and the lack of 
cooperation by Mexican officials.  In fact, Mexican officials often aided smugglers by 
serving as scouts and armed guards on the border.  Mexican residents living along the 
river also helped smugglers avoid U.S. law enforcement agents.  Suspected smugglers 
and U.S. law enforcement consistently engaged in gun battles throughout the 1920s.  All 
in all, the El Paso border region provided easy access for smugglers and made it possible 
for them to avoid prosecution.  This constituted a major challenge to state and federal 
authorities. 
 The study focuses on El Paso and Ciudad Juárez because the popular crossing 
became a key point of confluence in the history of immigration, smuggling, and law 
enforcement at the turn of the twentieth century.  This was especially evident in the field 
of immigration.  When El Paso and Ciudad Juarez developed the accoutrements of a 
modern city in the 1880s, the region experienced massive population growth as Anglo 
settlers sought out land and cheap Mexican labor to satisfy the expansion and 
                                                 
24 Most of American capital was invested in mines or related industries, such as smelters.  Most of the 
mines and smelters were in territory controlled by Villa.  However, in March 1915, Villa issued a decree 
that provided for the confiscation of all mining properties that had been abandoned.  The decree affected 
many American business owners since the American government advised all its citizens to leave Mexico 
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development of the railroad and other industries in the area.  Mexican laborers filtered 
through the border seeking job opportunities.  The immigrant flow was facilitated by the 
building of railroads in the 1880s that connected the border cities with each other and 
their respective interiors. 
 El Paso’s development attracted workers and the industrialization of the 
Southwest.  The proximity of the border encouraged the influx of foreign capital and 
facilitated the penetration of Mexican and U.S. products into both markets.25  
Construction companies, for example, depended heavily on Mexican workers, especially 
for common labor as modernization hit the area.26  The industrial boom in El Paso 
required a large number of manual laborers and employers sought Mexicans.  El Paso’s 
large Mexican population and proximity to Ciudad Juárez was believed to be an 
incredible asset to develop numerous industries.27  However, the ready supply of Mexican 
laborers had adverse affects that kept them from full incorporation into the American 
socio-economic enclave. 
 According to scholar, Mario T. Garcia, El Paso’s commercial and semi-industrial 
economy determined the jobs Mexicans acquired in the border city.  The city’s 
dependence on manual labor was subsidized by the large labor pool of Mexicans on both 
sides of the border.  Also, for many employers, Mexicans were thought to be ideal for 
manual labor since they were thought to have no ambition and were willing to work for a 
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low wage.28  These recruitment practices discussed by Garcia channeled workers to the 
lower skilled and lower paying jobs in the developing industries of mining, railroads, and 
agriculture.  Competition for Mexican workers outside the American Southwest also 
increased and placed pressure on the state and federal government to regulate the 
Mexican labor flow according to the needs of regional employers. 
 By the late 1920s, Texas farmers began to move towards a more effective 
regulation of labor flows primarily in response to the recruitment activities of labor 
agents representing Midwestern industrial interests.  Their practices drew increasing 
numbers of Mexican workers away from Southwestern agriculture.  For example, the 
number of Mexicans employed by sixteen railroads in the Chicago-Gary region grew 
steadily throughout the 1920s.  By 1928, Mexicans comprised forty-two percent of the 
railroads’ workforce.29  According to David Montejano, Texas farmers saw their labor 
supply jeopardized as the activities of these “outside” employers threatened to siphon off 
the labor source.30  Texas employers responded by seeking a more regulated practice of 
placing Mexican workers to satisfy the employers’ needs and adopting effective methods 
to control the movement of workers in places like South Texas. 
 Farmers collaborated with the Texas state government to establish the Texas Farm 
Placement Service which used agricultural agents to direct the movement of workers.31  
Collaboration with the state to regulate labor flow did more than satisfy farmers’ needs.  
                                                 
28 Ibid, p. 68. 
29 David Montejano, Anglos and Mexicans in the Making of Texas, 1836-1986 (Austin: The University of 
Texas Press, 1987), pp. 208-209. 
30 Ibid, pp. 209-210. 
31 Ibid, p. 212. 
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It also involved the assignment of Mexicans to lower-skilled and lower-paying jobs in 
agriculture.  In this way, farmers contributed to the overall segregation of Mexicans. 
 Since Mexican immigration is central to this study, it is necessary to discuss and 
incorporate the focus on immigrants as laborers and their impact on social development.  
Scholars such as Juan Gómez-Quiñones and David Montejano have underscored that the 
history of immigration is also the history of workers and that it includes labor issues such 
as work experiences, methods of control, transnational organizing, and independent 
organizations.32  Gómez Quiñones’ ground-breaking historiographical essay is especially 
important.  He provided the earliest argument calling for the study of immigration history 
that went beyond a focus on legislation, its enforcement, and the role that authority 
played.  He also called for the incorporation of race and relations between governments 
and communities.33  This study answers the call and builds on Gómez-Quiñones’ 
argument by analyzing the experiences of each institution involved in the militarization 
of the region and their unique affect on social relations.    
 David Montejano furthered our understanding of race relations and their impact 
on social development.  In his study, the Mexican emerged as a resistant and 
“problematic” feature of the overall social structure and as an ambiguous racial type that 
disrupted the strict racial dichotomy of black and white in the United States.  Moreover, 
Mexicans as both immigrant and subjugated citizen became part of a socio-economy that 
created separate and subordinate institutions that defined their place within the American 
                                                 
32 Juan Gómez Quiñones, “Toward a Perspective on Chicano History,” Aztlán, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Fall 1971), 
pp. 1-51 and Montejano, Anglos and Mexicans in the Making of Texas. 
33 Gómez Quiñones, “Toward a Perspective on Chicano History.”  
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cultural enclave.34  In this dissertation, the emergence of the Mexican subject “other” and 
reinforced divisions between Anglos and Mexicans compliments Montejano’s assessment 
of the separate and subordinate place of the Mexican. 
 The history of Mexicans is intimately tied to the special relations between border 
communities.  By recognizing the relative codependent relationship between border 
communities, we acknowledge their vantage point from which to study national and 
regional histories in transnational settings.  In addition, policies regarding border 
militarization, labor, immigration, and prohibition affected communities and caused them 
to search for ways to survive and resist changing circumstances.  The peripheral setting of 
El Paso and Ciudad Juárez and the ethnic status of Mexicans, at times left them 
vulnerable to the policy decisions of Washington, D.C. and Mexico City.  Moreover, 
much of the conflict and social agitation present in the West Texas region originated in 
changes in the socio-economy, which then took on a racial form as it complicated social 
divisions between Mexicans and Anglos in El Paso and the surrounding area.35  The 
transnational nature of my study will demonstrate and second the observation by Mario 
Garcia and Oscar Martínez. That is, border communities have a history of intimate 
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relations.  In addition, this study will augment García and Martínez’s assessment of the 
region by focusing on militarization and its affect on social relations. 
 The case studies that follow appear in chapter form.  The first case study, 
introduces the topic of militarization with an examination of the history of Texas and its 
western frontier.  Special attention is given to the Texas Rangers, who acted as the 
primary law enforcement body that addressed social unrest and made significant 
contributions to socio-economic change in the region.  Through this case study I 
demonstrate that Ranger authority changed over time and consequently affected social 
relations between Anglos and Mexicans. 
 The second case study addresses the role of the U.S. Army and vigilantes in 
racialized conflict in 1916.  I argue that military force contributed to the racial divisions 
that characterized social relations in West Texas, especially in El Paso.  The chapter 
focuses on the race riot of January 1916 in El Paso that resulted in the segregation of the 
Mexican community from Anglos.   
In the third case study, I examine the history of the National Guard and the Home 
Guard after the Columbus, New Mexico raid by Francisco “Pancho” Villa.  The main 
contention here is that racial and political demarcations within El Paso and between the 
United States and Mexico were bolstered by the National Guard and civilian volunteers.  
Also, progressive reform aimed at military personnel impacted downtown merchants and 
agitated social relations. 
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 The fourth case study analyzes the establishment of a permanent federal 
institution entrusted with enforcing immigration law and brokering labor and immigrant 
flows.  The enforcement of prohibition laws and the consequential violence that ensued 
created a conflictive relationship between law enforcement officials and Mexican 
residents.  Moreover, a heightened racial context is discussed as nativist rhetoric and 
backlash influenced enforcement policy. 
 My final chapter summarizes the dissertation and concludes with a discussion of 
key findings.  An emphasis is placed on the historical significance of the period and the 
region as a binational space.  The study seeks to demonstrate that militarization and the 
development of authority racialized social relations and the efforts undertaken by federal, 
state, and local authorities to bring order and maintain divisions. 
 This study addresses a binational experience that sheds light on other border 
regions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Modernization engulfed the 
socio-economy and produced variations of the same general experience along the U.S.-
Mexico border.  Border towns witnessed the significant growth and expansion of regional 
economies and, as a consequence, grew significantly in population.  The dramatic 
economic and demographic growth, as well as the violence that resulted from the 
Mexican Revolution, overtook the capacity of local authorities to insure a peaceful 
transition to a modern state.  In numerous cases, ad hoc law enforcement actions as well 
as the overzealous enforcement of immigration and prohibition laws aggravated matters 
in local areas and created international conflicts.  Militarization, consequently, became an 
acceptable option as law enforcement agencies also sought greater cooperation and 
efficiency in disciplining frontier society.  In the process, social relations that were 
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already racialized as a result of previous local and international conflicts were further 
complicated and created separate communities of Mexicans and Anglos. 
 A special framework is established in this study that demonstrates that each 
institution involved in the militarization process shared similar and unique experiences in 
West Texas.  Each one is affected by larger occurrences and consequently impacts social 
relations in a particular manner.  Local, state, and federal institutions differ in how they 
adjust to local circumstance and execute their individual agendas.  Therefore, the 
discussion of militarization and development of authority on the border is complicated by 
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As the state’s primary police force in the nineteenth century, the Texas Rangers 
had the ostensible responsibility of maintaining law and order, a duty that meant 
pacifying Native Americans and securing the Texas border region from the recurring 
conflict with Mexicans.  According to Julian Samora, the Rangers were responsible for 
“securing the rapidly expanding frontier of the [Texas] Republic, and later the border of 
the state of Texas,” since at least 1823, when they began patrolling the Texas western 
frontier.”36  However, as time and circumstance changed so did their work.  The end of 
the “Indian Wars” in the 1880s, the expanding frontier, and its isolated character attracted 
notorious criminals as well as revolutionary minded Mexicans.  As a consequence, the 
Rangers became the state’s leading law enforcement body on the border at the turn of the 
twentieth century.37  
The story of the Rangers in the late 1800s and early 1900s is intimately tied to the 
development of the border socio-economy.  They generally used harsh methods to pacify 
the region and usher in a new era of economic development.  Pacification and economic 
development involved racialized conflict, the collapse of a complex Mexican social 
structure, the isolation of Mexicans in the bottom segment of the working class, and the 
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Americanization of life along the U.S. border.  Historians differ on the degree to which 
Ranger violence contributed to this momentous change, but they agree that the state 
police force played an important role.   This consensus, however, for the most part does 
not take into account important differences in the Ranger story nor do they use these 
differences to underscore varying consequences to their law enforcement work.  
The West Texas region that encompasses El Paso/Ciudad Juárez offers an 
opportunity to re-evaluate the role that the Rangers played in pacifying the border and in 
establishing racialized American authority. The region stands apart with its largely 
Mexican demographic, as well as, isolated and mountainous landscape.  The vast space 
and the long border with Mexico as well as the important point of international 
interchange at El Paso and Ciudad Juárez presented special and often insurmountable 
challenges to effectively pacify and develop the region.  Moreover, the large Mexican 
population and international tensions that appeared prominently along the border and in 
the twin cities of El Paso and Ciudad Juárez caused the Rangers to seek out collaborative 
ties with local Mexican residents.  Their relations with the local Mexicans showed much 
cooperation though racialized conflict was also evident elsewhere. 
This study seeks to demonstrate that the Texas Rangers reinforced divisions 
between Anglos and Mexicans as it became the state’s principle law enforcement body on 
the border at the turn of the twentieth century.  Between the 1880s and the 1910s, the 
Rangers collaborated with the Mexican population and officials to suppress the 
“lawlessness” and criminal element represented by both “bad Mexicans” and a “hard 
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formation of [Anglo] Americans.”38  However, as modernization brought more Anglo 
settlers and the Mexican Revolution took shape, the Rangers’ relationship with the 
Mexican community grew more divisive.  The state’s determined efforts to establish 
authority, the resulting violence, and the advent of the Mexican Revolution played a 
significant role in dividing the two communities further.  
The “border troubles” of the late nineteenth century led to one of the earliest 
deployments of Rangers in the region.  On such instance occurred in 1895 when Texas 
Governor Charles Culberson sent members of the state police force to the region to 
enforce the state’s prohibition of prizefighting and gambling.39  Other factors contributed 
to the deployments.  The vice industry at El Paso and Ciudad Juárez represented a major 
source of concern for the governor and the Adjutant General, the civilian officer 
responsible for the Rangers.  Smuggling, depredations by Mexicans crossing into Texas, 
and the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution also contributed to tension and the official 
and public perception of lawlessness.  The Rangers also came to West Texas to 
supplement the outnumbered and outmatched local law enforcement officials.  Despite 
the different relations that Rangers were able to negotiate with Mexicans in the region, 
conflicts associated with the Mexican Revolution of 1910, including the excessive use of 
force on political exiles, racialized relations and contributed to the expansion of the 
Ranger force.  This coincided with the greater militarization of the region as well as with 
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the larger process of racialization that shaped relations between Mexicans and Anglos in 
Texas. 
 
“Texas frontier law was raw, rough, and red with blood…”40 
Since 1823, the Texas Rangers served primarily as a small volunteer force to 
protect Anglo settlements from Indian intrusions.  However, as the Anglo settlements 
moved westward, the Rangers served as guardians of this expansion.  Borderlands scholar 
Julian Samora contends that the Rangers were responsible for “pacification” of Native 
Americans as well as the removal of Mexicans from their lands.41  This served as a 
catalyst for Anglo ranchers and farmers to settle the area and profit from Ranger 
protection.  Cattle barons often funded the Rangers to guarantee their protection and 
influence.  Paired with the responsibility of protecting white property and the “clean up” 
of undesirables militarized the force even more.  The Rangers were organized under 
formal leadership appointed by the governor and given specific responsibilities that 
addressed its western frontier and protection of its southern border.    
After Reconstruction, the plans to establish a permanent state force assumed 
greater importance when Texas became less dependent on the federal government and 
detested the presence of federal troops in the state.42  This involved James Davidson, the 
first Adjutant General appointed by the Legislature in 1870.  One of early reforms of the 
Rangers occurred in 1874 when Governor Richard Coke created two separate forces, 
                                                 
40 “Early Day Rangers,” El Paso Times, October 27, 1963. 
41 Samora, Gunpowder Justice, pp. 11-12. 
 
42 Walter Prescott Webb, The Texas Rangers: A Century of Frontier Defense (Austin: The University of 
Texas Press, 1935), p. 307. 
 29
each with unique responsibilities.  The larger of the two forces was the Frontier Battalion.  
It was commissioned to protect the western settlements from Indian raids and, if 
necessary, punish them.  The groups consisted of six companies of seventy-five men 
each.  Major John B. Jones was entrusted with commanding the Battalion.43  Major Jones 
described his terrain as the frontier that stretched from the Red River to the Nueces.  He 
relied heavily on his fellow captains to mobilize the various companies and supply them 
adequately.44  The Frontier Battalion engaged in approximately fifteen Indian battles in 
1874 and by the following year, with the help of the United States Cavalry, forcibly 
displaced the Comanches and Kiowas from the Texas frontier.  In addition to Indian 
removal, the unit apprehended thousands of Texas outlaws, such as Sam Bass and John 
Wesley Hardin.45 
The Frontier Battalion operated until 1881. By that time, the Indian strongholds in 
West Texas had been destroyed.  Cattle and land barons had taken hold in places like Palo 
Duro and El Paso.  Moreover, by 1882 the Southern Pacific and the Texas Pacific made 
their way to El Paso paving the way for Anglo settlement to the West Coast.46   
Governor Coke’s reorganization of the Texas Rangers included a smaller Ranger 
contingent known as the Special Ranger Force.  This group of Rangers was led by a 
former Confederate scout and guerilla leader named L.H. McNelly.  The primary 
responsibility of the Ranger force was to end thieving and plundering along the Rio 
Grande River from Brownsville to El Paso.  For many ranchers and farmers along the 
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Texas-Mexican border, the claims of Mexican banditry had become so acute that in 1875 
Captain McNelly was asked to “clean-up” the border of Mexican cow thieves and restore 
order.47  For much of the next twenty years, the Rangers acted as a lawless group of 
“roughnecks” harassing and tormenting residents who crossed their path, especially 
Indians and Mexicans.48 
The Frontier Battalion and Special Ranger Force came to their demise by 1900.  
Various factors played a role in their dissolution.  For example, many Anglo cattle barons, 
especially in West Texas, resented a centralized police force.49  For many, a centralized 
police force represented the arbitrary powers exercised by the state during the 
Reconstruction Era.50  Also, their violent behavior throughout the state led to a popular 
outcry for their dismissal.  Jealousy among local law enforcement officers and corrupt 
recruits also played a role in the reduction of the force.51  The Texas Rangers were 
reorganized on June 1, 1900, into a skeleton crew of four companies of six men each, 
three officers and three privates.  The force continued to be responsible for protecting the 
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frontier against marauding and thieving parties, and for the suppression of lawlessness 
and crime throughout the state.52 
The Rangers underwent another major reorganization in 1918. The Thirty-fifth 
Texas Legislature appropriated $400,000 for the Border Service Fund and expanded the 
size of the Texas Rangers.  The expanded ranger force included an investigatory branch 
responsible for gathering intelligence on Mexican revolutionary activities, cattle stealing, 
and anti-American campaigns in Texas.  A volunteer division emerged from within the 
Special Ranger division known as the Loyalty Rangers.  They patrolled the Rio Grande 
and monitored border crossings and “draft dodgers” who were eluding Woodrow 
Wilson’s military conscription proclamation.53  The expansion of the Rangers was an 
attempt by the state, in particular Governor William Hobby, to address the national 
security concerns that came with the U.S.’s involvement in World War I and the state’s 
commitment to prosecute “disloyal” acts.54  In addition to enforcing federal laws, the 
Ranger force was responsible for addressing thievery, ranch raids, and other illegal 
activities associated with the border troubles. 55  
At the end of World War I, the Ranger force faced another major reduction and a 
fresh round of harsh criticism primarily due to its harsh tactics.  In September 1918, the 
appropriation for the Ranger Force was cut to $50,000.  Although officials were 
concerned over the Rangers’ violent tactics, they took this action primarily because of a 
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depleted state treasury.  The volunteer divisions were abolished by February 1919 and the 
Regular Rangers were reduced from twelve companies to four beginning on December 
31, 1918.56  Charges of unwarranted violence against Mexicans along the border also 
contributed to their reduction.  
Texas state representative, José T. Canales, of South Texas filed nineteen charges 
against the Ranger force largely for their violence against Mexicans in South Texas.57  
This resulted from an investigation of the force by the Texas Legislature and state 
representative William H. Bledsoe who chaired the committee that conducted the inquiry.  
The investigation discovered major violations and human rights infractions in South 
Texas, but also in other places throughout the state. 
The charges by the investigative committee ranged from murder, wanton killing, 
flogging and torturing prisoners, drunkenness, and assault.58  Most of the charges came 
from the Rio Grande Valley region of South Texas; however, major incidences of mass 
murder and other atrocities occurred in West Texas as well.  For example, among the list 
of charges presented by Canales accused the Rangers of committing racial violence 
against Mexicans between 1915 and 1918, including the killing of fifteen Mexicans in a 
small West Texas village called El Porvenir.  The committee concluded that the dead men 
were innocent of any wrong doing and determined that they were shot because the 
villagers had conspired with some of the ranch raiders.  The El Porvenir case, as will be 
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later demonstrated, underscores the tenuous relationship that emerged between Mexican 
residents along the border and state authority figures like the Rangers. 
An awkward political compromise was arranged after nearly two months of 
investigation and a wide range of accusations made by Canales.59  The understanding was 
that the Rangers’ excesses were unacceptable but that its function as a state police force 
was necessary to protect cattle men from thieves and other “bad characters.”60  The 
committee recognized the abuses of the Rangers but also highlighted the exemplary 
services of the Rangers.  The committee chairman, William H. Bledsoe of Lubbock, 
proposed a substitute bill for Ranger reform that the legislature subsequently accepted.  
Initially, Canales had introduced a bill to reorganize and upgrade the Rangers by raising 
their pay and qualifications.61  However, he faced considerable opposition from ranger 
captain Frank Hamer and committee chairman William H. Bledsoe for his harsh criticism 
of the force.  Bledsoe, in turn, introduced a substitute bill that the legislature subsequently 
accepted. 
The Bledsoe bill provided for Special Rangers to be recommended by district 
judges and attorneys.  This was intended to deny ranchers the opportunity to solicit the 
help of the Adjutant General in deputizing their own private police forces and to use these 
private Rangers to kill Mexican ranchers and deprive their families of their properties.62  
The bill also called on the Rangers to surrender their prisoners to the local sheriff’s 
department where the arrest could be made.  The intention was to put a stop to the 
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mysterious killing of Mexican prisoners in legal custody, a practice that had also 
seriously impaired racial relations in Texas.63  In addition, charges of abuse were to be 
heard by a local magistrate if the Adjutant General decided it was necessary to initiate an 
investigation. Moreover, nominal salary increases were also proposed but reduced before 
the bill left the House. The Bledsoe bill passed both the House and Senate with little 
opposition.  Despite the reduction in the authority of the Rangers, the force remained 
relatively intact.  For instance, the governor and adjutant general were left to utilize the 
Rangers as they saw fit.64  The Ranger investigation, nevertheless, highlighted the 
violence that the Rangers directed against Mexicans and their contribution to the 
racialization of relations between Mexicans and whites in South and West Texas.  Their 
general influence, however, varied between regions.  
 The Ranger account of West Texas that emerged at the turn of the century 
differed in part because residents resisted outside influence and authority.  Much of this 
defiance was attributed to the great distance between West Texas and Austin, the seat of 
state authority.  It was difficult for supervisors such as the Adjutant General, who 
commanded the Texas Rangers, to manage the work of the Rangers.  In addition, the 
isolation of West Texas encouraged local officials and citizens to seek their own kind of 
justice or retribution.  Moreover, the international boundary was a unique obstacle for the 
Rangers in that it made evasion from the law possible.  The variety of problems that were 
presented to the Rangers in West Texas included rebelliousness, defiance, and general 
disorder.  This was evident in 1896, when locals tested the authority of the governor and 
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Rangers by moving a prizefight to Ciudad Juárez and beyond the jurisdiction of the state 
police.   
The incident began when a boxing promoter named Dan Stewart offered 
heavyweights Bob Fitzsimmons and Peter Maher $10,000 to fight in Ciudad Juárez.  
When news outlets reported that the fight would take part in El Paso, Governor Charles 
Culberson sent a company of Rangers to El Paso to enforce the state’s anti-gambling 
legislation.  City leaders, of course, had anticipated this and went ahead with their plans 
for the fight to be held outside of El Paso, on a disputed stretch of land in the middle of 
the Rio Grande.65  The intrusion by the state was met with stiff resistance from local 
politicians and the populous.66   
City officials and local residents from West Texas did not welcome the Rangers, 
as they planned the Fitzsimmons and Maher fight.  El Paso mayor Colonel Bob Campbell 
and the city council called an emergency session and passed several resolutions 
denouncing “in strong terms” the actions of the governor.  The council asserted the city’s 
right to enforce laws without the governor’s interference.  It became obvious at this point 
that the issue went beyond a boxing match and the desire to evade the law on one single 
occasion.  Underlying the official defiance was a common desire to use El Paso’s sister 
city to circumvent the law on a regular basis.  Moreover, prominent citizens and 
businessmen participated prominently in this institutionalized behavior.  The business 
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elite, for instance, generally looked upon gambling as a lucrative and necessary business 
for the border region that could be safely promoted on the other side of the border and 
beyond the watchful eyes of state authorities seeking to enforce prohibition laws and 
other such “progressive” statutes.  State authority, in other words, represented an 
intrusion in local affairs and local elites could evade the law almost at will.67 
Local residents also resisted the governor’s mobilization of the Rangers, 
suggesting that the defiance of state authority went beyond the local elites.  One of the 
Rangers in El Paso explained that the crowd that gathered for the prizefight had openly 
threatened the Rangers while they patrolled El Paso.68  Several cases of violence, 
including gunfights between the Rangers and local residents, occurred in the city limits. 
Popular discontent towards the Rangers was widespread throughout the city and among 
all ranks of society, including the city administration and police. 
The 1896 prizefight was not the only instance that demonstrated the unique 
challenges that West Texas posed for the Rangers.  The case of Enefrio Baca is a case in 
point.  Baca shot and killed a newspaper editor in Socorro, New Mexico.  Texas Ranger 
James B. Gillette learned that the murderer was hiding out in Zaragosa, Mexico, just 
across from Ysleta, Texas.  Assuming that any effort to extradite Baca would be futile, he 
and another Ranger captured Baca and brought him to New Mexico to face charges.  
Before Baca could be brought to Santa Fe, however, over a hundred armed men 
confronted Gillette in Socorro with the idea of applying their own sense of justice to 
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Baca.  Gillette pleaded with the mob, but the outnumbered Gillette was forced to give up 
Baca.  The mob hanged him.  The episode reiterated the defiant nature of the region to 
outside authority and, more importantly, reflected the power that resonated within the 
populous.69  
In another example of local defiance that occurred in 1908, vigilantes confronted 
Captain John R. Hughes in the area near the Shafter Mines and San Antonio Canyon.  
Ranger Alex Ross, Ranger Sergeant J.D. Dunaway, Sam McKenzie, and a Justice of the 
Peace from the Shafter Mines had gone to San Antonio Cañon to arrest S. A. Wright for 
killing a Mexican.  When they returned, approximately thirty-five armed Mexicans 
demanded that Wright be handed over to them. The Rangers refused and the situation 
grew tense, according to Hughes’ report, “The Rangers refused to give [Wright] up and it 
looked for awhile like there was going to be war between the Rangers and the 
Mexicans.”70  The situation was finally resolved when the Mexican vigilantes backed 
down and the authorities took the prisoner to Marfa.  
The Rangers also faced problems of their own doing when they aggravated local 
tensions.  In this case, citizens of Clint, a town located southeast of El Paso, petitioned 
the Adjutant General for aid in keeping the peace, although they did not note the source 
of their concern.  Justice of the Peace Homer Wells, acting on behalf of the town’s 
citizens, asked for the Rangers.71  Adjutant General James A. Harley responded by 
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sending group of Rangers led by Jeff Vaughn. The Rangers did not quell the “troubles” 
but escalated them, according to Wells: 
Some months since Clint and [the] surrounding country petitioned the 
state for some Rangers and in answer to that petition you sent four men, 
but the one whom was put in charge of the bunch (They call him Jeff 
Vaughn.) has acted in such a way as to cause more trouble in the past few 
months than has been here for months before…I hope some action will be 
taken at once as the longer he remains here the more liable is there be 
trouble.72 
 
According to the petition, Jeff Vaughn assaulted an innocent Mexican man for no 
apparent reason.  Wells also added in his letter to state that if the Rangers stayed in the 
area there is “liable to be serious trouble.”73  Many residents of Clint and the surrounding 
area had expressed to the judge that if the Harley did not act they would take matters into 
their own hands.  The Vaughn case clearly demonstrated the disorderly nature of some 
Rangers, an observation that scholars like Julian Samora and Glenn Justice have also 
addressed.  
The Rangers faced a variety of problems that were occasionally related to the 
great distance between Austin and West Texas and the inability of state officials to 
properly oversee the work of the Rangers.  This distance also encouraged local officials 
and West Texas citizens to obey their own sense of justice.  The temptation to cross the 
river and evade the law added to the distance.  
Rangers also faced problems associated with the vice industry in El Paso.  As 
noted earlier, the vice industry was an important economic activity.  It was so important 
that local businessmen and the general public joined in defending it against any policies 
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or law enforcement directives from Austin, including the Texas Rangers.  Ciudad Juárez, 
of course, had it own vice industry and it attracted El Pasoans who simply chose to cross 
the river to evade the law.  The bustling business devoted to vice complicated matters for 
the Rangers in another important way.  It naturally attracted the criminal type and taxed 
the ability of both local as well as state enforcement bodies from applying reformist laws.    
The story of vice and the Rangers changed as the West Texas economy grew and 
expanded, a change that had repercussions in local social relations, as well as, the role 
that the Rangers were to play in local affairs. By 1904, much of the entertainment or vice 
industry moved to Ciudad Juárez or simply relocated to El Paso’s Mexican sector, 
Chihuahuita.  This change reflected new developments in the political climate in the state 
and in El Paso.74  El Paso’s political power structure changed in 1902 with the election of 
conservative B. F. Hammett as mayor of the city.  On May 3, Mayor Hammett and his 
councilmen passed an ordinance to curb El Paso’s vice industry by removing gambling 
out of saloons and out of plain sight of the street. Also, saloons were forced to close on 
Sundays.75  His administration, with the help of the newspaper, El Paso Herald, closed 
many of El Paso’s gambling halls.76  When local authorities threatened to continue this 
policy with other business establishments, many transferred their operations to Ciudad 
Juárez.77  This move, which included other vice-related businesses, transformed the 
Mexican city and El Paso’s Mexican sector into the antithesis of reform-minded 
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governments that had emerged during the Progressive Era in localities throughout Texas. 
Differences over the vice industry in Ciudad Juárez and El Paso divided the communities 
along moral, as well as, racial lines.  
By late November 1904, El Paso’s tolerance of its vice industry had grown thin.  
Some citizens complained that the city’s policemen were not only drinking on duty but 
several of them were known to live with prostitutes.78  In addition, local authorities 
learned that many of the prostitutes were renting apartments in “decent” neighborhoods 
due to the eradication of vice in the city.  Under intense pressure from one of the city’s 
civic groups, the Citizen’s League, newly elected Mayor Charles R. Morehead, Sheriff J. 
H. Boone, and the Texas Rangers started to enforce all of the state’s “blue laws,” which 
made Sunday commerce of any type illegal.  As a result, thousands of Americans crossed 
the bridge into Juárez and indulged in all the city had to offer.79 
Over four-thousand El Pasoans flocked to Juarez on November 20, 1904, and 
spent an exuberant amount of money, while leaving many of El Paso’s merchants holding 
the bag.  After three weeks of enforcing the state’s blue laws, the campaign came to an 
end.  Mayor Morehead had revealed that if all of the state’s laws were strictly enforced, 
El Paso’s commercial prominence over Ciudad Juárez would fall to the wayside.  El Paso 
gradually opened up its saloons and gambling halls and by January 1, 1905 all of its vice-
related business had resumed at their original location along Utah Street.  News had 
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spread throughout Texas and the U.S. Southwest that El Paso’s city administration was 
lenient in its attitude toward vice.80   
The city’s new-found policy on vice may have succeeded but it did not remove 
the Rangers from West Texas.  This was due in great part to the fact that El Paso’s new 
vice industry continued to attract criminals, some of whom were involved in other 
activities beyond El Paso.  The border city claimed an arrest every fifteen minutes.81  In 
addition to petty crimes within the city limits, criminals were stealing cattle and raiding 
ranches throughout West Texas, especially along the border.  Therefore, increased 
criminal activity in the surrounding communities attracted presented the Texas Rangers 
with another set of challenges. 
The number of criminals in the San Elizario, Ysleta, and El Paso district greatly 
outnumbered local peace officers at the turn of the century.  The center for El Paso’s 
criminal activity was an area known as “Pirate Island.”  A small Ranger detachment 
consisting of four men and led by Captain Frank Jones, along with the help of El Paso 
deputy sheriff, R.E. Bryant Company “D” enforced the law on the island. Captain Jones’ 
death at Pirate Island revealed the extent of criminal activity in West Texas and the 
Rangers’ ability to effectively regulate it.  Captain Jones was mortally wounded on June 
30, 1893 in a gun fight with criminal elements at Pirate Island.82 
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Pirate Island was a land mass that had formed as a result of the shifting currents 
on the Rio Grande.  The “island” was comprised of 15,000 acres of land that lay between 
the original river bed and the channel of the Rio Grande.  According to the International 
Boundary Commission, the original dry river bed was the boundary line making the 
“island” part of the United States.  However, half a mile across the line was Mexico, 
which made for an easy escape for smugglers or suspected cattle thieves.83  It was 
covered with brush and became a rendezvous for a large criminal element in the area.  
Texas authorities had difficulty patrolling the area since the Mexican line was so close 
and could place the Rangers out of their jurisdiction and at the mercy of Mexican 
officials.  The criminal ring that used the island as their headquarters was led by the 
notorious Holguín family which was involved in stealing cattle and conducting other 
depredations in the region.  
The death of Captain Jones ushered in new leadership and more problems for the 
Rangers.  Under the captainship of John R. Hughes (1893-1915), the Texas Rangers 
sought more collaborative relationships with both local and Mexican officials to 
apprehend suspected criminals.  However, efforts to bridge the gaps between the two 
communities never fully succeeded.  By 1907, depressed economic conditions in northern 
Mexico and the advent of the Mexican Revolution created a fertile ground for 
revolutionary activity and banditry.84  The conditions instigated by the revolution, 
                                                 
83 “Battle of Tres Jacales, 25 Years Ago Recalled, Rangers to Ride Into Trap and Leader is Killed,” El 
Paso Times, date unknown, “Texas Rangers” Vertical File, Southwest Collection, Border Heritage Center, 
El Paso Public Library, El Paso, Texas. 
 
 
84 Mario T. Garcia, Desert Immigrants: The Mexicans of El Paso, 1880-1920 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1981), p. 172. 
 43
especially depredations on West Texas ranches by raiders that the U.S. authorities always 
considered bandits, prompted the Rangers to utilize brutal tactics and crude justice aimed 
at Mexicans who were suspected of participating in the raids or of collaborating.  
Throughout the period of the Mexican Revolution, all Mexicans would emerge as a target 
of the Texas Rangers.   
The appearance of Captain Hughes as the new head of Company “D” marked a 
shift in how state authority was established and challenged in the region.  This was due 
primarily to Hughes’ ability to nurture cooperative relationships with authorities in the 
region, as well as in Ciudad Juárez.  For example, Hughes along with other Ranger 
officers developed a friendship with Francisco “Pancho” Villa, the most powerful 
revolutionary figure in northern Mexico between 1910 and 1920.  Hughes was also 
instrumental in grounding the authority of the Rangers on positive relationships with 
some local Mexicans.  Hughes understood that the Mexican population in West Texas 
greatly outnumbered Anglos and often would challenge local Anglo American authority.85 
In another example, Captain Jim M. Fox of Marfa, Texas, befriended Villa and 
utilized his services on several occasions to apprehend Mexicans suspected of a variety of 
crimes in the area: 
…The best friend the Rangers ever had on the Rio Grande, old Pancho 
[Villa]…why, he’s executed many a bad ‘un for me!...86 
 
According to Fox, several Rangers chased after three Mexicans suspected of thievery in 
1915.  One of the Rangers was shot dead.  Across the river near the scene of the shooting 
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was a battalion of Villista troops.  Fox arranged a meeting with General Villa in Ciudad 
Juárez regarding the apprehension of the men who killed the Ranger.  Villa agreed to 
have the men captured and executed.  When Fox returned to Marfa he received word that 
Villa had apprehended the men and asked if the Rangers cared to be present during the 
execution.  Ranger medical officer, Dr. Goodwin, witnessed the execution in Ciudad 
Juárez and gave the spent cartridges to Captain Fox as proof of their execution.87  Captain 
Fox understood the advantages of his relationship with the powerful revolutionary and 
remained loyal to Villa throughout the Revolution.  
Despite the friendly relations that Hughes and Fox were able to develop, 
increasing violence undermined hopes for lasting racial peace.  Livestock thefts and 
border raids plagued ranchers living in remote areas in West Texas.88  Many of the bands 
exploited the lucrative business of smuggling arms and livestock to advance their own 
financial agendas or to seek retribution for the injustices Anglos had visited on the 
Mexican population.89  Throughout the early twentieth century as border depredations 
became more frequent, criminality became synonymous with “Mexican.”  As a result, 
Ranger treatment of Mexicans became harsher and more indiscriminate.   
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An increasing number of Mexican raids on American ranches and other forms of 
violent behavior also contributed to a deteriorating situation in many parts of Texas, 
especially in areas close to the border.  Unstable economic conditions in northern Mexico 
during the Revolution forced the peasant class to reject their oppressed and impoverished 
state and act against their oppressor.  The peasant turned social bandit gave expression to 
vengeance on the rich.90  This response to injustice expanded across the border, as 
increasing numbers of Mexicans also decided to even scores in Texas.  The sparsely 
patrolled border created an opportunity for many of Mexico’s poor border residents to 
prey on the goods and herds of border ranchers.  For some bandits, the decision to raid 
American ranches was shaped by need, hunger, and most of all, the mistreatment at the 
hands of many of the gringos.91  The isolated ranch incursions often spurned a series of 
vengeful acts by ranchers and Rangers that perpetuated the cycle of violence and 
animosity throughout the region.   
In one such case in Ft. Hancock, Mexicans were held hostage by a Texas Ranger 
who was appointed by the local Sheriff to deal with the “problem” of Mexicans who were 
allegedly stealing goods and transporting them to Mexico. The Ranger held the Mexicans 
with an iron chain.  According to historian Mary Rak, “One by one the prisoners’ necks 
were clasped by a padlocked chain until the whole length of log chain was alive with 
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angry, bewildered, and frightened men.”92  The Ranger would not release them until 
stolen goods transported to Mexico were returned to the United States. The tactic worked.  
Items were returned to the United States and the hostages were released. Many local 
residents did not question the methods of the Ranger as long as the actions produced 
desirable results.93 
By the mid-1910s, relationships between Mexicans, local authorities and ranchers 
were highly racialized, however, they did not always reflect the obvious racial character.  
For instance, some ranchers in West Texas had business and personal dealings with the 
same bandits they were complaining about to the Rangers and local authorities.  Ranchers 
often forged contracts with bandits to recover their own cattle or steal cattle from rival 
ranches.  However, unlike the friendly relationship between Captain Fox and Pancho 
Villa, these relationships were highly volatile and fluid.  Ranchers manipulated their 
relationship with Rangers to opt out of contracts with bandits and created distrust and 
animosity between the two sides. And after all is said and done the relationships remained 
highly racialized.94   
The relationships between the bandits, rancher, and Rangers grew increasingly 
ambiguous as the political tides changed in Mexico during the Revolution.  In order to 
obtain some protection for their property, ranchers forged alliances with revolutionary 
factions near the area.  These alliances did not always coincide with the revolutionary 
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minded bandits in the region.  For many ranchers and Rangers, it was difficult to tell if a 
Mexican was a bandit or if he was a friend:  
…We knew what we were up against when we seen a bunch of 
Comanches; there were two things to do, fight or run. You meet a bunch of 
Mexicans and you don’t know what you’re up against, whether they are 
civilized or not, [so you just fight].95  
 
Although observers like Neill wondered about the loyalty of local Mexicans, he was not 
unlike the Anglo ranchers and Rangers who ultimately opted for classifying all Mexicans 
as criminal and threatening.   
A daughter of a Ranger made the following observation to underscore the fact that 
Whites were infuriated with the Mexican raids on Anglo ranches:   
…The [Rangers] were popped off easily and the outlaws stole more Texas 
cattle than ever [and] they also carried more contraband back and forth 
across the Rio Grande…These conditions made the Texans furious…96 
 
The loss of property and lives led to a public demand on state and federal officials to 
provide more protection.  The response was a massive military campaign directed at the 
violence associated with the San Diego revolt in Deep South Texas.  It primarily involved 
the Texas Rangers and the U.S. Army.97  Its focus may have been Deep South Texas, but 
its message of Mexican banditry and a disloyal Mexican community spread throughout 
the border region, however.  
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Confrontations between the Rangers and bandits often resulted in a great deal 
violence.  A contributing factor was an understanding among the Texas Rangers that no 
time would be lost in avenging a comrade’s death.98  In West Texas the violent 
relationship between Texas Ranger Joe Sitters and bandit Chico Cano reflected the 
overall conflict evident throughout the Texas-Mexican border.  Joe Sitters owned a ranch 
near Valentine, Texas.  He had worked as a border guard and Texas Ranger, and had come 
to know Chico Cano.  Sitters despised Cano’s arrogance and lack of respect for Anglo 
authority.  Because of his intense hatred for Cano, Sitters accused the Mexican of every 
ranch raid or wrong doing that occurred in the area.  In one incident, some of Sitters’ 
neighbors had lost thirteen horses to four armed Mexicans who claimed to be from Pecos, 
about one-hundred and ten miles northeast of Valentine.  Sitters refused to accept that the 
Mexicans were from Pecos and insisted that the notorious Chico Cano and his friends had 
taken the horses.99  Cano fought a number of skirmishes with the Rangers, sheriffs, and 
ranchmen along the border partly as a result of his reputation as a bandit that Sitters 
promoted.100 
On January 23, 1913, Sitters, Jack Howard, U.S. Customs Inspector, and J. A. 
Harvis, an inspector for the Texas Cattle Raisers Association, set out to capture Cano 
because Sitters accused him and his men of movig stolen horses and cattle across the 
river to Mexico.  Their first move was to raid a Mexican wake on the Texas side of the 
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Rio Grande, in Presidio County, believing that Chico Cano was present.  Sitters called 
Cano to come out while Cano’s father tried to stall the authorities who in turn threatened 
to burn the house down if he did not surrender.  After a series of inquiries regarding the 
safe release of the women and children present at the wake and Cano’s safety while in 
custody, he gave himself up to Sitters.101    
Everyone at the wake knew that Cano would not make it to Marfa alive.  The 
Rangers had a reputation of killing Mexicans who “attempted to escape.”  Before the 
posse could get too far from Pilares, Cano’s younger brother organized several family 
members and friends residing on the Mexican side to rescue Chico.  A gun battle ensued 
and all three of the law enforcement officers were wounded.  Howard later died from his 
wounds.  The incident spawned a series of blood oaths and vows of vengeance.  The 
group that rescued Cano from Sitters became known as the “Cano Gang” or the “Pilares 
band of outlaws.”  A succession of ranch raids occurred a few weeks after the episode and 
was reported to be the work of Cano’s gang.  The accuracy of the accusations was 
questionable.  Nevertheless, the fact that the bandits were armed and willing to engage 
U.S. authorities created great anxiety among Anglos in the area.102  The problems 
between Sitters and Cano reached their boiling point in May 1915.  
On May 21, Ranger captain Jim M. Fox of Marfa, Texas, organized a party of 
Rangers and local ranchers to investigate claims of stolen horses.  Villista soldiers had 
informed his friend Joe Sitters that Cano had a large herd of smuggled horses and mules.  
                                                 
101 Cano and Sochat, Bandido, pp. 56-57. 
102 Ibid., pp. 59-60. 
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Sitters saw the opportunity to help Villa and finally kill Cano.103  The feud reached its 
climax on May 24, 1916, when Cano ambushed and killed Joe Sitters.  Personal vendettas 
and “blood oaths” were assumed after Sitters was killed and indiscriminate violence 
ensued.  The Rangers would transcend the personal feud into full blown racialized 
conflict.    
The responsibility of maintaining the peace in the area east of El Paso was to 
Captain Jim M. Fox and Texas Ranger Company “B.”104  In many cases, Fox recruited 
local cattlemen who had grown increasingly impatient with Mexicans they suspected of 
being bandits. As Fox investigated the raids, he began to pay closer attention to a small 
village known as EL Porvenir.105  The small community lay on the banks of the Rio 
Grande and was located approximately one-hundred and seventy miles southeast of El 
Paso, across from Pilares, Chihuahua, Mexico.  The village mostly consisted of farmers 
and small scale ranchers.  Some of the inhabitants had lived in the village for up to six or 
seven years and were citizens of the United States.106  Local ranchers and Captain Fox 
agreed that El Porvenir harbored bandits and needed to be cleaned out.107  The posse also 
                                                 
103 According to Joe Sitters’ daughter, Mattie Baca, Sitters was a personal friend of Pancho Villa.  They 
had exchanged pleasantries on numerous occasions and even exchanged gifts.  Baca stated that Sitters had a 
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Rangers, Figured Pretty Good,” El Paso Times, October 27, 1963. 
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Center, Waco, Texas. 
105 The village of El Porvenir, Texas, is spelled differently by various authors. For the purpose of this 
study, the spelling and reference to the village are based on the following: Justice, Revolution on the Rio 
Grande. 
106 Testimony given by “Witnesses in U.S.” and signed by Capt. Anderson, Co. G. 8th Cavalry, Camp 
Evett, Valentine, Texas and Sgt. Bruin. Files from the Adjutant General, Proceedings of the Joint 
Committee of the Senate and House Investigation of the Texas State Ranger Force, 1919, pp. 831-862. 
107 Justice, Revolution on the Rio Grande, p. 36. 
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believed that the residents of El Porvenir and its sister city across the river, acted as spies 
and accomplices for Chico Cano.108 
On the evening of January 23, 1918, the Rangers and several local ranchers 
surrounded the village, rounded up the Mexicans, and held them at gunpoint while they 
searched the houses for stolen “loot” from the nearby Brite Ranch which had recently 
been raided.  The Rangers found some items like soap and other small items from the 
ranch and proceeded to disarm the village.  The Rangers arrested three Mexicans and 
questioned them before releasing them the following day.  
Three days later, the Texas Rangers approached Camp Evetts, an Eighth Cavalry 
border outpost located near El Porvenir, where they presented Capt. Henry H. Henderson 
with a letter from his commanding officer, Col. George T. Langhorne, requesting army 
assistance at the village.109  The U.S. Army’s Eighth Cavalry had previously investigated 
the Brite Ranch raid and some of the soldiers suspected an ulterior motive by the 
Rangers.  One of the cavalry officers, Captain Anderson, had already found that the 
Porvenir residents were innocent of wrong doing.  He had found that all of the men were 
accounted for on the day of the Brite Ranch raid and none of them knew of the raid until 
it was over.110  After confirming the validity of the letter and order, Capt. Anderson 
nevertheless mobilized his men and accompanied the Rangers and ranchers to El 
Porvenir.  Despite Capt. Anderson’s suspicions, the soldiers and Rangers acted with 
                                                 
108 Mattie Baca reiterated what the Rangers and local cattlemen thought of Porvenir.  She also stated that it 
was believed that many of Chico Cano’s cousins and other family members lived in the village and used 
the locale to move goods freely across the river.  “Early Day Rangers,” October 27, 1963; Justice, 
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109 Ibid., pp. 36-37. 
110 Testimony given by “Witnesses in U.S.,” Proceedings of the Joint Committee of the Senate and House 
in the Investigation of the Texas State Ranger Force, pp. 849-853. 
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impunity.  They ambushed the village in the late hours of the night, some wearing masks 
while others hid their identity with the shadows of the night.  
While the Army secured the perimeter of the village, the Rangers forced 
themselves into the homes, removed the men from their beds, and beat them on the way 
to an isolated area a few minutes away from their homes.111  The Rangers also ransacked 
the village while the cavalrymen stood watch over the inhabitants, who were disoriented 
and huddling around a makeshift campfire. As the Rangers finished searching the homes, 
they requested the army to wait for them just outside the village.  
The Rangers began to separate the men from the women and children and led 
them a short distance away to a bluff where they shot the Mexicans in cold blood.112  
Ranger captain J.M. Fox later reported to the Adjutant General that when they removed 
the men for questioning they were fired upon in the dark and were forced to defend 
themselves killing all the men they had rounded up.113  The Rangers rode away in a 
drunken stupor shouting “Comanche yells.”114   
The army collected the bodies on the morning of January 28, 1918, and informed 
the survivors about what had occurred.  A local schoolteacher named Harry Warren 
                                                 
111 The sworn testimonies of Librada Montoya Jaquez, Juana Zonilla Florez, Felipa Mendez Castaneda, 
and Eulalia Gonzales Hernandes gave consistent accounts of how their husbands were taken from their 
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the Joint Committee of the Senate and House Investigation of the Texas State Ranger Force, 1919, pp. 831-
862. 
112 Justice, Revolution on the Rio Grande, p. 39. 
113 Letter sent to the Adjutant General by Capt. J.M. Fox of Company B in Marfa, Texas on June 11, 1918. 
Proceedings of the Joint Committee of the Senate and House in the Investigation of the Texas State Ranger 
Force, January 1919, pp. 838-839. 
114 Justice, Revolution on the Rio Grande, p. 39. 
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policed the area and informed the women of the circumstances of the killing.115  Many of 
the families collected their loved ones and took them to Mexico for burial where the rest 
of the residents had escaped.  The village and the surrounding area of the upper Big Bend 
were abandoned for fear that the Rangers would return to “finish the job.”116  They 
abandoned the harvest and livestock and fled to Mexico.  Some of the bodies collected at 
El Porvenir were mutilated by stab wounds to the face or “chopped up with a knife” by 
the Rangers.  According to reports filed by the United States Army, the survivors had few 
options regarding justice or legal retribution.  Only one of the twelve widows, who were 
interviewed, for instance, mentioned any contact with Mexican officials.  Moreover, the 
soldiers denied any knowledge of the incident.117 
Mexicans from Mexico and the United States expressed outrage and threatened to 
retaliate against the Rangers and Anglos.  The threat of violence from Mexicans was 
serious as far as Captain Anderson was concerned.  He insisted that the governor remove 
the Rangers from the vicinity immediately “instead of proving themselves [observers] of 
the peace & dignity of the state, they are proving themselves its worse enemies.”118  
The wholesale murder at El Porvenir exposed the extent of the Ranger violence 
against Mexicans as well as the sense of impunity with which they acted.  The massacre 
also exposed the deep divisions that emerged during the 1910s between Anglos and 
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Mexicans in West Texas.  At the same time, the brutal tactics of the Texas Rangers and 
ranchers worsened racialized relations.   
 
Conclusion 
The Texas Rangers served as the state’s primary police force in West Texas 
throughout the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century.  Their work in 
pacifying and displacing Native Americans and Mexicans to make way for Anglo settlers 
in the late nineteenth century worsened an already troubled relationship.  In the Anglo 
community, they were welcomed as a necessary police force but were questioned when 
they began to enforce “progressive laws that prohibited alcoholic consumption and other 
“immoral” behavior.  The violent response by Mexicans to the heavy-handed methods of 
the Rangers ushered in another conflictual period during which the Rangers targeted the 
Mexican community in an effort to pacify the region and discipline the resident Mexican 
population.  Anglos welcomed this shift in the exercise of Ranger authority.  The West 
Texas region, however, posed special challenges for the Texas Rangers, including a 
general state of lawlessness, distance from centers of authority, Mexico as a safe have for 
illicit behavior and a staging area for violent forays into Texas.   
As the twentieth century drew near and the social and political climate changed in 
West Texas, so did the Rangers.  Initially West Texas functioned as a somewhat 
politically independent region because the long distances made it difficult for the state 
government to exercise authority over its people.  The existence of gambling and sporting 
houses in El Paso at a time when the state was being swept by a wave of reformist 
sentiment underscores the independent nature of life in El Paso.  El Paso’s popular 
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support for its entertainment industry was a barrier to state policy, as well as, to attempts 
by the Texas Rangers to enforce the law.  The political climate eventually changed in 
West Texas in large part because of the more effective imposition of state authority in El 
Paso.  The entertainment industry was forced to close, but it reopened across the river, in 
Ciudad Juárez. 
The Ranger approach to law enforcement in the 1890s under the captainship of 
John R. Hughes first sought to nurture close relationships with some of the area’s most 
influential and notorious individuals, including the revolutionary Pancho Villa.119  
Rangers also understood that local support in the form of informants and alliances with 
local ranchers and revolutionary figures could help them do their job.  Still, despite the 
collaborative efforts, especially under the leadership of Captain Hughes, racial tension 
escalated during the early years of the twentieth century. 
Ranch raids caused great distress among property owners living along the 
international boundary.  The economic and political instability in Mexico during the early 
twentieth century had marginalized much of Mexico’s poor.  Driven by need and 
retribution, various individuals sought social justice through banditry.  Many Mexican 
residents residing on both sides of the river accepted the bandits as heroes, as champions, 
and fighters for justice.120  However, Anglo ranchers and authorities, specifically the 
Texas Rangers, viewed the bandits as nothing more than arrogant outlaws that threatened 
the lives and livelihood of residents in West Texas.  The violent relationship between 
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Sitters and Cano reflected the larger struggle between law enforcement and social 
bandits. 
The skirmishes between the Rangers and bandits had remained largely isolated 
events as a byproduct of complex alliances between ranchers, Mexican revolutionary 
factions, and American law enforcement.  Throughout the early 1910s, however, their 
confrontations had developed an environment of distrust and animosity.  The Texas 
Rangers utilized humiliating and brutal tactics, at times, accepted by Anglo residents.  
Mexicans captured by Texas Rangers were often murdered before legally charged or tried 
in a court of law.  On the other hand, the popular support that Anglos believed Mexican 
bandits enjoyed made them apprehensive and fearful.  Many Anglo residents in West 
Texas categorized all Mexicans as bandits and potentially dangerous.  By the mid-1910s, 















Dead Lines, Defiance, and Race in El Paso 
 
“...Entonces estaba el Segundo Barrio lleno de pura mexicanada, se imagina…” (Then there were the 
residents of the Second Ward, full of mexicaness, can you believe it?) —Hortencia Villegas, eyewitness and 
survivor of the El Paso riots of January 13, 1916121  
 
Introduction 
The Mexican Revolution had a major impact on the social, cultural and political 
landscape of Mexico and the United States.  The horror and ideals of the movement were 
obvious as it spread across Mexico.  Also, the Revolution extended its reach into the 
United States, especially into the Southwest, as revolutionaries migrated across the 
international border during the early 1900s.  For the United States, increased political 
activity associated with the fighting in Mexico required vigilance and expanded authority 
among its border patrolling organizations.  Locals in places like Columbus, New Mexico, 
Presidio, Laredo and El Paso, Texas, were also drawn into the conflict as participants in 
the Revolution as Mexican insurgents who claimed to be embracing a broad transnational 
cause or redressing local wrongs.  Others participated in General Pershing’s “Punitive 
Expedition” or in Mexico’s army of “Dorados” in Chihuahua headed by General 
Francisco Villa.122 
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This chapter seeks to demonstrate that the “border troubles” associated with the 
Revolution gave shape to a disciplined society that reinforced racial segregation within El 
Paso and, to a certain extent, between El Paso and Ciudad Juárez.  A U.S. policy sought 
to pacify the region with vigilance and punitive measures.  It began in 1916, when 
approximately sixteen American engineers were killed in cold blood in Santa Ysabel, 
Chihuahua, by Pancho Villa’s army.  When the bodies arrived in El Paso, rioting broke 
out against residents in the Mexican sector of the city, known as “Chihuahuita.”  The 
event demonstrated in stark fashion that Mexicans, despite their citizenship or long 
residence in El Paso, could be easily identified as the local enemy, the proxies for the 
Mexican revolutionaries who had taken American lives.  Anglo rioters marched into 
“Chihuahuita” and assaulted every Mexican they came across.  The riot of January 1916, 
triggered by an international incident, strengthened the hand of authorities, including 
local officials and military forces stationed in the city.  Moreover, the riot and the military 
pacification left a more rigid set of racialized relations.  
The incident involved local police officers, four companies of the Sixteenth 
Infantry from Ft. Bliss, and a mob of American citizens who sought to “clean up El Paso 
Street.”  Various groups took to the streets to disperse and contain Mexican residents to 
the Chihuahuita section of the city.  Anger over the “Santa Ysabel Massacre,” as some in 
the media called it, intensified and was countered by martial law instituted by General 
John J. Pershing to avert further “race rioting.”123  At the same time, riot control reports 
were leaked to the press and by word of mouth that the reaction was spreading.  Secret 
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meetings were taking place among cattlemen and miners to organize a revenge expedition 
in Mexico “with or without the consent of the Carranza government.”124 
The episode gave rise to ill feeling that had been brewing in El Paso since the 
Revolution.  Many Anglos were increasingly fearful of an armed insurrection by the 
revolutionary minded local Mexican community.  The riot also raised security concerns 
among city and military officials and polarized the city along racial lines. Various law 
enforcement officials, military personnel and vigilante groups played a major role in 
defining a racial line of separation while Mexicans in El Paso and Ciudad Juárez 
contributed to the separation with their own self-defining activities.  Most observers 
became convinced that the Revolution had reached home.  In order to better appreciate 
the significance of the riot in Chihuahuita, it is necessary to first review the history of the 
border area of El Paso and Ciudad Juarez.  In the process, we will outline the process of 
which Mexicans became the “enemy” other.  
The New Socio-Economy, the Spawning of Conflict, and “Bad Blood” 
The riot and its consequences can be best understood by examining the history of 
the development of the El Paso/Ciudad Juárez region.  The industrialization of the region 
began around the time that the Southern Pacific Railroad reached El Paso on May 19, 
1881.  Prior to its arrival, El Paso was known as a quiet and practically irrelevant village 
of just 800 residents.  Change, however, came quickly.  One of the most notorious 
lawmen in El Paso’s history described the transformation, or “social activity,” that 
affected his world:  
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Bankers, merchants, capitalists, real estate dealers, cattlemen, miners, 
railroad men, gamblers, saloon–keepers, and sporting people of both sexes 
flocked to town…A saloon was opened on almost every corner of the town 
with many in between, but if one wished a seat at the gaming tables he had 
to come early or he could not get within thirty feet of them.125 
 
Local leaders saw a different, broader challenge.  They sought to effectively manage the 
rapid and often chaotic development of a socio-economy made all the more complicated 
by a volatile international setting characterized by pre-Revolution activity and the arrival 
of increasing number of destitute immigrants, including political exiles with radical ideas.  
It is no accident, then, that the history of law enforcement and border surveillance began 
in tandem as the region witnessed the “booming” growth at the close of the nineteenth 
century.  The events of the time period revealed the unavoidable ties shared by border 
communities and their residents.  In the process, law enforcement and border patrolling 
officials came into conflict with the local residents, especially Mexicans from Mexico 
and the United States. 
El Paso began to look like a modern industrialized U.S. city in the late 1880s with 
banks, newspapers, churches, a fully functioning city government, and a hotel.  A school 
board was elected in December of 1882 and the first public school opened in March 
1883.  The first “Black School” had been built and Olivas V. Aoy had organized a school 
for Mexican-origin children.126  Moreover, the Mexican Central Railroad Company 
connected Mexico’s northern outpost to its interior in 1884.  Mexico’s industrialized 
northern region attracted foreign capital and stimulated the importation of northern 
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Mexican agricultural and mining products into the United States.  By the 1890s, Mexican 
railroads had reached the urban centers of the north from central Mexico and places like 
Ciudad Juarez also began to prosper and exhibit the accoutrements of a modern city.  
Mexico’s labor population grew substantially during the late nineteenth century, 
especially along the international boundary; thus contributing not only to the population 
growth of a sparsely inhabited area but to the overall economy and spending power of the 
region.127 
In order to keep up with its northern neighbor, Ciudad Juárez, known as El Paso 
del Norte until 1888, requested special concessions from the Mexican government to 
stimulate the economy and retain its work force.  Special concessions were made possible 
with the tariff-free trade zone.  Residents of northern Chihuahua had signed a petition 
requesting that the government to extend the Free Trade Zone to their region because of 
lack of employment opportunities and the high cost of living.  In January 1885, the 
Mexican government responded by extending the trade zone along the entire northern 
border for a distance of twenty kilometers from the boundary line.  El Paso del Norte 
subsequently entered the more modern era of economic development.  Within a short 
period of time, modern structures were raised in El Paso del Norte and foreigners brought 
capital and buying power to the once sleepy northern frontier.128  The standard of living 
rose along with wages.  Exotic and profitable foreign goods made their way into the 
Mexican city. 
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The Free Trade Zone was not without controversy.  El Paso merchants, for 
instance, opposed it because they feared that the smugglers would import the duty-free 
goods and undermine their businesses.  Many of them pleaded to the U.S. government to 
intervene.  U.S. officials responded with a series of articles and decrees that placed hefty 
tariffs on goods produced and imported from the Free Trade Zone.129  As tariffs began to 
place unbearable restraints in the area and contraband made its way into the interior of 
Mexico, the economic potential of the region slowly began to wither.  
The Mexican currency began to fail, overbearing tariffs of the Free Trade Zone 
limited trade, and the absence of water for farming complicated northern Mexico’s 
relationship with American consumers and businesses, thus intensifying the international 
tensions inherited from a conflictual past.  At times, the economic dilemma and 
complaints by merchants prompted city officials to call for diplomatic and military 
assistance to resolve local differences that occasionally achieved international 
importance.  Calling for interventions from higher authorities, in other words, had 
become a “natural” option along the international border. 
As U.S. officials and El Paso merchants challenged the Free Trade Zone 
businesses closed up shop while some moved across the border to El Paso.130  This 
caused many laborers to move to the United States in search of work.  The depopulation 
of Ciudad Juárez crippled the economic promise of the 1880s.  El Paso, on the other 
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hand, faced overpopulated neighborhoods, health issues associated with a growing poor 
population, and unemployment.131 
When merchants from Ciudad Juárez tried to recapture the economic prosperity of 
the past, they introduced activities like gambling, cockfights, and prizefighting during the 
1880s.  These activities, which were to give Mexican border towns the reputation of 
coddling illicit activities for the pleasure of American visitors, also came to places like 
Ciudad Juárez in response to the activities of reformers in the United States.  Ciudad 
Juárez thus turned to tourism as well as the vices that the socially and politically 
conservative El Paso had suppressed.132 
The construction of tourist-oriented facilities, such as the bull ring and race track 
solidified Ciudad Juarez’s reputation as a center of recreation for Americans.  As Oscar 
Martinez stated, “entertainment became a prominent part of the town’s livelihood, 
ushering in the age of notoriety.”133  Reformers brought other changes to the border.  As 
the temperance cause grew at the turn of the century, the demand for the Rangers 
increased in places like El Paso to enforce laws against the consumption of alcohol as 
well as prizefighting and gambling.  
Though numerous confrontations occurred between law enforcement officials and 
El Paso residents in the late nineteenth century, none were as significant or telling as the 
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San Elizario Salt Wars of 1877.  The conflict revealed the growing tension between 
Anglo entrepreneurs and Mexican residents and highlights the use of local and state-
based authority to impose law that disagreed with the daily and accepted practice of the 
locals.  Resistance by the residents in turn called for a greater number of law enforcement 
and supervision.134 
The Salt Wars involved a dispute over the free access to local salt licks located in 
El Paso County.  They had been used by both American citizens and Mexican nationals; 
however, local officials privatized the area and denied them access.  Many residents 
continued to frequent the salt licks and eventually decided to challenge the privatization 
of the land. Louis Cardis, an Italian stagecoach manager and local political boss, and 
Judge Charles Howard, who had bought the disputed land and declared it off limits to 
local residents, became embroiled in the early phase of the confrontation.  The conflict 
worsened when the Texas Rangers and the U.S. Army arrived to handle the potential 
uprising.  Finally, in 1878, after a haphazard investigation and the reestablishment of Ft. 
Bliss to suppress future uprisings, El Paso area residents were given free access to the salt 
under the watchful eye of a Texas Ranger.135 
The Salt War underscored two developments that were to re-appear during the 
1916 riot.  First, residents were “swept up” by circumstances that quickly took a life of 
their own.  In the process, residents took the law into their own hands and violently 
expressed latent racial feelings.  Second, the opposing factions generally divided 
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themselves along racial lines that transcended citizenship and class.  Also, the conflict left 
a bitter impression on many Mexicans, especially the merchants who were to be excluded 
from the opportunities of the new developing economy.  Opposing factions mostly 
divided themselves along racial lines resulting in what Martínez describes as “intensified 
racial animosities that had existed since the U.S. invasion of the area in 1846.”136  The 
Salt Wars demonstrated that both sides were willing to use force to impose their will, and 
many Mexicans were left with the distinct impression that social relations had become 
even more racialized.  
When the Revolution broke out with the first major battle at Ciudad Juárez in 
1911, the contemptuous rendering of Mexicans as a “problem” was securely entrenched 
in the minds of many El Pasoans.  The presence of federal and state law enforcement and 
military officials in El Paso positioned the Mexicans as the “subject” other. The Mexican 
Revolution further complicated matters as revolutionary thought influenced some local 
residents to see the conflict as a fight against entrenched racialized ideas. 
 
¡Viva La Revolución! El Paso’s place in the Mexican Revolution 
El Paso’s role in the Mexican Revolution was immediate.  Many of the 
revolutionary leaders staged their battles and organizing initiatives in El Paso and Ciudad 
Juárez.  Because El Paso had become a premier site for Mexican revolutionaries and 
radical political activity had increased in the American border city, U.S. and Texas 
officials became concerned with border security.  This concern was palpable even since 
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the election of Governor Oscar Colquitt in January 1911.137  Ranch raids and arms deals 
originating in Mexico and the related exiled and civil rights politics in El Paso also 
prompted U.S. officials to begin paying more attention to the border region.  This 
attention focused on El Paso because of its position as one of the most active points of 
economic and political exchange along the border.138 
In 1912, Governor Colquitt revitalized the Texas Rangers to police the border and 
investigate any criminal activity that would compromise the neutrality act.139  The United 
States Bureau of Investigation also began to stake its roots at this time.  The agency sent 
numerous undercover agents to border points like El Paso disguised as photographers, 
newspaper men, trading post operators, and civilian cavalry scouts.140  According to 
Charles Harris and Louis Sadler, their secret activities surfaced in El Paso during the 
Pascual Orozco rebellion of 1912 in Ciudad Juarez.  The atmosphere of secrecy and 
intrigue was suggestive of West Berlin during the Cold War, with its share of agents, 
double and triple agents, mercenaries, gunrunners, and propagandists. A secret war was 
raging in El Paso and subversive activity pitted Mexican factions, United States citizens, 
and governmental agencies against each other.141 
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The Orozco rebellion began when followers of Pascual Orozco, a popular 
revolutionary exile operating in El Paso, began to use the border city as a port for arms 
and munitions trade.  President Howard Taft, however, had become weary of 
conspiratorial activity along the border and imposed an arms embargo on munitions 
shipments to Mexico, although he did not apply it to the revolutionary faction that he 
favored, the one led by the moderate Constitutionalist Francisco Madero.142  Despite the 
embargo, the Orozquistas were determined to ship arms for their cause in Mexico.  Law 
enforcement officials were equally determined to intercept the arms shipments and to 
arrest the revolutionaries.  This resulted in a number of arrests as well as violent 
confrontations.  
As arms deals and violence increased along the border, the Bureau of 
Investigation and the Mexican secret service cooperated fully, suggesting that 
intergovernmental relations also followed a quieter form of border diplomacy.  The 
primary objective of the bureau was to enforce American neutrality laws while utilizing 
the various federal and state institutions, including the U.S. Army, Customs Service, and 
the Texas Rangers.  Mexico’s Secret Service was interested in denying revolutionary 
groups the use the U.S. side of the border to foment revolutionary activity by securing 
arms and recruiting new recruits for their causes against the established government.  
Usually, the Mexican Secret Service conducted investigations on revolutionary groups 
operating in the United States and U.S. authorities made the necessary arrests.  This 
cooperation led to the arrest and death, under suspicious circumstances, of Orozco. 
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However, beneath the façade of cooperation among federal agencies on both sides 
of the river inherent mistrust and growing animosity persisted.  Orozco’s death at the 
hands of ranchmen, local law enforcement officials, the U.S. Army, and the Texas 
Rangers near Sierra Blanca, Texas prompted serious protest and outcry in San Antonio 
and El Paso.143  Anglo residents in West Texas feared reprisals from the local Mexican 
community and requested Rangers for protection.  In addition, the Carranza revolutionary 
faction requested the American government to investigate into the killings.  Orozco’s 
death and the anxious response by Anglo residents revealed that tensions in the area were 
intensifying.  As important as the activities of arms smuggling and revolutionary plots 
were, they took a back seat to events that took place in 1915. 
The closing months of 1915 witnessed escalated racial tensions in the relations 
between Mexico and the United States.  On October 19, 1915, Villa’s political rival, 
Venustiano Carranza emerged as the political leader of Mexico when the Wilson 
administration extended him de facto recognition and special military concessions.  Villa 
saw these actions by the United States as a betrayal and a clear violation of neutrality 
laws.  His anti-American rhetoric forced state and federal governments to reexamine 
security concerns along the border.  Villa’s antipathy is well documented in various 
academic and popular works, however, but few historians have measured the significance 
of these international on local social relations in places like El Paso.144 
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On October 26, 1915, Villa assembled the inhabitants of Colonia Morelos, Sonora 
and delivered one of his most notable public speeches.  His speech was heavily anti-
American, especially when he stated that he would, “rescue the settlers from the tyranny 
of the North American Mormons, who exploit, vilify, and assassinate the Mexicans in the 
region.”145  His willingness to include the “tyranny” of the Mormons is a strong 
indication that his growing hatred toward Americans was not limited to the Wilson 
administration.  
Relations between Villa and Carranza continued to deteriorate at the same time 
that Villa was beginning to criticize the United States.  General John Pershing, who had 
taken command of Fort Bliss, intervened by inviting Carranza’s chief general, Alvaro 
Obregón, and Villa for conversations in El Paso.  The attempt to reconcile the opposing 
revolutionary camps may have sought to pacify matters on the border.  The results, 
however, were different.  Villa became the man of the hour among the Mexicans in the 
city.  One El Paso resident recalls Villa in exciting terms: 
Pasó por la Calle de El Paso cuando vino con el General Pershing..¿Comó 
no lo voy a recorder, joven? Pero ni el golpe (the young girl sustained a 
minor injury falling down some stairs) sentí por llegar hasta ver a Pancho 
Villa…(He came through El Paso Street with General Pershing..How 
could I forget, young man? Not even my injury was going to keep me 
from seeing Pancho Villa.)146  
The Mexican community clearly welcomed him into the city.147  This alarmed members 
of the Anglo community.  
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Illustration 1: Left to right: General Alvaro Obregón, Pancho Villa, General John 
Pershing. Courtesy of ElPaso.org. 
Since Villa’s glorious return to El Paso, a series of events fueled the racial tension 
between Anglos and Mexicans, especially in Texas where Mexicans had responded to the 
call to arms in the 1915 Plan de San Diego.148  Tensions escalated as fear of a Huerta 
uprising began to creep into El Paso’s social circles, as well as newspapers began floating 
rumors of Villa’s plan to attack El Paso.  The San Antonio Express, for example, reported 
the following incendiary story: 
General Manuel F. Medinavieta, former chief of staff of General [Pancho] 
Villa, now a prisoner in [El Paso]…related that Villa had planned an attack 
on Juárez and later upon El Paso…He intended a surprise attack to capture 
Juárez and then open fire on El Paso.149 
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The attack never materialized, however, Anglos continued to think that it would and 
harbored resentments against the local Mexicans who had expressed support and 
admiration for the revolutionary figure. 
Anglo farmers and ranchers were especially resentful against Mexicans because 
of the raids that had been occurring for some time.  Mexicans, on the other hand, often 
saw the raids as acts of self-defense and retribution justified by their experience of racial 
discrimination and violence.  Anglo residents in the city, on the other hand, became 
increasingly concerned over the poverty and associated health problems that Mexicans 
immigrants purportedly introduced to their area.  With the rise of immigration and 
increasing political activity led by Mexican exiles, tensions grew considerably and the 
confrontations that ensued reflected and reinforced serious problems in intergovernmental 
relations. 
¡No Más! Defiance of Authority and Angry Mobs in 1916 
The riot began when a group of sixteen American engineers set out by train from 
Chihuahua City for the Cusi Mining Company near Santa Ysabel, Chihuahua. The 
Americans were entering “hostile” territory, yet the Governor of Chihuahua gave them 
assurance of safe passage.  Near Santa Ysabel, a band of Villistas stopped the train, 
forced the Americans off and shot them dead.  The revolutionaries next stripped the 
bodies and mutilated them.150  Killing of Americans was not a common occurrence; 
however, the incident underscored the failure of the Chihuahua government to guarantee 
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Americans safe passage.  The involvement of Villista forces also aggravated the situation.  
Villa’s anti-American rhetoric and his public denunciation of President Wilson had 
already made Villa a persona non grata, especially among the Anglo residents of El Paso.  
Racial tension reached its boiling point on January 13, 1916 when the cadavers 
were displayed in El Paso.  The news of the massacre spread, and a small group of Anglo 
residents from El Paso started to make their way towards Chihuahuita, clearly intending 
to exact revenge on local Mexicans.  The approximately fifty rioters essentially went on a 
rampage, beating up any Mexican that they encountered on the streets, businesses, and 
even homes.151  According to a newspaper report, the local police had to rescue one 
Mexican from a mob intent on killing him.152  The angry mob was not alone as mining 
and cattle men organized a secret meeting to gather a punitive expedition into Mexico to 
capture the persons who killed the American engineers.   
 
Illustration 2: West side view of South El Paso Street (Chihuahuita). Courtesy of 
ElPaso.org. 
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According to Hortencia Villegas, an eyewitness and survivor of the siege, a large 
group of men began to make their way towards the movie theatre, El Teatro Alcazar, on 
El Paso Street.153  The group started a squabble with some Mexicans.  The confrontation 
turned into a full-fledged assault when the Anglos began to beat up anyone they saw.  The 
riot turned into a shadow of a war that involved two primary characters--Anglos and 
Mexicans.  Anglos invaded the “foreign territory” of Mexican “Chihuahuita” in 
retaliation for the death of their comrades in Mexico.  Women, children, and the elderly 
were not excluded from the terror of the vigilante group: 
…me acuerdo que a toda la gente dándoles golpes, a viejitos y a jóvenes y 
a todos. (I remember everyone receiving blows, the elderly and young 
people, everyone).154 
 
The Anglo rioters, however, met resistance.  
Once the word of the riot spread throughout the neighboring “barrios,” groups 
from “El Segundo Barrio” began to show up with sticks, bats, pipes and anything else 
they could get to defend themselves.155  According to Villegas, residents of Ciudad 
Juárez, including soldiers, joined their Mexican brethren from El Paso; 
no le digo que se vino toda la mexicanada, y luego los de Juárez.  Creo 
que eran todos los soldados de allá de Juárez, porque los tranvías 
empezaron a pasar con gente que se fue pa’ Juárez y avisaron allá como 
andaba aquí el mitote… 
[I tell you that all the Mexicans came and then from Juárez.  I believe they 
were the soldiers that were stationed there in Juárez because the trolleys 
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began to take people to Juárez to tell everyone there of the ruckus that was 
going on…]156  
 
At the climax of the rioting, Pershing ordered the Sixteenth Infantry to take charge of the 
downtown area as police officers had lost control of the crowds.  Lines of troops four 
abreast bulldozed through the streets and established sentries on the corners and in the 
middle of the plaza.  American soldiers conducted a search for weapons and Villa 
sympathizers in Chihuahuita after midnight.  Residents were prohibited from walking the 
streets without a permit signed by the provost marshal.157  Despite the military 
occupation, soldiers and Mexicans continued to brawl in the streets.158 
After the riot, General Pershing and the El Paso Police Department sent their 
respective units on a “Clean Up” mission of the Mexican quarter to avert further race 
rioting in the city.  About fifty soldiers and as many police officers went “looking for 
Mexicans” and rounding up suspected Villa associates during their “clean up” of the 
Chihuahuita streets.159  As the “clean up” efforts were coming to an end and soldiers and 
police officers spread out over the bustling downtown area, General Pershing declared 
martial law.  Despite this drastic military measure, Anglo rioters insisted on frequenting 
saloons and other public establishments.  Some Mexicans also congregated in some 
public places and police officers ordered them to leave because of “concern for their 
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safety.”160  Fights nevertheless broke out between American soldiers and Mexican 
residents.161 
An article in the otherwise progressive Labor Advocate revealed the smoldering 
outrage among Anglos who increasingly saw the conflict in nationalistic terms.  The 
writer called on “Americans” to defend their country.162  He suggested that defending the 
country meant revenge for the murder of American engineers and other foreigners in 
Mexico.  The exaggerated nationalism that was used to give meaning to the attack on 
Chihuahuita deepened a racial line of division as real as the international border that 
separated Mexico from the United States. 
General Pershing reinforced the developing racial divisions by instituting martial 
law and enforcing a policy of containment on Mexican neighborhoods.  One of General 
Pershing more creative enforcement practices were “Dead Lines,” or physical 
demarcations that set aside the Mexican neighborhoods from the rest of the population.    
Mexicans were not allowed to come out of the “Chihuahuita” district and Americans 
were not permitted to enter.163  Matters worsened when General Pershing closed the 
international bridge, thus extending the “Dead Line” to the line separating the United 
States from Mexico.  With this order, American residents were prohibited from crossing 
into Ciudad Juárez and Mexicans were prohibited from crossing into El Paso.164 
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The intent was to quell the disturbance, but it reinforced the division with a dead 
line that was reminiscent of the imaginary point beyond which prisoners during the Civil 
War could not go lest they be shot.  In the case of Chihuahuita, Mexicans who violated 
the dead line were met with legal and physical repercussions.  Many residents, including 
Hortencia Villegas, were too afraid to cross the line for fear of getting assaulted, “Yo pa’ 
la Plaza no me voy, no me vayan a golpear” (I don’t go to the Plaza; they may hurt 
me).165  In one case, a Mexican left a bar after the curfew set by the “Dead Line” and was 
severely beaten by soldiers.166 
The sequestering of Mexicans in Chuihuahuita suggested that they were 
responsible for the uprising and required detention.  Their containment also made it 
possible for the Army to continue searching Mexican homes in search of armed “Villa 
sympathizers.”  Subsequent declarations by officials that they had “cleaned up El Paso 
Street” indicated that Mexicans in “Chihuahuita” had been liable for the riot and that they 
represented a threat to social order in El Paso.167  Such repressive measures further 
alienated the Mexican population and affirmed popular anti-Mexican feelings among the 
rest of the El Paso population. 
The conflict in El Paso was not confined to the segregated Mexican 
neighborhood.  The massacre of the American engineers also ignited a bitter campaign 
and petition to President Woodrow Wilson for the immediate removal of the United 
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States Consul T. D. Edwards, stationed in Juarez, for his alleged indifference to American 
interests in Mexico.  As a mob gathered outside his hotel in El Paso, they claimed that 
representatives like him were to blame for the massacre.168  As he left a hotel in the early 
morning of the thirteenth of January, a hostile crowd greeted him with shouts and jeers.  
Some of the shouts included, “Villa’s consul, not ours,” and “Go back to Juarez with the 
Mexicans, where you belong; don’t come over here.  Go find Villa, the murderer; you’re 
his consul, not an American representative.”169 
The Mexican Revolution had now spilled over into the lives of common citizens 
and had ignited deep-seated resentment and distrust against Mexicans in El Paso.  Also, 
law enforcement officials, especially military personnel stationed in the area, assumed a 
key role in deepening the racial divide, both in El Paso and across the international 
border.  They may have been primarily interested in containing the conflict and “cleaning 
up” El Paso of Villa “sympathizers” and revolutionaries.  They also reinforced anti-
Mexican feelings and their positions as the final arbiters in cases involving racial conflict.   
Moreover, they enforced the racial custom of separating the races, ostensibly for the 
protection of the Mexicans who suffered an injustice during the riot.   
The metaphor of the “deadline” was especially important in revealing the extent 
to which authorities were able to segregate El Paso.  They had the consent of the 
dominant Anglo population to dictate a line beyond which Mexicans could not travel.  
The separation of Mexicans from the rest of El Paso, the prohibition of passage across the 
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border, and the establishment of martial law with the accompanying “dead lines” 
reinforced the idea that Mexicans were a defeated minority.  Moreover, their isolation and 
vilification identified them as an “enemy other.”   The race riot in El Paso is one of the 
most dramatic expressions of anti-Mexican feelings that were also directed against 
Mexicans from Ciudad Juárez.  It also demonstrated how law enforcement officials, 
especially members of the U.S. military, influenced racial thinking despite their 
seemingly disinterested role in handling the riot.  
El Paso’s experience with a race riot was accompanied by other events that 
underscored the complex nature of life in El Paso as it also witnessed the more traditional 
and cooperative type of diplomatic relations as one of the most important border cities in 
the United States.  Former President Victoriano Huerta, the successor to Madero who had 
been deposed and exiled to El Paso, passed away the very day the bodies were brought to 
El Paso.  His family members laid him in state at his residence in El Paso anticipating a 
return to Mexico.  However, because of the racial and social tension surrounding El Paso, 
his body was temporarily placed in a vault and later interned at Concordia Cemetery in El 
Paso.  Mexican Army officials, family members and Mayor Tom Lea escorted the 
casket.170  Although Huerta had few supporters in El Paso and Ciudad Juárez, the services 
demonstrated that diplomatic protocol could still provide a measure of normalcy to 
intergovernmental relations despite the local and international crisis associated with the 
riot.  The ritual of recognition and respect accorded a former Mexican president also 
encouraged the nationalistic sensibilities of the Mexican residents of El Paso and 
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reinforced the popular view that they were prone to look to the south for political 
identification and encouragement.  
 
The Invasion of Columbus, New Mexico and racialized justice 
Huerta’s funeral services and martial law in El Paso may have stilled the political 
waters somewhat, but the Revolution still ran deep and its current continued to carry the 
fortunes of many in its wake.  This was especially evident in Villa, still smarting from 
Wilson’s recognition of Carranza and the U.S.’s arms embargo that was undermining his 
revolutionary cause. Villa, in other words, continued to carry out his anti-American 
rhetoric months after the El Paso riot.  His eventual attack on nearby Columbus, New 
Mexico, demonstrated that the Revolution was still spilling over into the United States 
and influencing both intergovernmental relations and race relations in places like El Paso.  
U.S. officials had continued to monitor Villa’s whereabouts in 1916.  A number of 
military and civilian officials as well as run of the mill Anglo residents from El Paso 
aided in the intelligence gathering of Villa near the international boundary.  Zachary 
Lamar Cobb, the city’s Collector of Customs and Intelligence during the Mexican 
Revolution, expressed a popular local concern over the instability in Mexico to Secretary 
of State Robert Lansing: 
As seen from here, the Carranza authorities have lost their opportunity to 
have established the trend toward improvement. The trend has set in 
against their success. As seen from here, I am reconciled to the expectation 
that conditions in the state of Chihuahua and along the border will grow 
worse.171 
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Cobb also warned of possible German influence in Carranza’s administration, a point that 
must have piqued the interest of the security conscious Wilson.  He also sounded the first 
alarm of a possible invasion by Villa or his sympathizers on American soil.172 
Villa’s continued influence in Ciudad Juárez explained the U.S.’s interest in El 
Paso and the intelligence reports that came from the border city.  Villa had maintained 
military control over Juárez at least until late December 1915.  Cobb maintained that his 
influence was still evident. He reported, for example, that Villa’s family continued to live 
in El Paso.  In January 1916, Cobb relayed a message from Carranza authorities 
indicating that Villa would be crossing “to U.S. somewhere in Columbus, New Mexico 
district.”173  Cobb eventually was able to confirm Villa’s movement towards Columbus, 
New Mexico: 
Villa left Pacheco Point, near Madera Wednesday [March 1] with three 
hundred men headed towards Columbus, New Mexico. Hs is reported west 
of Casasgrandes [sic] today. There is reason to believe he intends to cross 
to United States and hopes to proceed to Washington. Please consider this 
possibility and the necessity of instructions to us on the border.174  
 
On March 8, 1916, Villa and five hundred men arrived just outside of Columbus 
to a place called Bocagrande.  They set up camp and began to organize their attack the 
following morning.  Villa had two American “prisoners,” one was a cook and the other 
was a “corporal.”  As Villa approached the camp, he reportedly shot them and had them 
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hung from a nearby tree.175  Villa had just set the example for all of his men.  After the 
execution, he made his way towards Columbus.  Along the way, in the ranches “El 
Chale,” “Rancho Verde,” and others just outside of Columbus, Villa recruited an 
unknown number of local Mexicans.176  Villa attacked Columbus on the morning of 
March 9, 1916.  Columbus claimed four hundred residents and an untold number of 
soldiers of the thirteen cavalry.177 
 
Illustration 3: View of Columbus, New Mexico. Courtesy of the Otis A. Aultman 
Collection, El Paso Public Library 
Shots and battle cries rang out, “Viva Villa!” and “Muerte a los gringos! (Death to 
Gringos)” Private Fred Griffin, the sentinel on post number three at Regimental 
Headquarters, challenged the rebels and was mortally wounded.  Villistas made a strong 
push forward setting ablaze Ravel’s Commercial Hotel.  Officers were absent and the 
soldiers had to rip down the locks to the guardhouse to get to their weapons.  Chaos 
spread like wildfire. Civilians and some soldiers made a run for the desert to escape the 
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attack. The battle ended fairly quickly.  By day break the Villistas started to make their 
retreat when they realized that a machine gun unit cut off their access.  This proved to be 
the deciding factor in ending the raid.178  The raiders were finally outnumbered and 
outgunned when several of the officers and units began to organize.179  
The aftermath of the battle closely resembles the violence that occurred in El Paso 
after the riot just three months prior.  When the smoke cleared and the clean up efforts 
began, people who had fled to Deming, New Mexico, El Paso, and Asunción, Chihuahua, 
made their way back to Columbus.  Among them was a Mexican from El Paso, who was 
hoping to open a barber shop in Columbus.  Late that night, on March 9, when their train 
arrived a group of Americans assaulted the Mexican and killed them.  According to an 
interview with an observer: 
(Armendáriz) Y hubo otros Mexicanos, eran tres, tres Mexicanos, que 
llegaron en la noche, también por ahi de Deming. Y los agarraron, y luego 
… Les soltaron los balazos y dos cayeron…los mataron. (And there were 
Mexicans, three, three of them that came that night from Deming.  And 
[the Americans] got them and then shot them and two of them fell…they 
killed them.) 
(Sánchez): ¿Los Americanos? (The Americans?) 
(Armendáriz): Los Americanos los afusilaron. (The Americans executed 
them) 
(Sánchez): Y esos muchachos nomás venían, no tenían nada que ver con el 
ataque ni nada. (And those men just arrived, they didn’t have anything to 
do with the attack or anything.) 
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(Armendáriz):  No, nada nada. Si nomás venían de por ahi de otros 
pueblos. (No nothing. They just came from other towns)180 
More Mexicans, some arriving from Asunción and Janos, Chihuahua, encountered the 
same fate that night.  After the Columbus attack, a vigilante group made up of Anglos 
took justice into their own hands, just like in El Paso, and began to assault any Mexican 
they saw.  It did not matter if the Mexicans were associated with Villa or not.  Little is 
known about the violence after the attack, but it was clear that it was used to justify the 
racially inspired reprisals and the continued separation of the people of Columbus and 
other towns and cities on racial grounds.  
 
Conclusion 
The El Paso riot uncovered underlying anti-Mexican feelings and reinforced a 
negative view of Mexicans.  It also provided local authorities the opportunity to reinforce 
their positions as the final mediators in cases involving racialized social conflict.  Also, 
the episode legitimized their role in enforcing the racial custom of separating the races, 
ostensibly for the protection of the Mexicans who suffered a clear injustice during the 
1916 riot.  The “deadline” was especially important in revealing the extent to which 
authorities were able to segregate El Paso.  They had the consent of the dominant Anglo 
population to dictate a line of separation that could be militarily enforced.  The separation 
of Mexicans and Anglos and the establishment of martial law and “dead lines” reinforced 
the idea that Mexicans were a defeated minority. Moreover, their isolation and vilification 
that stemmed from the massacre and the riot identified them as an “enemy other.”  
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The 1916 riot deepened racial divisions between Mexicans and Anglos in El Paso 
and colored relations between Americans and Mexicans in the border region. A less 
obvious consequence is that authorities assumed great importance in defining these 
divisions and in reinforcing their role as the final arbiters in social conflicts. 
The violent campaign against everything Mexican made it possible for authorities, 
such as General Pershing, the U.S. Army, and angry mobs to assume a central role in 
defining social relations in racialized terms.  The conflicts at El Paso and nearby 
Columbus demonstrate that the Mexican Revolution figured prominently in the history of 
Mexico-U.S. relations and in local affairs, especially in the way that it shaped social 
relations along the border.  Military officials were clear about the importance of the 
Revolution in intergovernmental relations as well in local social relations.  Their actions, 
especially during the El Paso riot, reinforced local racial antipathies and divisions.  
Relations between Mexicans and Anglos, already defined in racial terms, became even 
more problematic as Anglos expressed their anxieties over their perceived threat of the 
Revolution and Mexicans expressed their mixed political allegiances and cultural 





The National Guard, Vigilantism, the Mexican, and War 
 
“…I’ve done my fill of the border,/ Of greasers and border men,/I’ve done my bit and I stand to  quit/And 
never take on again,/ But I seem to know, when the bugles blow/ And I hear the reveille,/ That my blood 
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will heat and my pulses beat/ No matter where I may be./ And I’ll yearn to go—with a burning yearn/ That 





After Pancho Villa’s attack on Columbus, the borderlands of West Texas, 
Southern New Mexico, and Northern Mexico burst into conflict.  Civilians, servicemen, 
and politicians had fully engaged the problems on the border, waged punitive measures 
against Mexico, and managed the intense racial tensions that emerged.  Agencies that 
included the National Guard, the Texas Rangers, and local police had established order at 
the same time that they reinforced the idea of the Mexican as the “enemy.”  Also, the 
massive military buildup on the border, led by the National Guard, contributed to the 
separation of the neighboring regions that had long been interdependent.  Lastly, the 
infamous “Deadline” imposed on El Paso continued to divide people a year after the race 
riot.182 
The introduction of the numerous National Guardsmen to the border in 1916, 
especially to El Paso, established yet another layer to the authority structure already in 
place and complicated social relations even more.  The National Guard, or state militias, 
had long engaged the western frontier.  This was evident soon after the Mexican War of 
1846-48 when the border became a point of diplomatic and economic interest.183  The 
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interest continued during the late nineteenth century when railroads connected the 
southwestern states to the Pacific Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, and Mexico City.  Conflict on 
the border also encouraged official interest.  Mexicans residing in the annexed territories, 
for instance, resisted the takeover and often came into conflict with Anglo settlers. 
Anglos, on the other hand, often reacted with violence to defend themselves as well as to 
initiate land-grabbing schemes on Mexican land owners.  Also, federal and state 
authorities who sought to resolve the conflict often reinforced it with their own violent 
methods as well as with their partisan ways.184   
In this chapter, I intend to demonstrate that the “border trouble days,” meaning the 
border conflict stemming from the Mexican Revolution, required border institutions to 
move beyond local vigilance and punitive measures and request that federal institutions 
assume greater responsibility in securing the border.185  The federal response to the 
growing security concerns assumed international importance and reinforced a popular 
view of the Mexicans as the “enemy.”  I suggest that border institutions evolved from 
their localized and state settings into more federalized and concentrated power that 
extended beyond assuring border security to maintaining social order.  As the U.S.-
Mexico border witnessed pacification, two distinct and racially divided communities 
emerged.  The U.S. military assumed a major responsibility in this process as its 
relationship with local Mexicans worsened along the international boundary.  Moreover, 
the intense militarization of the border by the National Guard complicated 
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intergovernmental relations as Mexico came to see the buildup as a direct threat to its 
national security.  
President Woodrow Wilson’s recognition of Venustiano Carranza’s 
Constitutionalist government in December 1915 led to a series of events that underscored 
the international significance of border conflicts.  Wilson took this important action to 
gain Carranza’s help in pacifying the border.  Pancho Villa, however, saw the act as a 
betrayal by Wilson and a violation of the United States’ promised neutrality on the 
Mexican Revolution.  The U.S.’s new alignment with Carranza’s administration 
encouraged Villa to commence a series of violent acts that targeted American citizens and 
property.   
His subsequent attack on Columbus turned an intergovernmental initiative that 
sought greater security along the border into another source of conflict.  Predictably, 
Secretary of War Newton Baker responded to Villa by federalizing the state militias into 
the National Guard under the National Defense Act of 1916 to enforce the United States’ 
neutrality policy and border security.  While the U.S. Army marched into Mexico in 
pursuit of Villa, the newly organized National Guard under the direct command of the 
President and U.S. Army assumed the responsibility of patrolling the border, protecting 
American property owners from raids, and disbanding Mexican revolutionary juntas that 
were organizing on U.S. soil.  
 
The National Guard on the U.S.-Mexico Border 
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The mobilization of the National Guard and the militarization of the border in 
1916 followed a long history of securing the area and building institutions that included 
state and local law enforcement bodies.  State militias, for example, had operated in the 
frontier since their initial engagements with Native Americans during the infamous 
“Indian Wars” of 1865-1890.186  Frontier militias were mostly a state or private affair. 
Since the War of 1812, state militias had only been called into federal service on two 
occasions, during the Civil War and the Spanish-American War.   
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, the Texas state militia held the 
principle responsibility of resisting Indian incursions along the Texas-Mexico boundary.  
After the Texas war for independence in 1836, problems arose in the state’s most remote 
settlements, such as El Paso, that included ranch raids by alleged Indian bandits from 
both Mexico and the United States.  The state made a variety of attempts to organize 
mobile law enforcement groups to protect the isolated settlements throughout much of the 
later half of the nineteenth century.  On June 24, 1870, the Texas legislature passed a 
militia bill which provided for the organization and drilling of the state militia.  The unit 
was divided into two classes: the State Guard, which was composed of volunteer 
companies and the Reserve Militia, which included all males subject to military duty not 
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enrolled in volunteer companies.  In El Paso County, over four hundred men enrolled in 
the Reserve Militia.187 
The state militia underwent changes in the 1870s and 1880s that were inspired by 
a variety of political and social issues, including Indian incursions, uprisings, and the 
Democratic Party takeover of Texas politics.  Indian incursions prompted the Texas State 
Legislature to pass a law in 1874 that called on the state militia to provide for frontier 
protection.  The El Paso County Frontiersmen Minute Company under the command of 
Lieutenant Telesforo Montes and consisting of twenty-four men was thus mustered into 
service between May 27, 1874 and November 27, 1875.188  Montes reported that Indians 
were continuing to cause problems and the citizens of El Paso needed protection.  Texas 
governor, Richard Coke, however, cut the militia budget in response to reduced state 
appropriations.189  The problems on the border increased and Adjutant General William 
Steele subsequently reorganized the various volunteer companies throughout the state in 
1878 into larger divisions. 
In 1879, the Texas state legislature followed by passing a militia act that 
organized the Volunteer guards into uniformed companies that answered directly to the 
governor, the “commander-in-chief” of the state militia.  The governor also had the power 
to mobilize the unit to “suppress insurrections, repel invasions and protect the frontier 
from hostile Indians and other predatory bands.”190  Most of the companies, however, 
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received critical logistical material and support from local officials and acted somewhat 
independent of state officials, especially in remote areas like El Paso.  Ysleta formed its 
Volunteer Guard and El Paso formed Company “K” (also known as the “El Paso Rifles”) 
in 1879 and 1882, respectively.191   
Adjutant General reports during the latter part of the nineteenth century show that 
Texas militia units assisted local and regional authorities on numerous occasions.  County 
sheriffs and city mayors typically activated local militia without state approval.192  State 
support for the militia in fact waned during the 1880s and its work was overshadowed by 
the Texas Rangers and U.S. Army.     
The “Indian Wars,” the major justification for the militias, came to an end by 
1886, and both the federal and state government began to abolish small and desolate 
army posts and state police forces, such as the Texas Rangers’ Frontier Batallion.  Fort 
Bliss nearly fell victim to the new reorganization but was spared by local financial and 
political support that felt an army post along the border was necessary for protection 
against raids and insurrections.193  El Paso’s militia underwent a series of reorganizations 
and ultimately disbanded as Fort Bliss siphoned much of the local and federal support for 
border security.194  According to Adjutant General Wilburn King, it was increasingly 
difficult to retain sufficient number of young men in the militia despite its need in El 
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Paso.195  The militia, however, experienced a revival as a result of the Spanish-American 
War and federal appropriations.  President McKinley federalized the state militias at this 
time.  Several Texas companies served, although El Paso was not represented in the 
campaign because the militia did not exist in the border city at the time.196  The U.S. 
government reorganized the state militias one more time at the turn of the twentieth 
century.  The principle aim was to provide uniformity among all units and ensure that the 
federal government would have at its disposal the necessary forces.  This reorganization 
federalized the State militias and converted them into the National Guard.  
Following the Spanish-American War, Congress passed the Dick Act of 1903, 
which increased appropriations for the state militias and provided for federal 
compensation when they operated in concert with the Regular Army.197  The main 
objective of the national militia law was to once again organize the various state militias 
into one uniform entity and to make it available for the federal government’s call to duty.  
A fully organized and federally funded state militia was also intended to provide for the 
common defense of the nation and to make it unnecessary to maintain a standing army.198 
However, as the Dick Act appropriated money and compensated militiamen when 
they served in the Regular Army, state militias continued to serve their respective states 
under local command.  It is important to note that state militias were not part of the 
Regular Army.  As stated by the Dick Act, they could be mustered into federal service but 
                                                 
195 Ibid, pp. 16-17. 
196 Zillich, “History of the National Guard in El Paso,” p. 17. 
197 Clarence C. Clendenen, Blood on the Border: The United States Army and the Mexican Irregulars 
(London: The Macmillian Company, 1969), p. 286. 
198 Adjutant General of Texas, “General’s Report, 1903-1904,” p. 6, Texas State Archives and Library 
Commission, Austin, Texas. 
 92
remained primarily a state entity.  Ultimately, state militias served as an extension of 
American defenses, especially in areas like the U.S.-Mexico borderlands where the U.S. 
Army was scarce and overextended.  The Dick Act of 1903 essentially designated state 
militias as an added layer of defense to aid the Regular Army.  
Texas ordered its militia troops and detachment of the Texas Volunteer Guard to 
muster into service as the Texas National Guard in July 1903.  El Paso was assigned its 
first unit of Texas National Guardsmen in November, 1905.  The city furnished the 
armory with amenities such as electricity and water.  El Paso mayor Joseph Sweeney 
served as Captain of Company “K,” but resigned his post by 1909.  The unit participated 
in numerous maneuvers and exhibitions throughout the country and received praise from 
regulars stationed at Fort Bliss.  The outbreak of the Mexican Revolution in 1910 
expanded the Texas National Guard’s responsibility.  The Mexican Revolution was a 
major security concern for the United States, especially in West Texas.  Ultimately, the 
National Guard became responsible for responding to raids by Mexicans from Mexico 
and localities in West Texas, the activities of revolutionary juntas on the U.S. side of the 
border, and dead American citizens at the hands of revolutionary forces in Mexico.199  
Mexican revolutionaries, including Francisco “Pancho” Villa, the leader of the 
prominent revolutionary force known as La División del Norte that controlled much of 
northern Mexico, congregated near Ciudad Juárez on the eve of the Revolution.  In the 
first major battle of the Revolution, Francisco Madero, who was to become President of 
Mexico in 1910, captured the city from the government forces.  Subsequent battles in the 
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Mexican border region, including Ciudad Juárez and the surrounding area led Texas to 
mobilize its state militias and supplement the Regular Army soldiers who were already on 
border duty.  According to a local historian named Emily Zillich, a single National Guard 
unit was headquartered in El Paso.200  The company consisted of some fourteen officers 
and twenty-four privates.  This was a small contingent considering that it was responsible 
for much of West Texas and parts of southern New Mexico.  Governor Oscar Colquitt 
went further and rejuvenated the Texas Rangers despite the calls for the dismantling of 
the force on charges of corruption and unlawful violent actions that they took against 
South Texas residents.  As discussed in previous chapters and elsewhere, El Paso and 
Ciudad Juárez assumed an important role in the Mexican Revolution. Its strategic locale 
for importing munitions and recruitment saw increased actions by both the state and 
federal governments where by 1912 three thousand U.S. troops, including National 
Guardsmen, were stationed in West Texas.201  
The call for military protection that often involved the National Guard troops in 
places like West Texas usually came in response to fears that the Revolution or 
international incidents associated with it could inspire Mexicans residing in the United 
States to take up arms.202  The landing of U.S. Marines in Vera Cruz in 1914, for instance, 
demonstrated that such incidents could trigger these fears.  As U.S.-Mexican relations 
began to deteriorate after the Vera Cruz occupation by American marines, army troops at 
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Ft. Bliss and the National Guard were ordered to patrol the streets of “Chihuahuita” and 
place under surveillance a number of suspicious residents.  Fearing aggressive or violent 
anti-American demonstrations, additional troops were placed on high alert and citizens 
were deputized to enlarge the police force.203  The hysteria soon passed.  Fear, however, 
continued in some parts of the city.  This was especially the case in the city’s Anglo 
community.  The thought of revolutionary sympathizers operating in the city, the 
possibility that they would instigate violence in El Paso and the limited presence of the 
federal military and National Guard deepened their concerns.204 
This concern led Governor Oscar Colquitt to further militarize the border.  He 
rushed sixteen companies of the National Guard to supplement the Texas Rangers already 
on border duty.205  El Paso residents offered to aid the National Guard and Rangers by 
submitting requests to organize volunteer guards for war with Mexico and border 
protection.206  The Vera Cruz incident and the militarization of the border that it caused 
were accompanied by other political developments that increased security concerns along 
the border.  For example, continued fighting between Mexican revolutionary forces in 
1914 and 1915 led the United States to contribute additional army troops and National 
Guard to border security. 
The constitutionalist forces of the newly recognized President Carranza and 
Villa’s troops fought some of the bloodiest battles Mexico had seen.  Some of them took 
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place near the international boundary.  Area newspaper added to security concerns by 
reporting that thousands of Villa and Carranza officers and soldiers were residing in El 
Paso and planned on invading the city.207  In response to the increased violence and fears 
of invasion, the U.S. military placed one of its largest troop concentrations in the El Paso 
area.208  In August 1915, troops were again mobilized in response to a possible uprising 
among revolutionary minded immigrants residing in “Chihuahuita.”209  Their actions 
worsened a tense situation.  They sowed distrust between Anglos and Mexicans. 
Racial animosity and the fear of uprisings did not only exist in West Texas.  Social 
uprisings laced with racial overtones emerged in South Texas around the same time.  The 
discovery of the Plan de San Diego in 1915 was especially important.  It originated in 
South Texas and the Plan’s call to arms initially called for a race war against Anglos and 
the establishment of separate republics for Mexicans, Native Americans and Blacks in the 
territory lost by Mexico during the 1846-48 war.  Subsequent documents issued by the 
revolutionaries who waged a guerilla war mostly in South Texas announced that they 
were acting against anyone that opposed their irredentist movement, particularly the 
Texas Rangers.210 
The raids stemming from the Plan of San Diego forced both state and federal 
authorities to reevaluate their vigilance over the border region.  The small network 
involving the federal military, the National Guard, Texas Rangers, and local law 
enforcement groups engaged the raiders with a level of frequency that alarmed federal 
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officials.211  The raids associated with the Plan of San Diego brought to light the broader 
context of border security throughout the Texas border region.  Headlines of racialized 
tension in South Texas reached El Paso and, as a result, its residents requested that more 
federal troops be stationed in the area.212 
The fear that resulted from events like the Plan of San Diego permeated the 
border region and prompted many Anglos to resort to vigilantism and indiscriminate 
assaults on Mexicans.213  Anglo Ranchers in Hudspeth and El Paso counties armed 
themselves after popular revolutionary leader Pascual Orozco was killed near Sierra 
Blanca, Texas, believing that a the local Mexican community would retaliate to his 
killing.214  Increased vigilance was clearly required to handle a situation that was 
spiraling out of control.   
The Revolution took a dramatic turn after diplomatic recognition was extended to 
Carranza’s constitutionalist government in late 1915 by Woodrow Wilson.  Pancho Villa 
did not take the political move very well and his relationship with the American 
government and people soured.  A series of anti-American rhetoric and actions were 
vented by Villa and climaxed in March 1916.  Villista soldiers attacked Columbus, New 
Mexico, a small army post in the southern part of the state, and jolted the nation into an 
international crisis with Mexico.  The Columbus raid created the opportunity for the 
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United States government to organize and deploy its army and National Guard to the 
U.S.-Mexico boundary.   
 
Illustration 4: View of Camp Cotton, Fort Bliss, Texas. Courtesy of ElPaso.org 
The incessant call for more troops and federal redress by border residents and 
politicians since the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution had finally reached policy 
makers in Washington by May 1916.  Soon thereafter, heightened security concerns 
stemming from Villa’s attack on Columbus led Secretary of State Newton Baker to call 
on the governors along the border to mobilize their national guardsmen and make them 
available to the President for border duty. In one communiqué to Governor Ferguson, 
Secretary of War Newton Baker underscored the importance of the mobilization:  
I am directed by the President confidentially to advise you that he may be 
obliged to call out the militia of your state for the defense of the Mexican 
border and to ask you to take such steps through your Adjutant General as 
can be taken without publicity to [expedite] immediate action upon such a 
call if it does become necessary for the President to issue it.215 
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Eight days later, the U.S. government issued the order to activate all state militias into a 
National Guard and assign them to border duty.  The U.S. Congress and President 
Woodrow Wilson had approved the National Defense Act which further expanded the 
National Guard's role through a unified federal effort and guaranteed that the National 
Guard would function as the Army's primary reserve force to serve along the border.  
The legislation coined the term “National Guard” and granted the President the 
authority to mobilize it in case of war or national emergency.216  By August 1916, about 
111,954 National Guardsmen from across the country and nearly 11,000 Texas 
guardsmen were placed along the Texas-Mexico border.  West Texas was regarded by the 
commanding officers as an area desperately needed of reinforcements.217  The Fourth 
Texas Infantry and the First Texas Cavalry arrived at Marfa and immediately set up camp 
outside of town.  Their responsibilities were expanded to guard against a possible 
Mexican invasion, disrupt illegal revolutionary juntas that violated neutrality laws, and 
protect American property from raiding Mexican bandits.  
 
Illustration 5: National Guardsmen at Camp Cotton. Courtesy of ElPaso.org 
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The mobilization of the National Guard in May of 1916 was a response to several 
key events.  First, the Wilson administration’s recognition of Venustiano Carranza as the 
de facto government in Mexico in December 1915, spurred a series of violent initiatives 
by Villa against American citizens and property.  Moreover, the Carranza government 
posed a diplomatic problem as the Mexican Revolution continued to spill over into Texas 
and other parts of the border region and Carranza did not seem interested in cooperating 
with the United States until Wilson recognized his government. 
The government also militarized the border in response to the fear and racial 
tension that had escalated since the Mexican Revolution, most notably after the discovery 
of the Plan of San Diego in 1915.  For many border residents the Mexican threat was real 
and capable of erupting into a larger problem. This was made evident when U.S. consular 
agent George Carothers pointed out that the militarization of the border was necessary 
due in large part to the suspicion and fear of worsening conditions at places like El Paso.  
The Santa Ysabel massacre and resulting race riot in the city as noted in the previous 
chapter demonstrated the volatile potential between Mexicans and Anglos.  Following the 
incident, the debate over national defense along the border became especially marked.  
Carothers reported an armed Mexican community to Senator Robert Lansing: 
…a large portion [of the] Mexican population of El Paso have arms and 
ammunition in their houses which will create [a] dangerous situation 
here…the possibility exists of them starting something [is] serious.218 
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National guardsmen and army troops were often assigned to Chihuahuita as a preemptive 
measure but it became evident to many Anglos in El Paso that the local population 
represented a potential threat to everyone.  
The mass deployment of national guardsmen to the border hit a peak in February 
1917 and redirected its efforts and presence elsewhere.  Pershing and his men were 
recalled from Mexico after failing to capture Villa and the United States was preparing 
for its entry into World War I.  Removal of the Guard units from the border began in mid-
February and dispersed to various places away from the border.  The Texas units were 
sent to Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio and Camp Bowie near Waco.219  Units from 
Arizona, New Mexico, and California were stationed at Camp Kearney, California.  
Many of the units were some of the first to be deployed to France when the United States 
declared war on Germany April 1917.220   
World War I left the border to fend for itself.  State and local officials assumed a 
greater responsibility of protecting its citizens along the border.  In 1933, the Guard was 
reorganized as a permanent component of the federal army which could be ordered into 
active federal service by the President whenever Congress declared a national 
emergency.221   
 
“Confict, Not Peace” The National Guard in West Texas 
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Impending war with Mexico and the high concentration of Mexican residents 
along the border forced the U.S. government to use National Guardsmen from across the 
country to reinforce what was thought to be an inadequate defense along the border.  
Villa’s attack on Columbus was believed to have exposed the weaknesses of the 
American military.  According to Senator George E. Chamberlain, Chairman of the 
Military Committee, the United States only had 15,000 eligible men for border service 
while it was projected that Mexico could organize 50,000.222  Senators Reed Smoot and 
William E. Borah contributed to the argument by adding that Mexico had more field guns 
and were better equipped than the United States.  The political critics were not only 
concerned with the lack of eligible men for border service but did not underestimate the 
difficulty of manning an extensive boundary. 
In a New York Tribune interview an anonymous “high ranking military official” 
recognized the immensity of the line and felt that the undertaking would be too great for 
the small military: 
Persons do not realize the length of the line we would be called upon to 
defend to prevent raiding-parties from attacking border-towns and treating 
them far more terribly than Columbus was treated…The length of the 
Texas frontier is more than the distance from [New York] to Chicago…We 
talk of invading Mexico. With every regular in the United States 
concentrated on the border we could not defend it properly from an attack, 
let alone inaugurate a pursuing punitive expedition…223 
 
Congress and military officials then turned to the National Guard to supplement their low 
numbers.  However, the National Guard reporting for border duty confronted a set of 
                                                 
222 Author Unknown,  “Our Unpreparedness Revealed by Villa,” The Literary Digest, New York, April 1, 
1916, p. 884. 
223 Ibid. 
 102
circumstances and obstacles that would affect their ability to successfully negotiate the 
borderlands region, especially in West Texas.  
The National Guard in West Texas faced a number of problems.  First, the rough 
and vast terrain of West Texas kept the guardsmen from effectively executing their 
responsibilities of protection and surveillance.  Small canyons and other nooks in the area 
provided ideal hiding places that made it nearly impossible to conduct effective 
searches.224  Also, some Mexicans on the Texas side of the river sympathized with the 
raiders and revolutionaries.  They furnished them information concerning the area 
ranches and patrol schedules of the National Guard and other authorities.  These 
problems caused the guardsmen to assume the added responsibility of conducting 
surveillance over the Mexican community.  They also recruited Mexicans as guides and 
spies and urged local residents to provide for their own protection. 
National Guard officers called on border residents to organize committees of 
defense and neighborhood guards under the supervision of a National Guard officer.225  
The local units, or “home guards,” patrolled the international boundary and gathered 
intelligence on the movements and actions of Mexican on the U.S. side of the border.  
The commanding officers of the National Guard claimed that Mexicans in the United 
States were increasingly abetting revolutionary factions and activities thus causing 
disorder and breaching federal neutrality laws.226  Fear among the predominantly Anglo 
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“home guards” may explain why some of them began to apply their own brand of justice 
on innocent Mexicans.   
Overzealous locals often took action into their own hands.  In places such as 
Culberson, Hudspeth, and Presidio counties, citizens were quick to pursue suspected 
Mexican raiders who had attacked desolate ranches hugging the U.S.-Mexico border.  In 
some cases, a mere rumor was enough to trigger action.  According to a former resident 
of Van Horn, the town’s residents reacted immediately:  
A report came over the wires that Van Horn was to be raided. The men of 
the town gathered guns and ammunition to defend the town.227   
 
The feared raid did not occur.  Nevertheless, residents from all over West Texas were 
ready to seek out any Mexican they thought was breaking the law. 
National Guardsmen contributed to the campaigns against Mexicans in other 
ways.  In some cases, they were reckless and aggressive with them.  These problems 
became so serious that commanding officers found it necessary to issue general orders 
reminding soldiers of the Mexicans’ rights and the need to observe them.228  This explains 
the policy of “peace and friendship” that the National Guard and the Army implemented 
in 1917 primarily to avoid conflicts with Mexico and local Mexicans.  The National 
Guard, for example, posted this policy in May:    
The policy to be observed toward Mexico and Mexicans is one of peace 
and friendship. The same treatment will be accorded to all Mexicans by 
our troops, whether on or off duty, as is required by law and custom to our 
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own people. Following this policy in the past has resulted in much 
harmony between the two races.229 
 
Tensions were riding high between the National Guard and local Mexican residents.  
Much of the reckless behavior exercised by the guardsmen was related to aggressive 
tactics and indiscriminate pursuit of Mexicans.  
Guard units were instructed to seek the “offensive” when confronted with 
suspected bandits and “hunt them down and exterminate.”230  This resulted, in several 
occasions where innocent Mexicans were fired upon by the patrols of the National Guard: 
…There have been several instances where so-called Mexicans have been 
fired on in the dark by patrols of the National Guard, and where it has 
been altogether uncertain that the parties fired on were not attending to 
their legitimate business…231 
 
Mexicans along the border grew increasingly distrustful of the National Guard and the 
U.S. Army.  As a result, the units amplified the feelings of animosity and distrust among 
Mexicans in the border region.  In some cases, Mexican residents manipulated 
intelligence data to thwart National Guard operations.232 
The mobilization of the National Guard consequently increased militarization of 
the border but did little to effectively cement effective and adequate authority in the 
region.  The vast and rugged terrain, especially in West Texas, forced the Guard to set up 
only short camps as the regiments were “split up and scattered throughout [the Big 
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Bend].”233  Vigilance over the Mexican population was of the highest priority.  General 
orders to monitor “suspicious” congregations of Mexicans were issued and carried out by 
the conjoined effort of both guardsmen and civilians.234  Surveillance efforts were also 
evident within the city.  The National Guard’s presence in the El Paso area brought on 
progressive initiatives that resulted in economic hardship in many of the city’s 
entertainment industries located in El Paso’s Mexican sector “Chihuahuita.” 
The National Guard also conducted surveillance in El Paso.  Its major challenge 
in El Paso, however, involved a reaction from reformers against the vice industry in 
“Chihuahita” which had grown in large part to service the increasing number of 
guardsmen and army personnel in town.  Businessmen involved in gambling, prostitution, 
and drinking establishments eagerly promoted their services to the soldiers.  As noted in a 
previous chapter, the call for restrictions on the vice industry caused many businesses to 
simply move their operations to Ciudad Juarez.   
The commanding officers of the National Guard, on the other hand, responded to 
War Department warnings to “clean up” by restricting the movement of the soldiers.235  
According to one missive, “the war department is determined not to locate cantonments 
in communities maintaining a [red light] district.”236  Problems with soldiers were 
frequent.  According to Court-Martial records from El Paso, many soldiers were 
arraigned for various infractions including public drunkenness, leave without permission, 
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and behavior unbecoming of an officer.237  Problems became so serious along the border 
region that Congress addressed alcohol consumption and disorderly conduct in the 
Emergency Army Bill of May 1917. The directive read as follows: 
That the President of the United States, as Commander in Chief of the 
Army, is authorized to make such regulations governing the prohibition of 
alcoholic liquors in or near military camps and to the officers and enlisted 
men of the Army…that no person, corporation, partnership, or association 
shall sell, supply, or have in his possession any intoxicating or spirituous 
liquors at any military station, cantonment, camp, fort, post, officers’ or 
enlisted men’s club, which is being used at the time for military purposes 
under this act.238 
 
According to some commanding officers who reviewed units along the border, the 
accessibility of the vice industry at Ciudad Juárez and El Paso handicapped the Guard’s 
ability to effectively perform its duties and patrol the region.239 
City officials also acted on the soldiers’ behavior.  The city applied the “Dead 
Line” policy to them.  The policy prohibited soldiers from frequenting El Paso’s 
downtown entertainment district located in and near the Mexican portion of the city and 
adjacent to the international bridge.  The enforced “Dead Line” placed many of El Paso’s 
downtown merchants at an economic disadvantage as profits began to decline due to the 
absence of soldiers.  Furthermore, customers were encouraged to go to other parts of the 
city deemed more desirable.240 
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Downtown merchants sought various options that would make the district more 
suitable for soldiers and citizens. One of them was to regulate the district with curfews 
and medical examinations for the city’s prostitutes.241  Other merchants tried to cooperate 
with the National Guard and local police to rid the district of “undesirables” who were 
responsible for bootlegging and other forms of vice, presumably prostitution.242  Despite 
their efforts to reopen “Chihuahuita” to soldiers and salvage their economic livelihood, 
the city and the Guard persisted with its enforcement of the “dead line.” 
 
Conclusion 
The activation of the National Guard in 1916 signaled the elevation of local 
tensions and conflict to an international level.  Villa’s Columbus raid served as the 
catalyst for the mass mobilization of the U.S. Army and the newly minted National 
Guard.  The amassing of troops served diverse purposes.  In 1916, the U.S. Army 
engaged an international agenda with the Punitive Expedition into Mexico and the 
National Guard served as the source for national defense on the U.S. side of the 
international boundary. The National Guard provided an added “added layer” to the 
security initiatives already in place by local, state, and some federal authorities.  
The National Guard also faced problems.  Its inability to effectively negotiate the 
terrain and overcome the existing racial tensions handicapped their effectiveness.  
Furthermore, reform-minded initiatives aimed at the military brought economic hardship 
to business owners in El Paso’s “Red Light” and downtown districts.  
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The “Dead Lines” in El Paso’s downtown “Red Light” district and the resulting 
segregation of Mexican neighborhoods reinforced a rigid line between Anglos and 
Mexicans. The complete elimination of vice was never fully realized as many soldiers 
and patrons were simply encouraged to seek take their business to more “desirable” 
places outside the downtown or Mexican sector.  Moreover, the issues of vice served little 
more than a front to further isolate Mexicans from the rest of El Paso. The military’s 
prohibition initiatives disrupted more than the economic structure of El Paso’s downtown 
entertainment district.  They crystallized the divisions between Anglos and Mexicans and 


















Previous chapters have addressed the various types of conflict that occurred in the 
West Texas region.  This chapter examines the history of the United States Border Patrol 
in El Paso, and its contribution to social divisions and racialized conflict.  It addresses 
several policies including the immigration laws of the 1917-1918 period which targeted 
Mexican labor and the landmark Quota Act of 1924 that led to the establishment of the 
Border Patrol.  The National Prohibition Act of 1919 also figured prominently in the 
story of the Border Patrol.  The agency was responsible for enforcing the law which 
prohibited the manufacture, transportation and sale of beverages that contained more than 
0.5 per cent alcohol.  These policies contributed to the establishment of legal and political 
authority in West Texas and in worsening social relations between Mexicans and Anglos.  
The Border Patrol strengthened federal authority along the border and contributed to the 
image of the Mexican as the foreign “other.”  The agency, however, did not just enforce 
immigration and prohibition laws but also mediated differences between nativists who 
called for stricter restrictions on Mexican immigration and farmers who wanted an 
uninterrupted flow of low wage labor.243 
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This chapter’s objective is to demonstrate the importance of border security in the 
region and how it changed over time.  Enforcement practices, of course, reflected policy 
changes in immigration and prohibition laws as well as the accommodated needs of 
employers, mostly farmers.  Also, an increase in the Mexican population created a “race 
problem” that encouraged restrictionists to call for stricter enforcement.  Strong 
restrictionist sentiments gave greater significance to the enforcement of the National 
Quota Act of 1924 while “cultural nationalism of the late nineteenth century had 
transformed into a nationalism based on race.”244  Mexican immigration increased 
exponentially since the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution and did not diminished after 
armed conflict had subsided at the end of the second decade.  By the early 1920s, nativist 
groups identified Mexican immigrants as a threat to the ethnic, economic, and cultural 
fabric of the United States.  
 
History of the United States Border Patrol 
The Border Patrol emerged with the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 
1882 and the establishment of the Chinese Division of the Immigration Service, which 
operated within the Department of Labor.  The Act reduced Chinese immigration and 
limited the immigrant labor supply for U.S. industries like mining, railroads and 
agriculture.245  According to the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, Chinese immigration was 
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to be limited until otherwise provided by law.246  Enforcement duties fell on the United 
States Customs Service which had patrols known as the “line riders” or “mounted guard” 
serving principally on the Mexican border.247  The “Mounted Guard” consisted of former 
and active Texas Rangers, Sheriffs of border counties, and deputized cowboys.248  The 
Customs Service had been entrusted to prevent all illegal smuggling, including Chinese 
aliens.  However, the task overwhelmed the Customs Service and the apprehension of 
illegal immigrants fell on the shoulders of the Immigration Service in 1903.   
In 1904, the El Paso area received some of the first mounted immigration officers 
to patrol the U.S.-Mexican border for illegal Chinese immigrants.  Though the U.S.’s 
southern border became a focal point at the turn of the century for apprehending illegal 
immigrants, Mexican immigration was largely inconspicuous.  The massive influx of 
European immigrants at Ellis Island and the geographic isolation of the American 
southwest allowed Mexicans to remain under the radar screen.249  Moreover, virulent 
anti-Chinese campaigns and the resultant declining numbers of Chinese labor in 
agriculture and railroad industries in the West and Southwest left a vacuum which 
Mexicans eagerly filled in increasing numbers.250  Despite this, the primary focus of the 
Immigration Service remained in the restriction of Chinese immigration. 
                                                 
246 Perkins, Border Patrol, p. 7. 
247 Ibid, p. 9. 
248 “The United States Border Patrol, 1924-1999, El Paso Sector: Where the Legend Began,” pamphlet 
published by the El Paso Border Patrol Office, Special Collections, University of Texas at El Paso. 
249 Mark Reisler, “Always the Laborer, Never the Citizen: Anglo Perceptions of the Mexican Immigrant 
During the 1920s,” The Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 45, No. 2, (May 1976), p. 233. 
250 For more on increased Mexican labor at the turn of the century, see: Carey McWilliams, North from 
Mexico: The Spanish-Speaking People of the United States (New York: Greenwood Press, 1948); Rudolfo 
Acuña, Occupied America: A History of Chicanos (New York: Harper & Row, c1981); Emilio Zamora, 
The World of the Mexican Worker in Texas (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1993). 
 112
The Immigration Service created a section called the Chinese Division and 
labeled its officers Chinese Inspectors.  Line riders aided the new division with 
apprehensions as they were familiar with scouting detail along the international boundary 
and border community residents.251  According to Chinese Inspector, Clifford Alan 
Perkins, many of the illegal entries continued to cross the Mexican border but they began 
to abide by different patterns of movement: 
By the time I joined the Service [1910], few Chinese were coming in east 
of El Paso. Some continued to enter through gulf and west coast ports, but 
by far the greatest numbers were entering in the vicinity of towns on or 
near the Mexican border.252 
 
Work along the line was difficult as few officers had been commissioned, the territory 
was extensive, and smuggling rings were very efficient.  For instance, highly 
sophisticated civil or legal groups, such as the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent 
Association, better known to Americans as the Chinese Six Companies, operated highly 
successful human trafficking rings from Mexico and in the U.S. to smuggle 
undocumented immigrants.253 
The Immigration Service officers inspected incoming traffic at major sea and air 
ports, at rail terminals, and along vehicular access routes.  Officers maintained 
surveillance of backcountry areas and forecast crossing periods by monitoring habits and 
trends.254  The officers increased their inspections over time especially along railroad 
lines as labor agents utilized box cars to transport Chinese migrants.  A steady decline 
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ensued as illegal immigration enforcement became stricter and Mexican immigrant flows 
increased and laborers filtered into industries once dominated by Chinese workers, 
including railroads and agriculture,.   
In the 1910s, the Immigration office in El Paso was responsible for an expansive 
sector with jurisdiction over the western portion of Texas including the area that stretched 
from Del Rio to Yuma, Arizona.  In 1913, the El Paso headquarters employed 
approximately thirty-five officers and over twenty-five staff members.255  The Mexican 
Revolution changed this.  Prior to the historic conflagration, Mexican immigrants had 
been entering in increasing numbers to work in the rapidly expanding agriculture, 
railroad, and mining industries.  The economic dislocation and political instability 
associated with the Revolution placed an added pressure on Mexicans to head north and 
across the border in search of better and safe opportunities.  Immigration authorities, 
consequently, assumed the added responsibility of housing and caring for destitute 
refugees fleeing the conflict.  The U.S. government constructed a temporary camp near 
the river that was guarded by U.S. Army servicemen from Fort Bliss.256  The crude and 
temporary detentions facilities were used to aid and feed the refugees in addition to 
curbing the number of beggars roaming the streets of downtown El Paso.  Once the 
fighting on the Mexican side of the border had subsided and a semblance of peace had 
emerged in Ciudad Juárez, Border Patrol officers repatriated some of the immigrants. 
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The social and political instability caused by the Mexican Revolution complicated 
immigration matters.  Ports of entry were flooded by destitute refugees as violence 
escalated in Mexico and especially along the Mexican side of the border.  By 1914, 
Mexicans were a noticeable presence in the agricultural regions of Texas and 
California.257  Texas A&M professor William Edward Garnett identified the influx of 
Mexicans, or “Mexican invasion” as “undoubtedly the most pressing race question that 
confronted Texas.”258  The significant Mexican population growth urged restrictionists to 
reevaluate the social and racial value of Mexicans and conclude that the integration of the 
Mexican population would disrupt the racial homogeneity of the Texas population.  The 
immigrant flow continued relatively uninterrupted until the United States entered World 
War I, in 1917.  Security concerns, a growing restrictionist critique of immigration policy 
and enforcement, and the need for more efficient wartime methods for regulating the 
immigrant flow contributed to the new restrictive immigration policy that was passed that 
year.  The new policy affected work on the border.  In 1917, the former Chinese 
Inspectors who were now known as Immigrant Inspectors assumed greater 
responsibilities.  
The 1917 Act also included a new “head tax,” literacy requirements, and time 
limits on labor contracts.  However, as the United States sought to limit the entry of 
persons believed to be public charges, immigration authorities along the border also 
relaxed the restrictions to encourage the entry of Mexican laborers and assist area 
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agriculturalists meet their harvest needs.  After World War I, agriculture in the Southwest 
expanded even more.  At least two consequences became evident.  Since many of the 
immigrants increasingly chose to remain in the U.S., Mexican communities throughout 
the Southwest and other parts of the United States grew significantly during the 1920s 
and early 1930s.  Also, new immigration policies were enacted to regulate the existing 
flows in accordance with the needs of employers in the United States. 
The Immigration Act of 1924, also known as the Johnson-Reed Act, established 
the Border Patrol.  The Act of 1924 established the outfit as a uniformed law enforcement 
agency of the Immigration Bureau, which operated within the Department of Labor.259  
The Border Patrol’s place within the Department of Labor spoke to the prominent role 
that immigration played in the story of labor supply and demand on the border region.  
Not surprisingly, a West Texas rancher with experience in the recruitment and use of 
Mexican labor became the strongest supporter of the bill that resulted in the Act of 1924.  
Congressman Claude Hudspeth owned a large sheep ranch near Del Rio, Texas, and 
served largely as a representative of the stockmen in the area.  When Congress passed the 
Act of 1924, Congressman Hudspeth successfully pushed for a rider to the appropriations 
bill that provided for at least one million dollars for a land border patrol.  One hundred 
thousand dollars were to be made available immediately.260 
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The first Border Patrol unit consisted of 450 “Patrol Inspectors” who were 
dispersed along the Canadian and Mexican boundaries as well as the Florida coastline.261  
The agency’s first national headquarters were in El Paso, which also functioned as a 
regional sector for the Border Patrol.  Its regional jurisdiction consisted of New Mexico 
and the three western counties of Texas.  El Paso was manned by approximately forty 
patrol officers, however, only a few were dispatched on scouting missions since it took 
months for the enrollees to train.  The other sector headquarters included Marfa, Texas 
(1924), Gainesville, Florida (1925), Rouses Point, New York (1926), and Grand Forks, 
South Dakota (1939).  Initially Inspectors wore their own clothing, received $1,300 a 
year, and furnished their own horses and feed.  
In West Texas, the Border Patrol was initially composed of mostly former 
“roughnecks” who had previously served as Texas Rangers or deputized cowboys.  The 
Border Patrol unit at El Paso operated under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Hubert 
C. Horsley with twenty-five “cowboys” who only needed a passing knowledge of 
Spanish and the ability to ride a horse.262  Border patrol service had lax requirements, 
unspecified duties, and the organization was unclear on the extent of its authority.  
According to one of the “first” recruits serving along the Texas-Mexico border in 1924, 
little was known of their actual duties, “no one knew what we were supposed to do or 
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how we were supposed to do it.”263  Former Border Patrolman Wesley Stiles noted that 
his responsibilities were simple: 
Catch Aliens. That’s what we were supposed to do.  The thing that 
established the Border Patrol was the influx of European aliens. Getting 
out of Europe from the depression there, coming through Mexico and into 
the United States.  That was the main purpose of the Border Patrol that 
was organized and went into effect…264 
 
They were simply equipped with the instruction to “look for aliens” and a little law book 
that gave them quick information on the recent and standing immigration laws in the 
United States.265 
The overall responsibility of the Border Patrol was to manage the numerical limits 
specified in the Quota Act of 1921 and the Immigration Act of 1924.266  In May 1921, 
Congress passed the Quota Act which restricted immigration to 355,000 a year and set a 
quota for each European country at 3 percent of the number of foreign-born persons of 
such nationality residing in the United States as determined by the census of 1910.267  For 
many restrictionists, such as the Ku Klux Klan, greater restrictions were needed to 
“prevent America from becoming the melting pot or dumping ground of the world.268  As 
a result of extensive political and social pressure from restrictionists, Congress passed a 
more comprehensive quota bill in 1924.  The Immigration Act of 1924 made several key 
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changes to the 1921 Act.  First, it revised the numerical value of the quotas from 3 
percent to 2 percent.  Second, it based the quotas on the 1890 census, which shifted the 
immigrant flow into the United States away from Southern and Eastern Europeans.  The 
1890 formula reduced the level of immigration to 155,000 per year and reduced the 
proportion of southern and eastern European immigration to 15 percent of the total.269   
A standard procedure that involved a very basic legal process outlined the 
enforcement of the quota acts.  Border Patrolmen would request an arrest warrant from 
the Secretary of Labor if someone was thought to be in the country illegally.  A court 
hearing would be held and legal counsel would be present if requested by the accused.  If 
the immigrant was found guilty of entering the country illegally, paperwork regarding his 
deportation was sent to the Department of Labor.  At this point the alien was secured his 
legal documents and at the government’s expense sent to an appropriate port of 
embarkation depending on where he originated.  In case of Mexican deportation, many 
were given the option of “voluntary return” and carted back to Mexico.270 
Nationalism and race played a prominent role in both the Quota Act of 1921 and 
the Immigration Act of 1924.  As a result of intense lobbying from the Ku Klux Klan, the 
American Federation of Labor, and restrictionist-minded politicians, a renewed emphasis 
was placed on patrolling the land borders and tightening up the enforcement of the law, 
especially along the southern border.271  W. A. Whalen, the District Immigration 
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Inspection Director, underscored this point in bold bureaucratic terms: “[the U.S.-Mexico 
boundary] must be guarded against the surreptitious entry of undesirable aliens ...”272  
Mexican immigrants emerged as the focal point in immigration discussion primarily 
because of their exemption from the quota laws and the oversupply of labor pools in 
some urban areas.273  The focus on Mexican immigration yielded yet another 
reorganization of the Border Patrol that recognized El Paso as a major point for the 
crossing of immigrants as well as alcoholic contraband. 
In order to restrict the flow of contraband and immigrants more effectively, the 
Border Patrol was placed under the authority of two directors in 1932.  One was in charge 
of the Mexican border office at El Paso.  Liquor smuggling was a major concern because 
it was thought to accompany immigrant smuggling as well.274  Smugglers used various 
methods to bring contraband across the international boundary.  As a result, the Border 
Patrol was modernized throughout the late 1920s and 1930s.  This involved standardized 
training.  The first Training School, “Camp Chigas”, was located in El Paso near the 
downtown area.  Training included functional “Border Spanish” and immigration laws 
and it lasted four hours per day.275  The training reflected the expanded function of the 
Border Patrol.  It was not only regulating the labor flows but it increasingly assumed 
stricter law enforcement responsibilities that included the protection of America’s moral 
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agenda in prohibition and its ethnic purity. The Great Depression brought the issues of 
labor and race to the forefront as prohibition laws were lifted in 1933. 
The stock market crash of 1929 and the resulting Great Depression decreased 
immigration flows for several reasons.  First, employment opportunities became scarce. 
Second, the restrictionist critique gathered popular racial support.  The Border Patrol thus 
became more aggressive in apprehending and deporting more Mexicans.276  U.S. consular 
offices also increasingly denied visas to Mexicans and immigration authorities began to 
more strictly enforce provisions of the Immigration Act of 1917 that denied entry to 
individuals liable to become public charges.  By 1930, all visa requests by Mexican 
common laborers were denied.277  By the 1930s the apprehensions along the Mexican 
border significantly outnumbered those along the Canadian border.278  The result was the 
deportation or voluntary movement back to Mexico of approximately 500,000 Mexico 
and U.S.-born Mexicans, the latter usually sons and daughters of the immigrants.279 
On December 9, 1930, newly appointed Secretary of Labor William Doak 
announced that his solution to the high unemployment rate in the United States was to 
deport immigrants holding jobs.280  Although he did not identify specific immigrant 
groups, the initiative greatly affected the Mexican community.  The effort, however, 
required manpower that far exceeded the capabilities of the Border Patrol.  Agency 
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officials responded to this by recruiting local and state law enforcement authorities to 
help in the deportations.281   
The Border Patrol also coordinated publicity stunts to scare immigrants back to 
their native homeland.  In some cases, press releases announced mass deportation drives 
and noted that local authorities would join in the effort in substantial numbers.282  
Mexicans and those of the Asiatic Barred Zone were specifically targeted.283  The agency 
also coordinated apprehension sweeps.  On February 13, 1931, for example, Border 
Patrol agents performed a raid in the El Monte area of Los Angeles questioning 300 
people of which thirteen were arrested.  Twelve of the thirteen were Mexicans with no 
criminal record and charged only with failure to prove legal entry.284  Between 1929 and 
1931, Mexican repatriation often involved raids in private homes and workplaces by the 
Border Patrol and other government officials.   
Los Angeles city officials were especially concerned that Mexicans were taking 
an inordinate amount of the relief services made available to the large number of 
unemployed workers.285  The raids yielded few results and many of the Mexicans who 
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returned to Mexico left voluntarily because of their high unemployment and destitute 
condition.286  The Los Angeles round-ups were repeated across the country.     
Mexicans in the 1930s were at the center of the immigration debate.  The 
heightened tension associated with the strict enforcement of immigration laws painted a 
negative image of Mexicans and contributed greatly to presenting them as scapegoats for 
the economic crisis.287  Increased Mexican migration within and beyond the Southwest, 
high unemployment rates in the early years of the Great Depression, also increased the 
restrictionist rhetoric.  The Border Patrol found itself in the middle of the highly 
emotional debate between restrictionists and anti-restrictionists which became especially 
pronounced in the 1920s and 1930s.  The Mexican was also caught in the anti-
immigration rhetoric.  Scapegoating and unsettling deportations caused much misery in 
the Mexican community.  Their incorporation into American society was also disrupted. 
 
The Border Patrol and the Mexican Community 
The challenge of integrating the Mexican community into American society can 
be best understood by examining their role as immigrant labor and its relationship with 
the Border Patrol.  Mexican labor distinguished itself in the late 1910s and 1920s when it 
registered high immigrant figures and assumed a migratory character in agriculture.  
Immigration was primarily a response to the labor needs in Southwestern industries, 
particularly agriculture.  Their movement across the border and throughout the 
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Southwest, the Far West, and the Midwest typically followed the maturation patterns in 
agriculture and the recruitment activities of their employers.  This gave rise to a 
migratory work force that provided a number of challenges to the Border Patrol, as its 
patrolmen sought to enforce the law and avoid denying farmers the immigrant workers 
they needed.  The mediating role that they played in West Texas can be appreciated by 
examining immigration policies and enforcement activities that preceded the National 
Quota Act of 1924.     
Immigration policy was revised following the passage of the Immigration Act of 
1917. The Department of Labor, for instance, established the Temporary Admissions 
Program which permitted approximately 80,000 Mexicans to work as a “guest-workers” 
in selected industries.288  The growing demand for laborers, especially from Mexico, 
eventually led to the designation of the Immigration Inspectors as labor and immigration 
brokers who regulated and monitored the flow of labor from Mexico.  They worked hand 
in hand with agricultural employers to meet labor demands in various industries.   
In 1917, the Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson allowed for a labor 
importation program during wartime that introduced workers for the agricultural, mining, 
and railroad industries.  Immigration officers and railroad companies from El Paso 
collaborated fully in the guest worker program.  After a successful evaluation that 
included physical examinations and intensive interrogations, laborers were escorted by 
Immigration Inspectors to the rear of the immigration office building to hear labor agents 
“pitch” their company’s services:  
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The employer’s representatives would make speeches about the delightful 
quarters, good pay and fine food they would have if they went to work for 
their company. When the promising was over, the [labor] agents would 
shout, ‘This way for the Santa Fe,’ ‘This way for the Southern Pacific...’289 
 
The obvious purpose of the change was to fill the void left by the previous strict 
immigration policies of the Chinese Exclusion Act, the U.S.’s entry into World War I, and 
the labor drop offs resulting from the Immigration Act of 1917.   
The first labor importation program guaranteed employers a legal process of labor 
contracting at the border.  Agriculturalists, of course, could still depend on the larger 
number of workers who were crossing without the direct assistance of government 
officials.  The labor importation program, in other words, institutionalized a process of 
close cooperation between government officials and farmers and provided prospective 
employers a more rational and legal system to insure a ready labor supply.  At a more 
general level, the Immigration Service continued to mediate the flow of labor to satisfy 
the requests of employers in the United States at the same time that it enforced 
immigration policy:   
…Immigration officers will attend to the admission and distribution of 
[Mexican] laborers…respective employers of the agreements required 
under departmental orders…will cooperate with immigration officials in 
keeping track of laborers after they are admitted and in establishing and 
enforcing a follow-up system, to insure as far as possible, the eventual 
return to Mexico of those admitted…290 
  
The amended policies of 1917 and 1918 introduced a seeming contradiction between the 
law and its enforcement.  Although the policy itself was relaxed to allow for the 
admission of more immigrants and to coordinate their movement more effectively, 
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officials on the border did not enforce the law strictly.  As labor demands escalated due to 
“wartime” crisis, immigration enforcement was relaxed.291    
The ebb and flow of Mexican immigration rested primarily on the actions of the 
Border Patrol.  The agency enforced the official and private practice of placing immigrant 
laborers in needed industries and restricting the overflow of unwanted immigrants into 
nearby towns and cities.  Border Patrolmen, E.A. “Dogie” Wright indicated this much 
when he told ranchers to “let me know when he’s gonna leave so I can pick him back 
up.”292  The system of cooperation between the farmers and the Border Patrol 
systematically controlled Mexican movement.    
The relationship between employers and the Border Patrol was significant in 
regulating the marginal social status of Mexicans.  In the mid-1920s, farmers in Texas 
worked in tandem with the Border Patrol to fix Mexican farm wages by restricting the 
mobility of agricultural workers who sought higher wages.  The average wage of 
Mexican laborers in Texas in 1926 and 1927 was the lowest in the south and 
southwestern region of the country.  Anglo farmers in Texas saw a clear distinction 
between Anglo wages and Mexican wages and sought the help of the Border Patrol to 
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regulate those divisions.293  However, the same time the Border Patrol regulated labor 
flows and enforced immigration policy, prohibition laws detracted the agency.   
The work of the Border Patrol became more complicated in 1920s and early 
1930s when its agents began to devote more of their attention to the smuggling of 
alcohol.  Mexican border residents often engaged in a “cat and mouse” game with the 
border patrolmen knowing that they were practically incapable of enforcing immigration 
laws as well as prohibition policies.  Moreover, the high demand for alcohol in the United 
States created a lucrative and profitable market.  Smugglers were willing to protect their 
valuable commodity by any means necessary and, as a result, violence often erupted 
between smugglers and the Border Patrol.   
Once again, the Mexican community experienced things differently.  
Prohibitionists generally saw Mexican communities as bastions for alcoholic 
consumption that promoted “temptation, contamination, and damnation.”  The general 
public also associated the contraband business with Mexicans.  This reinforced the view 
of Mexicans as unsuitable members of American society.294  Violent clashes between the 
Border Patrol and Mexican smugglers also added to negative public perceptions.295  In 
short, the Border Patrol’s responsibilities of enforcing both immigration and prohibition 
laws deepened divisions between Mexicans and Anglos.  This became evident in West 
Texas, especially in El Paso.   
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Throughout the Prohibition Era (1920-1933), El Paso and Ciudad Juárez, became 
sites of tension and conflict.  In one fourteen-month period during the late 1920s, 
nineteen Border Patrol officers were killed in the line of duty.296  According to some 
newspapers reports, gun battles occurred almost daily near the international crossing.297  
This was a natural consequence of the fact that the West Texas region and the 
corresponding border area on the Mexican side had become a major staging and crossing 
point for smuggling immigrants and alcohol.   
In a statement to the House of Representatives’ Committee of Immigration and 
Naturalization, District Director of Immigration at El Paso, Grover C. Wilmuth, 
emphasized that much of the illegal contraband and human crossings occurred in the 
vicinity of the city: 
…At El Paso—about 90 per cent of the crossing is done right in the 
vicinity of El Paso…Yes, they cross all up and down the Rio Grande in the 
vicinity of El Paso. That is within, say, 5 miles…Most of the liquor and 
alien smugglers work close to town. The reason for that is that if they get 
farther out away from the settlements—on the banks of the Rio Grande all 
along near town there are Mexican settlements, and if they can get across 
safely they can run for harbor or shelter in one of these Mexican houses 
along there [on the American side], and unless you see them and trail them 
in you will never find them.298  
 
In 1927 alone, the Border Patrol seized over three-thousand gallons of liquor and over 
3200 illegal immigrants in El Paso.299 
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Mary Rak, an early Border Patrol historian, noted that one of the more troubled 
locations existed near El Paso.  It was “Cordova Island,” a “small body of land, entirely 
surrounded by trouble.”300  During Prohibition, Cordova Island was a notorious haven for 
smugglers; it was almost completely surrounded by American soil, but lay outside the 
city limits of Ciudad Juárez, a “no-man’s land” on the border.301  According to many 
patrolmen and other authorities, Cordova Island’s topography was enough to offer 
protection to smugglers, or contrabandistas as they were known in the area.  A screen of 
brush and cottonwoods littered the Mexican side of the one-time riverbed, and the 
densely packed maze of Mexican homes on the American side gave immediate shelter to 
smugglers.302 
Border patrolmen considered some areas around downtown El Paso as “hot 
spots”, as the following interview with a former border patrolmen indicates: 
You know, you’d maybe go into Eighth and Ninth Street…and they’d start 
shooting at you. You’d crawl on your belly so you could return the fire. 
I’ve had bullets throw gravel in my face; they’ve come pretty close.303 
 
Violence, in fact, became a common occurrence as customs agents and the Border Patrol 
sought out and confronted smugglers.  Newspaper reports from February 1927, for 
example, suggest that not one twenty-four hour period passed without a report of gunfire 
along the border between Fort Hancock and Anapra, a seventy-mile stretch extending east 
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and west of El Paso’s city limits.304  Thirty-two gun battles were also reported that same 
year.305  An older resident of El Paso who had emigrated from Mexico once recounted 
that “every night people would get caught in the crossfire and both Mexicans and 
Americans died.”306  El Paso presented major difficulties to the Border Patrol, especially 
since cooperative measures once utilized by other law enforcement agencies no longer 
existed.  
The difficult conditions on the border involved Mexican officials.  Mexican Fiscal 
Guards, or fiscales, worked closely with smugglers and persons interested in immigrating 
illegally to the United States.  The cooperation of earlier times was no longer evident. 
Both groups promoted official policies that sought peaceful relations.  The fiscales, 
however, generally supported illegal border crossers much like the Border Patrol looked 
the other way when farmers recruited Mexicans on both sides of the border.  
The fiscal guards would often position themselves in areas where known 
smugglers would congregate and force them to pay a nominal fee to guarantee free and 
safe passage. According to at least one apprehended smuggler, fiscales were a prominent 
fixture in the contraband business: 
…There have been some Fiscal Guards on the levee as they usually come 
down for the purpose of collecting fees from ‘Cucho’ for allowing him to 
run liquor over the river. One ‘fiscale’ came down tonight and made 
‘cucho’ pay him five pesos for each of the eight loads which we were to 
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bring across. I know that money is turned to the Fiscal Guards for passing 
liquor…307 
 
It is suggested that as long as smuggling retained considerable value, Mexican fiscales 
stood to benefit economically and therefore resisted cooperation with the Border Patrol.  
The combined efforts of residents and officials to resist prohibition policy further isolated 
the Border Patrol from community. 
According to a patrolman, the passing of the prohibition laws in West Texas 
increased the lawlessness.308  Rum runners were especially violent and were considered 
ready to fight at the “drop of a hat.”  Famed border patrolmen E.A. “Dogie” Wright 
added that “there was much public sentiment against those officers who enforced the 
law.”309  On numerous occasions, the smugglers would drop their cargo at the point of 
possible apprehension and flee back to Mexico.  Once near or on the Mexican side of the 
boundary, smugglers would often fire on the border patrolmen.  Another border 
patrolman described one such encounter: 
…When challenged to halt the smugglers dropped their loads and ran 
through the Box Factory Fence. When one of the smugglers reached the 
Box Factory platform he turned and fired two shots at our officers and 
further when the smugglers were making good their escape into the 
settlement…310 
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The isolated episodes of seemingly spiteful acts against the Border Patrol emphasize the 
wide-range of violence that existed in West Texas.  More importantly, it underscores the 
raging animosity that persisted between Anglo authority and a resistant community.   
 
Conclusion  
The history of the Border Patrol, especially in West Texas, reveals that border 
work involved changing responsibilities that reflected important political and economic 
trends, including immigrant flows that corresponded to distinct phases in the 
industrialization of the southwestern economy and a spirited national discourse over 
immigration policy that followed the up and down motion of the economy.  The Border 
Patrol and its predecessors helped mediate growers’ demands for foreign-born labor and 
the demands by restrictionists for stricter immigration controls.  Growers and federal 
officers worked jointly in regulating the flow and distribution of labor by systematically 
monitoring the immigrant and assigning them to low-wage jobs.  The added 
responsibility of enforcing prohibition complicated the Border Patrol’s ability to do it job.  
The lack of cooperation with Mexican officials made it even more difficult for the federal 
agency to enforce the law. 
The ambiguous enforcement of immigration policy in the mid 1910s affected the 
incorporation of the Mexican into American society.  The relaxation of the immigration 
laws of 1917, for instance, allowed Mexican laborers to avoid various restrictions.311  
                                                 
311 In the 1918 “U.S. Immigration Service Bulletin” updates on laws and amendments are published to 
inform immigration officers of their duties.  In various months throughout 1918, notices are given to the 
officers to allow Mexicans into a variety of low-wage jobs under the supervision of the employer and 
immigration office.  Suveillance of the workers was utilized to prevent them from seeking higher-paying 
 132
Greater accessibility to the United States, however, did not necessarily mean that the 
workers could travel freely and obtain jobs according to their training and experience.  
The immigrants were mostly channeled to work in low-wage and low-skilled jobs in 
agriculture.  Their movement was regulated by recruiters representing various 
southwestern industries.  These recruiters often worked together and in collaboration with 
government agencies like the Border Patrol.  The idea was to guarantee agriculturalists 
the workers that they needed, especially during harvest time.   
The Border Patrol assisted these recruitment and distribution activities on the 
border mostly by looking the other way when immigrants crossed and recruiters enticed 
them to different farming areas.  The agency was able to fulfill its official responsibilities 
by conducting raids in urban areas and in stepping up apprehension after the harvests had 
been completed.  The ambiguous nature of enforcement only spoke to this seeming 
contradiction.  Immigration enforcement, however, responded to certain logic of labor 
control, that is, immigration policy could be applied in a flexible manner to accommodate 
southwestern employers. 
Enforcing prohibition was less ambiguous, although it complicated the job of 
Border patrolmen many of whom described the 1920s as the most violent years in the 
history of the Border Patrol.312  The added responsibility of patrolling for contraband 
liquor was enough to challenge the ability of the Border Patrol to effectively guard the 
border.  The violence, abetted partly my Mexican officials, complicated matters further.  
In the process of enforcing prohibition laws, the Border Patrol further antagonized local 
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residents.  Mexican immigrants were already chafing under the watchful eye of border 
patrolmen.  Their action against liquor smugglers, most of whom were Mexicans, and the 
violence that accompanied this enforcement activity alienated the Mexican community 
more.  Anglo businessmen and consumers who supported the illicit trade also reacted to 
the work of the Border Patrol.  The Mexican community, however, came out of this story 
the greatest loser because they endured the inconsistent enforcement of immigration 
policy as well as the negative image of a law-breaking foreigner who threatened to 











                                                                                                                                                 






This study examined the history of West Texas and northern Mexico between 
1895 and 1924 with a special focus on the establishment of U.S. militarization and its 
connection to racialized social relations.  An emphasis on West Texas as a border region 
that includes the towns of El Paso and Ciudad Juárez provided a transnational perspective 
from which to study national and regional histories.  The study highlights events and 
authority figures throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to 
demonstrate how militarization of the region as a pacification, border security, and 
institutional building initiative incorporated the region and its people into the political 
and cultural orbit of the United States.  The border was initially militarized in the last half 
of the nineteenth century to pacify the region and to prepare it for eventual incorporation 
into the U.S.’s socio-economy.  U.S. authority was firmly established during the late 
nineteenth century and the early twentieth century despite challenges that included a 
general state of lawlessness, great distance from centers of power in Austin and 
Washington, D.C., and the use of Mexico as a safe haven for clandestine behavior and a 
staging area for violent depredations into Texas.  Establishing authority was not without 
its problems as many West Texas residents often reacted to the imposition of order.  
Framing this give and take process were experiences, policies, and programs that 
included progressive reform, the Mexican Revolution, racial conflict, and immigration.      
West Texas, especially El Paso and Ciudad Juárez, was an important international 
commercial and political staging point throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
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centuries.  The region boasted a growing population and significant economic 
development in the late 1880s and 1890s which was spearheaded by the construction of 
the railroad connecting the cities to their national centers.  The heavy flow of immigrants 
crossing through El Paso and Ciudad Juárez reflected and reinforced the region’s 
development into a bustling port of trade and commerce between the United States and 
Mexico.    
The study focused on the period between 1895 and 1924 in order to measure 
change in the early development of the border region’s authority structure.  The last half 
of the nineteenth century was characterized by efforts to militarily pacify the region and 
establish basic American institutions such as schools, banks, and commercial enterprises.  
Pacification followed a period of wars—the Texas war for independence and the Mexican 
American War—and the persistence of violence that often took the form of racial and 
international conflict.  The turn of the century and the early 1900s, on the other hand, 
witnessed the establishment of American rule, although conflict continued largely as a 
result of efforts to discipline the region’s population into an American cultural enclave. 
This study underscores the importance of the distant state, regional, and local 
authorities involved in the incorporation of the region into the American socio-economy.  
The process of pacifying the area and building key American institutions continued into 
the early 1900s partly because of the difficulties involved in establishing authority over 
the great distance separating the region from centers of power.  Unresolved issues of a 
local and international nature and the persistent problem of racial tension that 
militarization reinforced also contributed to the slow process of establishing U.S. 
authority in the region. 
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The period from 1895 to 1924 saw the transformation of the border region.  Along 
with the economic and commercial changes caused by modernization, social and political 
shifts served as a backdrop to the story of authority building in West Texas.  The 
reformist agendas that swept across the state with the election of Governor Charles A. 
Culberson in the mid-1890s, for instance, influenced the efforts to pacify the region and 
incorporate it into the cultural and political world of the United States.  The governor 
mobilized the Texas Rangers to enforce the new policy against “vice,” especially 
prizefighting and gambling, in West Texas.  True to the independent spirit that had 
developed in the distant region, local officials garnered popular support for an effective 
challenge against the Rangers.  At the turn of the twentieth century, larger issues of an 
international nature, including immigration and the Mexican Revolution, often brought 
local authorities in line with state policies that were re-defining relations between Mexico 
and the United States.  
While the early efforts at pacifying the region and in securing American rule 
resulted in major conflicts, a number of new factors further complicated the process of 
building a new society.  The Mexican Revolution, for example, had a significant impact 
on Texas, not merely in terms of armed conflicts along the Rio Grande, but also because 
border cities such as El Paso offered a haven to rival revolutionary groups from Mexico.  
They influenced Mexicans along the border to join the Mexican Revolution and to adopt 
critical views towards racial discrimination and their condition as a socially dominated 
group.  Others were less ideologically inclined and joined the international movement 
because of personal grievances as well as a way to maintain friendship and kinship ties.  
The sweeping changes revealed the unavoidable ties between the two countries and, as a 
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result, the protection of American lives and property emerged as a serious concern for 
U.S. government officials and residents living along the border and in Mexico.   
The Revolution threatened and disrupted American economic investments in 
Mexico, especially in northern Mexico where mines and other industries were largely 
owned by U.S. investors.  Diplomatic uncertainty over the protection of private property 
and citizens was a critical problem for American investors and the U.S. government.  The 
violence of the revolution also added untold numbers to the already large immigrant flow. 
The Revolution and the political exiles that joined the migration raised security concerns 
that complicated the incorporation of Mexicans into American society. 
Increased immigration from Mexico, primarily a response to the industrialization 
of the regional economy of the Southwest and the violence associated with the 
Revolution that overflowed into Texas, frayed social relations.  Opposition to 
immigration also involved nativists groups who claimed that the unregulated flow was 
increasing the population of Mexicans in the cities.  They made xenophobic arguments of 
racial, cultural, and economic vulnerability.  Restrictionist groups argued that Mexicans 
were not staying on the farms, but traveling to the towns and cities where they depressed 
wages and displaced Anglo workers.   
David Montejano points out that these critics were concerned that growers did not 
care that their recruitment efforts were worsening economic conditions in the cities.  The 
introduction of Mexican workers at a large scale eventually gave rise to a formidable 
restrictionist campaign.  Law enforcement agencies such as the Texas Rangers and the 
Border Patrol were caught in the middle of the debate over immigration and often found 
themselves walking the fine line of negotiating different world views represented by 
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restrictionists and growers.  The debate over immigration and the official challenge of 
mediating differences between growers and their critics was also part of the story of 
authority building in West Texas.   
Comprehensive legislation passed in 1924 attempted to bridge the differences 
between restrictionists and growers.  Immigration policy, such as the Immigration Act of 
1924, became more restrictive and enforcement practices became stricter.  The policy 
greatly reduced immigration from Europe by lowering their quota numbers and it 
established a permanent federal agency, the United States Border Patrol, to enforce the 
nation’s immigration laws.  The Border Patrol established its headquarters in El Paso, 
Texas, and originally only policed the U.S.-Mexican boundary.  El Paso’s role as the 
“only real labor depot” on the border reflected its significance as a point of convergence 
for immigrants and employers.  This explains its selection as a central headquarters for 
the Border Patrol.  Moreover, the pairing of El Paso and the Border Patrol positioned the 
agency to broker the labor demands by agriculturalists in the region.  Border Patrolmen 
enforced the law but made sure that area growers had all the workers they needed at 
harvest time.   
Problems associated with enforcing the National Prohibition Act of 1919 
overshadowed the challenges posed by immigration.  The insatiable thirst for contraband 
liquor inspired the illegal flow of alcoholic products from Mexico, especially in places 
like El Paso.  Moreover, the popular taste for liquor and its prohibition created situations 
that challenged authority in very unique ways.  Local authorities and otherwise law-
abiding citizens from the border cities, for example, engaged in large-scale alcohol 
 139
smuggling.  The smugglers, on the other hand, were mostly Mexicans.  Mexican 
authorities also joined the illicit trade by serving as scouts and hired guns to protect the 
illegal cargo.  The association of the trade with Mexicans, as well as, the violence that 
often erupted between U.S. law enforcement officials and the smugglers complicated 
matters even more by reinforcing the idea of the Mexican as a criminal.  The increased 
vigilance that accompanied Prohibition between 1918 and 1933 also bred discontent 
among Mexicans, including local and federal officials, who often claimed that law 
enforcement officials violated their rights. 
 This study pays special attention to race relations between Mexicans and Anglos 
as well as between Mexico and the United States.  The story of establishing order and 
building a border society included race as a means for defining social relations in West 
Texas and intergovernmental relations across the international border.  Isolated events, 
such as the Santa Ysabel massacre, antagonized the Mexican community on both sides of 
the border and prompted violent responses from Anglos and local authorities.  Law 
enforcement agencies reflected and reinforced local prejudice, some of which originated 
during the period of the Mexican-American War, the San Elizario Salt War, and the 
Mexican Revolution. 
During the tumultuous years of the Mexican Revolution, the Texas Rangers 
allowed for their racial antipathies to influence their relationship with the Mexican 
community of West Texas.  Battles with suspected bandits evolved from personal 
vendettas to indiscriminate violence towards innocent Mexican residents.  The wholesale 
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murder of innocent Mexican men at El Porvenir reflected the categorization of the 
Mexican as the subject “other.”   
Race became even more important in defining social relations when authorities 
treated Mexicans as a defeated minority while ostensibly meting out justice in an 
impartial way.  In the El Paso race riot of 1916, for instance, the U.S. Army reinforced 
segregation between Mexican residents in “Chihuahuita” and the rest of El Paso with the 
use of martial law and “dead lines.”  Army officials intended to use the “dead line” to put 
down the riot and isolate El Paso’s vice industry within the Mexican district.  The 
Mexican community, however, emerged as a subject “other”. 
This dissertation used a case study approach in order to acknowledge the 
important role that selected law enforcement bodies played in the development of a 
border society.  As the state’s primary police force throughout late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the Texas Rangers carried out state initiatives in the region.  The U.S. 
Army, on the other hand, enforced national policies regarding neutrality and sovereignty 
while bolstering defenses along the border.  Military policies, of course, also involved at 
least one important intervention in Mexico.  This left the National Guard to assume a 
greater role in peace-making along the border.  Militarization also involved the Border 
Patrol, a permanent federal agency responsible for enforcing immigration and prohibition 
policies enacted during the time period.  
Events such as the Chico Cano case, the race riot, the mobilization of the National 
Guard, and Prohibition presented special challenges to the different law enforcement 
agencies that sought to pacify and incorporate West Texas into American society.  These 
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events represent specific experiences in the history of the Rangers, the U.S. Army, the 
National Guard, the Border Patrol, and local officials.  They also reveal interchanges with 
the local population as official initiative triggered varied responses.  A great disconnect 
between authority and the local population emerges and complicates its incorporation into 
the American socio-economic enclave.   
The Texas Rangers played a critical role in the establishing authority in West 
Texas.  The Rangers were first entrusted with clearing the land of Indians.  Later, they 
assumed the responsibility of suppressing violence and disciplining the Mexican 
community.  The Frontier Battalion and Special Ranger Force led the way beginning in 
the late nineteenth century.  Both forces were created with distinct responsibility of 
protecting westward settlement from Indian depredations and suppressing banditry along 
the Mexican border.  The Rangers continued to act as the state’s primary police force 
during the early part of the twentieth century.  One of its primary responsibilities was to 
suppress political activity among Mexicans and to act on the increasing number of raids 
planned on Mexican soil.  Their overzealous activities earned the Rangers a reputation for 
being a violent police force that victimized Mexicans in Texas.  
The Rangers in West Texas confronted unique circumstances that saw their 
relationship with locals change by end of the nineteenth century.  As a representative of 
the state, the Rangers began to enforce the state’s temperance initiatives which conflicted 
with local custom and practice.  In the mid-1890s, Governor Charles A. Culberson 
initiated his progressive reform that included the banning of prizefighting and gambling 
in the state.  The governor mobilized the Rangers to enforce the state’s anti-prizefight 
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legislation in El Paso.  Since most El Paso residents were invested in the entertainment 
industry, progressive reform disrupted the region’s way of life.  Moreover, local law 
enforcement officials generally perceived the presence of the Texas Rangers as an affront 
to their abilities.  However, as the political landscape shifted towards a more progressive 
minded polity in 1903 so did the Rangers’ role in the region.  Problems associated with 
Mexican immigration and the Mexican Revolution changed the relationship of the Texas 
Rangers with local officials and West Texas residents.  Increasingly, local Anglos came to 
see the Rangers as a necessary bulwark against violence associated with the Mexican 
Revolution.  
The appearance of Captain John Hughes as the new head of Company “D” 
marked a shift in the local perception of the Texas Rangers in the region.  Although 
concerns over border violence were foremost in the minds of many residents, the Rangers 
also influenced them by seeking more collaborative relationships with Anglos, as well as 
Mexicans.  Hughes was able to nurture cooperative relationships with many of the 
authorities and ranchers in West Texas and Ciudad Juárez.  For example, Hughes, along 
with other Ranger officers like Joe Sitters, developed a friendship with Francisco 
“Pancho” Villa.  Hughes was also instrumental in building positive relationships with 
local Mexicans by working closely with many of them and by learning some Spanish. 
Hughes did this because he understood that the Mexican population in West Texas greatly 
outnumbered Anglos and often challenged local Anglo American authority.  
The increasing violence threatened any hope of lasting racial peace and 
overshadowed friendly relations that Rangers like Hughes were able to develop.  
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Livestock thefts and border raids, in particular, plagued ranchers living in remote areas 
and they became increasingly suspicious of Mexicans in the area.  Bandit gangs, on the 
other hand, were driven by two compelling motivations.  They ransacked ranch properties 
to advance their financial interests and to obtain retribution for the injustices Anglos had 
caused on the Mexican population.  Their actions, coupled with a popular disposition to 
see Mexicans in negative terms, encouraged Anglo ranchers and the larger society to 
believe that criminality was synonymous with being Mexican.  All along, the Ranger 
treatment of Mexicans became harsher and more indiscriminate. 
Many Rangers utilized humiliating and brutal tactics to deter banditry in the area.  
They had developed a reputation for killing Mexicans on trumped up charges and for 
attempting to “escape” before they reached the local jail.  The harsh treatment exercised 
by the Rangers reinforced the distant and violent relationships between Mexicans and 
Anglos.  
Bandit activity and Ranger excesses increased throughout the period of the 
Mexican Revolution.  The case of Ranger Joe Sitters and the social bandit Chico Cano 
typified the violent struggle between Anglo authority and Mexican residents.  Cano 
emerged as a protector of the Mexican people who sought retribution against the rich 
oppressors that subjugated his people.  On the other hand, many residents and law 
enforcement authorities simply perceived Cano as a bandit and a threat to the social 
order.   
Anglos generally categorized Mexicans as potential bandits or bandit supporters 
primarily because their communities often supported the bandits.  Some of them believed 
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that Mexicans could not be trusted because they could not distinguish between a 
“friendly” Mexican from a bandit.  The massacre at El Porvenir demonstrated the 
inconsiderate and even contemptuous view of Mexicans that characterized the work of 
the Rangers.  
The Rangers’ treatment of the Mexican community reflected long-standing 
distrust between Mexicans and Anglos in West Texas.  They had been engaged in a 
tenuous and conflictual relationship since at least the time of the Texas War for secession 
and the Mexico-American War.  The San Elizario Salt War of 1877 reminded everyone 
that racial ill-will still existed.  The insurrection was finally subdued and the salt licks 
remained free to all residents.  Nevertheless, the armed conflict demonstrated that race 
continued to define relations between Mexicans and Anglos.  
The Mexican Revolution was an important backdrop to the tenuous relationship 
between Anglos and Mexicans in West Texas.  Several contributing factors emerged 
throughout the conflict that deepened the divisions between the two communities.  Many 
Anglo ranchers and residents in West Texas feared that reprisals from local Mexicans.  
This was evident when popular revolutionary leader Pascual Orozco was killed under 
suspicious circumstances in El Paso.  Anglos in the small town of Sierra Blanca 
immediately took arms and patrolled the town for any Mexicans that might want to exact 
revenge on local Anglos.  Army troops and National Guardsmen also reacted.  They took 
to the streets of Chihuahuita in what was called by the mayor a “precautionary” effort 
because of rumors of an uprising.  The feared uprising did not occur.   
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Wilson’s recognition of Venustiano Carranza’s government, coming months after 
the start of the San Diego revolt in deep South Texas, may have been the single most 
important event in the Revolution that affected life in West Texas.  Villa’s subsequent 
anti-American tirade fanned fears that many Anglos had been harboring since the 
outbreak of the Revolution.  The climatic point was reached in January 1916 when Villa’s 
soldiers killed the American engineers near Santa Ysabel, Chihuahua.  Their bodies were 
immediately sent to El Paso where many Anglo residents sought justice under their own 
terms and marched to Chihuahuita seeking retribution. 
Soldiers entered Chihuahuita and began to institute order in the district by 
declaring martial law.  At this point, General John Pershing resurrected a Civil War prison 
guard tactic by imposing a “dead line.”  A perimeter was outlined and patrolled by the 
soldiers to keep Mexicans contained in their neighborhood.  The military enforced “dead 
line” was full of meaning.  Mexicans were to remain in their place under threat of 
violence, both from angry Anglos and concerned military officials and the policy carried 
the meanings of segregation and containment.  
The Columbus raid raised the stakes even higher.  It led the federal government to 
further militarize the border by mobilizing the National Guard.  Congress passed the 
National Defense Act in 1916 which federalized all state militias and placed them under 
the command of the U.S. army.  Their principle responsibilities were to protect property 
owners from ranch raids, enforce the country’s neutrality policies, and organize 
surveillance networks to anticipate any incursions that might occur from Mexicans on 
both sides of the river.   
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The massive mobilization included over 100,000 guardsmen.  This build-up, 
however, once again demonstrated that it was difficult for authorities to establish order on 
the West Texas border.  The vast space, rough terrain, and limited manpower, the same 
obstacles that hampered the work of the Texas Rangers, limited the effectiveness of the 
National Guard.  National Guard officers responded much like the Texas Rangers, that is, 
they organized civilian groups known as home guards to report suspected illegal activity 
or potential ranch raids.  The National Guard, like the Texas Rangers, also treated 
Mexicans as potential threats, and in that way contributed to the anti-Mexican feelings 
that dominated West Texas.   
The presence of the National Guard in West Texas, however, added a unique set of 
circumstances along the U.S.-Mexican border.  Home guards, at times, abused their 
authority or supplied the Guard with misleading information with led to false accusations 
and misdirected actions against Mexicans.  Commanding officers were constantly 
communicating to their units that special care and treatment should be undertaken with 
the Mexican population.  The reports reflected that mistrust between Mexicans and Anglo 
authority persisted.  A backlash to the presence of the National Guard was also seen in El 
Paso when policies directed at military installments directly affected local businessmen.  
The National Guard contributed to the isolation of Chihuahuita when its soldiers 
forced city officials to place restrictions on the vice industry that included moving some 
of the businesses to other parts of town. Progressive initiatives intended to curb the 
excesses of military personnel in the vice industry brought economic hardship to business 
owners in El Paso’s “Red Light” and downtown districts.  This occurred when city and 
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military officials expanded the use of the 1916 “dead line” to include entertainment-based 
businesses in downtown El Paso.  Soldiers were encouraged by churches and businesses 
outside the district to seek recreational activities in other parts of the city.  Though vice 
was never eradicated from the city, the redirected patronage away from Chihuahuita 
further isolated the district.  The National Guard’s presence along the U.S.-Mexico border 
disturbed social relations and failed to bridge the Mexican and Anglo communities.   
The Border Patrol, like the National Guard, also faced difficulties on the border.  
Many of its problems stemmed from the fact that the agency assumed two major 
responsibilities in the border region.  It was responsible for enforcing immigration law 
and, and after the passage of the Prohibition Act, the smuggling of contraband liquor.  
The Immigration Act of 1924 appropriated one-million dollars for its creation and 
established its headquarters in El Paso.  The initial responsibility of the Border Patrol was 
to enforce the provisions of the act that included the restriction of immigrants from 
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.  A quota was set of two percent for each nationality 
group based on the 1890 U.S. census reports.  The quota did little to affect the Mexican 
immigrant flow.  Immigrants from Mexico were excluded from the restrictive rolls but 
were subject to fees, literacy tests, taxes, and undergo a medical examination.  Despite 
increased restrictions on immigration the Border Patrol was overwhelmed by the 
immensity of the immigrant flow coming into the United States. 
The Border Patrol paid little attention to illegal Mexican immigrants and focused 
much of their energy on enforcing customs regulations and prohibition laws.  American 
prohibition was in full swing and much attention was given to it.  Alcohol and alien 
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smuggling was a lucrative business and many were willing to go to any extent to protect 
their cargo.  Violence resulted from this stubborn will and economic payoff.  The 
insatiable appetite for contraband liquor in the United States and Mexico’s willingness to 
supply it created an added obstacle to fully establish authority in West Texas.  Though the 
liquor trade detracted the Border Patrol from its primary responsibility in the area of 
immigration, it continued to play an important role in both insuring that farmers had the 
workers they needed and in responding to the restrictionist calls for tighter immigration 
controls.   
The Patrol walked a fine line when it came to enforcing immigration laws and 
distributing labor to U.S. farmers.  Employers, such as railroad companies and growers, 
worked in tandem with the Border Patrol to satisfy their labor needs and regulate the 
workers’ movement.  Amendments made to restrictive immigration policies that allowed 
for Mexican immigrant contract labor satisfied the growers’ needs.  However, Mexican 
mobility was regulated since employers and immigration officials made sure laborers 
stayed on specified sites and returned to their homeland when their contracts expired.  
This reflected how the Border Patrol facilitated labor distribution while enforcing 
immigration policy. 
West Texas became a major supply route for much of the United States’ 
agricultural and industrial needs.  The border region boasted the highest concentration of 
Mexicans in the southwest.  Moreover, El Paso’s proximity to a large pool of Mexican 
labor allowed American corporations to recruit directly at El Paso without the help of 
intermediary labor agents.  Industrial and agricultural industries tapped into El Paso’s 
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labor supply throughout the 1910s and 1920s.  The establishment of the Border Patrol as 
both a labor facilitator and immigration officer reflected the mediating role the agency 
had in placing the Mexican within the socio-economic enclave of the United States.    
The overall relationship between law enforcement agencies and local 
communities contributed to the establishment of racially divided communities.  Singly 
and collectively, the agencies reinforced these divisions at they same time that they 
established authority and helped incorporate the region into the U.S. socio-economy.  At 
the same time, however, they reinforced problems, particularly the racialization of social 
relations in West Texas.  The divisions between Mexicans and Anglos were, in part, 
militarily enforced.  General Pershing’s declaration of martial law and “dead lines” 
reinforced a policy of segregation that isolated the Mexicans in “Chihuahuita.”  The 
extended uses of the “dead line” policy to contain El Paso’s vice industry near the 
Mexican sector and restrict the military’s patronage further hampered the integration of 
the community into the larger socio-economic fabric of the region. 
The Rangers, on the other hand, introduced even harsher law enforcement.  Their 
wholesale murders of innocent civilians at El Porvenir and the use of crude justice is a 
case in point.  In the early years of the twentieth century, the skirmishes between the 
Texas Rangers and the alleged Mexican bandits were especially important in suggesting 
that the Mexican community was given to criminal behavior to a greater extent than the 
rest of the population in West Texas.  Anglo residents in West Texas were thus 
encouraged to consider all Mexicans as potential bandits  
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Immigration policy also marginalized the Mexican.  Congress, on the one hand, 
exempted Mexicans from the restrictive policies of the twentieth century and flooded the 
Southwest and other parts of the country with labor supplies that often exceeded actual 
labor needs.  The labor surplus mostly benefited growers.  Immigration policy, of course, 
did not address what happened to the workers who were arriving by the hundreds of 
thousands.  Employers, especially southwestern farmers, consistently assigned them the 
lower-paying and lower-skilled jobs regardless of prior training or experience.  
Government agencies like the Border Patrol actually participated in this process by 
allowing immigrants to cross relatively undisturbed during the harvest season.  The 
Border Patrol also promoted the idea that the government was responsive to the pleas of 
the restrictionists by occasionally conducting raids or by stepping up their apprehension 
activities.  The exercise of authority in West Texas, in other words, reinforced social 
divisions in West Texas and contributed to their racialization. 
This dissertation has also placed the emergence of the Mexican subject “other” 
within a historical context.  Immigration policy aimed at both growers and restrictionist 
groups marginalized the Mexican.  On one hand, the Mexican laborer is exempted from 
the restrictive policies passed in the early part of the twentieth century to satisfy the labor 
demands of growers and industries throughout the southwest.  However, their status 
remained largely at the lower-paying echelons of labor inhibiting their social upward 
mobility.  On the other hand, the influx of Mexican immigrants threatened the cultural 
homogeneity preserved by nativist groups.  Restrictive policies such as head taxes and 
medical evaluations coupled with the enforcement powers of the United States Border 
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Patrol were thought to preserve Anglo cultural homogeneity.  The racialized Mexican as 
neither black nor white complicated the racial hierarchy of American society.313  Their 
increasing population numbers alarmed the Anglo community which projected its fears 
by vilifying Mexicans as the cause for social decay and degeneracy.   Full incorporation 
of the Mexican into American cultural enclave was disrupted by intense moments of 
crisis and fear of American power displacement.   
This study makes several contributions to the history of militarization and 
borderlands history.  First, this study contributes to the history of militarization in West 
Texas and El Paso by examining the experience of different agencies.  The Texas 
Rangers, U.S. Army, the National Guard, and the Border Patrol shared similar 
experiences that included resistance and conflict.  However, each institution affected 
social relations between Anglos and Mexicans in unique ways that complicated the 
pacification process of the region.   
An examination of each institution that was mobilized to West Texas and El Paso 
exposes its direct impact on social relations.  For example, the Texas Rangers saw their 
role change over time.  At the close of the nineteenth century, the Texas Rangers enforced 
state policies that disrupted the local economy and social practices of El Paso.  As a 
result, the independent minded city perceived the presence of the Rangers as an outside 
interference and an affront to local authority.  At the turn of the twentieth century and 
under new leadership, the Rangers sought collaborative relationships with both Anglo and 
Mexican residents, especially with Mexican revolutionary figures like Pancho Villa.  
                                                 
313 David Montejano, Anglos and Mexicans in the Making of Texas, 1836-1986 (Austin: The University of 
Texas Press, 1987), pp. 179-196. 
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However, the overarching circumstances stemming from the Mexican Revolution 
overshadowed these relationships.  
Rangers took on an additional set of circumstances stemming largely from the 
outbreak of the Mexican Revolution.  For example, banditry along the Texas-Mexico 
border increased significantly throughout the Revolution.  Some were inspired by 
revolutionary thought and others pursued retributive measures for injustices stemming 
from past conflicts.  Nonetheless, as Rangers chased after the bandits and their 
confrontations grew more violent the tensions between the Anglo and Mexican 
communities grew increasingly more complex as banditry became associated with the 
greater Mexican community.  Mexican communities on both sides of the river were 
suspected of aiding the bandits and as a result, the Mexican population was vilified and 
experienced indiscriminate violence at the hands of the Rangers and ranchers in the area.  
The actions of the Rangers and bandits had a direct impact on the social relations 
between Anglo and Mexican residents in West Texas.   
In another example, the U.S. Army had a unique impact on social relations 
between the two ethnic communities.  The military during times of intense crisis, 
especially the El Paso race riot in 1916, enacted rigid and strict enforcement of separate 
communities.  The “dead line” marked and enforced boundaries between Anglo and 
Mexican residents in El Paso and to a lesser degree between Mexico and the United 
States.  Vigilant measures sought by the U.S. Army enacted methods of control that kept 
Mexican residents separated from the rest of the city.  These measures exercised by the 
U.S. Army and Texas Rangers; for example, offer a particular look at how militarization 
affected social relations in West Texas and El Paso. 
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This dissertation also underscores West Texas and El Paso as a unique region.  
The area was a major thoroughfare for goods, ideas, and the movement of people and 
groups.  This politicized and agitated the already tenuous relations resonating in the area.  
At the same time, these relationships were elevated to an international level because the 
cities were major prizes for various groups including those directly involved with the 
Mexican Revolution.  El Paso served as a safe haven for revolutionary factions to 
organize operations, recruit sympathizers, and purchase necessary supplies.  Ciudad 
Juárez, on the other hand, was a critical staging point for battles and access to goods.  El 
Paso as a revolutionary center, however, was not the only factor that defined the region as 
unique.   
People in the region were accustomed to making independent decisions and 
viewed adverse policies from the state and federal government as outside interference. 
The independent spirit manifested during the intense militarization period seen at the turn 
of the twentieth century.  At times, the city saw both Anglos and Mexicans working 
together to resist policy that disrupted their way of life.  In other instances, however, the 
independent spirit was seen by Mexican residents who resisted the encroachment of 
Anglos and authority figures.  Nevertheless, the series of events, the militarization of the 
region, and the reaction by its residents underscore that West Texas and El Paso offer a 
unique challenge to militarization and the development of authority.   
In this study, a close examination of the El Paso race riot is offered.  The analysis 
illustrates how social relations changed as a result of militarization.  The military 
enforced policy of the “dead line” instituted strict and rigid divisions between the Anglo 
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and Mexican communities.  One of the more poignant consequences of the policy was the 
discipline and control of movement by citizens within El Paso and between El Paso and 
Ciudad Juárez.  I am especially interested in metaphors like the “dead line” and plan to 
pursue it in future work.  
Lastly, this study offers a framework that takes in account of local experience and 
the larger political world beyond.  My study looks at how agencies affected social 
relations and how larger events impacted the way the agencies behaved.  In addition, the 
larger context is couched into a localized study that adds another perspective on changing 
social relations.  A full appreciation of immigration, the Mexican Revolution, and 
Prohibition cannot be achieved without understanding the ongoing activities that defied 
authority at the local level.   
The analysis provided by this study compliments the work done by borderlands 
scholars Mario García and Oscar Martínez.  It reemphasizes the significance of El Paso 
and the surrounding area as an important locale for economic development, political 
activity, and social change.  Second, the periodization used in this study reflects the 
important changes that took place in the region and were highlighted by the various 
works by García and Martínez.  Lastly, this study underscores the interdependent nature 
of El Paso and Ciudad Juárez that is repeated in their works.  Although García and 
Martínez discuss events such as the Mexican Revolution and the impact of immigration 
and labor to the economy of the Southwest and northern Mexico, little attention is given 
to the militarization of the region.  This study supplements their work by focusing on the 
development of authority and militarization.  
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The long running process of militarization and conflict in the region provides 
another lens into the complexity of social and political relationships along the border.  An 
examination of each border institution underscores that unique and varied approaches 
were taken to incorporate and pacify the region.  In addition, the continued conflict 
associated with the militarization took on an ethnic and international nature.  As a result 
of this process, social relations between Anglos and Mexicans became far more complex 
and varied across time and circumstance.    
The case studies discussed here demonstrate that an intensified and militarized 
context supplied by socio-economic change, policy, and conflict deepened divisions 
between Anglos and Mexicans in West Texas.  The coupling of an intense time period and 
militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border helped define racial and ethnic relations.  
Moreover, the incorporation of Mexicans during times of crisis and reinforced 
militarization was complicated as events such as the Mexican Revolution increased 
political and criminal activity and national security issues became a concern for the 
United States.  The difficulty in establishing an effective authority consequently defined 
Mexicans as a subject “other.”  Each institution of authority and vigilante group discussed 
in this study reinforced and deepened divisions between Anglos and Mexicans in West 
Texas.  Scholars, such as David Montejano, have argued that changes in the economic 
and political structure in Texas molded race relations between Anglos and Mexicans.314  
However, by peering into a narrow lens of individual authority figures entrusted with the 
                                                 
314 Ibid. 
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responsibility of enforcing policies and castigation we are able to understand how 
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